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This thesis examines the law’s response to defective transfers and other misapplications of 
assets and argues that the present variety of responses is unprincipled and fails to treat like cases alike.
Sometimes, when A mistakenly transfers property to B, the law says that, because of the 
mistake, A ’s legal title to that property never left him. At other times the law says that legal title did 
pass to the recipient but that the mistake leads to a new equitable title to the property arising in A’s 
favour. And at other times, the law says that A relinquishes all title to the property but has instead a 
personal claim against the recipient for recovery of the value o f the property mistakenly transferred. 
These differences matter because they affect issues such as the measure and form of recovery, the 
impact of B ’s insolvency, and the availability of defences. Yet in all such cases the claimant’s 
complaint seems to be the same: the asset was mine to dispose o f and I did not consent to its passing to 
the defendant.
If all these cases are concerned with the same question, they should all receive the same 
answer. Accordingly a new, uniform approach, consistent with the principles underlying such claims, 
will be put forward. This will then point the way to a clearer understanding of certain issues of a more 
fundamental nature, such as the organisation and structure of private law, the use of concepts in legal 
theory and reasoning, and the distinction between property and obligations.
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It has been said that, “[t]he relationship between the law of property and the law of unjust 
enrichment/restitution has long been regarded as fiendishly complex and problematic. Indeed one can 
regard it as the last great unsolved mystery for those working in the law of restitution.”1 The 
parameters of property, restitution and unjust enrichment are themselves uncertain, and it is plain that 
they may interrelate, and have been regarded as interrelating in a number of different ways and in a 
variety o f contexts. This thesis focuses on just one of these; the law’s handling of defective transfers 
and other misapplications of assets.
Sometimes we give away our assets by mistake. At other times, they are taken from us without 
our knowledge. Occasionally, we may be forced to part with them as a result of another’s illegitimate 
pressure. In all these cases, we can say that our consent to the asset leaving our hands was, at best, 
flawed, if not entirely absent. And in all these cases, the law gives us a claim against the person who 
received or took the asset from us. Why?
This thesis is, in the first instance, an examination o f the principles which underlie and support 
claims in these instances. At present, the law offers an array of diverse responses. So, if I transfer an 
asset to you by mistake, the claims then available to me vary depending on the type of asset involved 
and the nature of my mistake. Sometimes I can recover the asset itself, at other times only its monetary 
value. Sometimes my claim will have priority in the event of your insolvency, but sometimes it will 
not. At times the fact that you were unaware that my consent to the transfer was flawed and that you 
either paid for it or have since changed your position in the belief that it is now yours provides you with 
a defence, but at other times it does not.
These differences in treatment can be supported only if  they reflect genuine, material 
differences between the cases. Certainly this appears to be the view of the courts and the vast majority 
of academic writers. These various, alternative responses have been matched by a multiplicity of 
concepts and devices that have been employed to present and account for such claims, and which seek 
to validate their substantive differences. So, we see these claims allocated variously between the law of 
property, o f torts, trusts, quasi-contract, restitution and unjust enrichment, though without any 
consensus as to which of these labels are appropriate and when they are to be applied.
1 A. Burrows, “Proprietary Restitution: Unmasking Unjust Enrichment” (2001)117 L.Q.R 412,atp.412. Seetoo 
P. Millett, “Review of A. Burrows, The Law o f Restitution” (1995) 111 L.Q.R 517, at p. 518.
8
I shall argue that this approach is wrong. If we look to the facts o f these cases, they can be seen 
to raise a common problem. And, since they all pose the same question, they should be given the same 
answer. At present, the law is failing to treat like cases alike, and failing to do justice. We need, 
therefore, to rethink how the law should respond to defective transfers and to devise a scheme which is 
coherent, principled and just. The main body of this thesis will be concerned with doing just this. 
Following an identification of the principles which are raised by these cases, we shall see how these can 
then be used to construct an alternative, uniform regime for their resolution.
First though, we need to show why a fresh approach is needed. It is easy to say that like cases 
should be treated alike, but how do we know when cases are, materially, alike and unalike? Without 
some basis or criterion for establishing likenesses, we cannot move beyond assertion. To answer this 
we must turn to an issue which become increasingly popular and prominent in private law scholarship 
over recent years -  classification.
Questions o f legal classification, or taxonomy, have been the focus o f much recent writing on 
the law of restitution and unjust enrichment. The reasons for this are plain. The credentials of a subject 
long neglected fell to be established and its place within private law marked out. Unjust enrichment 
and restitution had to be defined and distinguished from the law’s other organising concepts. This, in 
turn, required analysis o f how and why we should classify and order legal rules and claims. As such, 
the claim that unjust enrichment be accepted as identifying a distinct and discrete branch o f the law 
necessarily entailed a broader claim as to how the law should be arranged and presented.
The attention that unjust enrichment lawyers have given to classification has paid dividends. 
The claim that unjust enrichment ranks alongside contract and tort as one o f the central organising ideas 
within private law is widely viewed as uncontroversial (though, perhaps paradoxically, what exactly 
unjust enrichment describes remains contested). Moreover, there is evidence that this renewed focus on 
classification is now making its mark in others parts of private law.2 However, while the gains made by 
unjust enrichment scholarship are many, I shall suggest that the answers they have given to the central 
questions o f classification are wrong, and threaten to encourage just the sort of arbitrary and 
unprincipled distinctions which unjust enrichment lawyers have fought so hard to excise from the law. 
Though this has consequences throughout private law, it has a particular bearing on our understanding 
of the claims that follow defective transfers, for, importantly, though unjust enrichment scholarship has 
gone a long way to breaking down some of the divisions that the law previously drew in its analysis of 
such claims, it has served to entrench others. As such, it stands as an impediment to a principled and 
just system of law.
2 See, e.g., P. Birks, “The Concept of a Civil Wrong”, ch. 1 of D. Owen (ed.), The Philosophical Foundations of 
Tort Law (Clarendon Press, 1996); P. Birks, “Equity in the Modem Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy” (1996) 26 
University o f Western Australia L.R. 1; R. Chambers, “Constructive Trusts in Canada” (1999) 37 Alberta L.R. 
173; J. Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Properly (Hart Publishing, 2002); 
A. Pretto-Sakmann, The Boundaries o f Personal Property: Shares and Sub-Shares (Hart Publishing, 2005).
9
Only by making a fresh start and rejecting many of the assumptions on which much unjust 
enrichment scholarship is founded will we in fact succeed in treating like cases alike and doing justice. 
We shall now see why.
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Chapter 2
A false start: the rise o f unjust enrichment
Even before the recent growth in unjust enrichment scholarship, it had long been clear that 
the dominant and long-established legal categories of contract and tort failed to exhaust all instances 
of private law liability. Building on the work of Goff and Jones, Birks in An Introduction to the 
Law o f  Restitution1 argued that out of this miscellany there could be identified a class of cases 
sharing such common features as to justify their recognition as forming a third basic category of 
private law claims. The common feature of these cases was that the defendant came under a 
liability to give up an enrichment he had received to the claimant. As a common term for liability 
to give up gains, Birks adopted the term “restitution”. Importantly, however, Birks saw a problem 
in slotting restitution into the existing classificatory scheme of English law.
On the basis that legal rights are all responses to certain events in the world, different rights 
reflect different responses to different events. Accordingly, rights can be classified by reference to 
either the nature o f the response2 or the event to which they respond. Restitution describes a 
response, and so aligns with other responses such as compensation and punishment. However, to 
Birks, the dominant classification within English law was one based not on response but on 
causative events, that is, the events from which rights arise. For instance, he viewed the established 
categories of contract and tort as being event-based, in that the formation of a contract or the 
commission o f a tort was an event from which legal rights would arise. As such, there was a need 
to find a term to describe the causative event which gave rise to restitutionary claims, and which 
could then line up next to contract and tort in our classificatory scheme.
It is here that unjust enrichment came in. As restitution was the response consisting in 
causing a defendant to give up to the claimant an enrichment, it followed that, for there to be 
restitutionary liability, the defendant must have received an enrichment which, in the circumstances, 
the law requires to be given up to the claimant. Wherever an enrichment must be given up, it can be 
described as “unjust”. Wherever it is the claimant to whom the enrichment must be given up, we 
can say that the enrichment was “at the claimant’s expense”. As such, unjust enrichment, more 
fully unjust enrichment at the claimant’s expense, by a simple unpacking o f the notion of
1 P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law o f Restitution (Clarendon Press, rev. edn 1989).
2 Given Birks’ preference for event-based classification, I shall not examine classification by response, though 
here too I think there are serious problems, particularly in defining and grouping individual rights. These 
have been touched on by others: see, e.g., A. Tettenbom, “Misnomer -  A Response to Professor Birks”, ch. 2 
of W. Cornish, R. Nolan, J. O’Sullivan and G. Virgo (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Hart 
Publishing, 1998), at pp. 34-36.
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restitution, became the generic conception of the event which triggers the right to restitution.3 
Unjust enrichment was then, by definition, the event from which all instances of restitutionary 
liability arose.4 This then left a fourfold classification of the events from which rights arise: 
consent, wrongs, unjust enrichment and a residual miscellany.
This first conception of unjust enrichment was, however, soon revealed to be problematic, 
so much so that, despite widespread academic and judicial endorsement, it was subsequently 
rejected by Birks himself.
2.1 The problem of restitution for wrongs
For Birks, problems became apparent when one examined the cases conventionally grouped 
under the heading of restitution for wrongs.5 Such cases involve the defendant coming under an 
obligation to give up to the claimant a benefit he received. This being so, these are clearly cases of 
restitution and, applying the logic of the Introduction, also instances o f unjust enrichment. 
However, the circumstances (events) in these cases which require the enrichment received by the 
defendant to be given up to the claimant amount to, or at least involve, the commission of a wrong 
by the defendant against the claimant. Moreover, the claimant relies on these facts as constituting a 
wrong in order to establish his entitlement to the defendant’s gain.6 Because of this it can be said 
that the right to restitution arises from the wrong. This is problematic for Birks’ taxonomy as it 
suggests that such cases straddle the categories of wrongs and unjust enrichment. As the four basic 
classes of event are intended to be mutually exclusive, and moreover because this is necessary for 
the taxonomy to fulfil its purpose, something had to give. Professor Birks’ solution was to hold that 
cases o f restitution for wrongs were not cases of unjust enrichment. This in turn entailed the 
admission that there was no perfect quadration between restitution and unjust enrichment. The 
restitution for wrongs case law demonstrates that restitution is a response not only to the event 
unjust enrichment, as the Introduction had asserted, but to another class of events, namely wrongs.. 
Indeed Professor Birks went on to assert that rights to restitution can and do arise from all four of 
the basic categories of event. Restitution is therefore multi-causal. However, while this may
3 Birks, Introduction, supra, n. 21, pp. 16-18
4 Accordingly, there was, in Birks’ terminology, a perfect quadration between restitution and unjust 
enrichment.
5 For the full version of this argument see P. Birks, “Misnomer”, ch. 1 of W. Comish, R. Nolan, J. O’Sullivan 
and G. Virgo (eds.) Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Hart Publishing, 1998) and P. Birks, “Unjust 
Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment” (2001) 79 Texas L.R 1767.
6 This point is important in demonstrating that the existence of a wrong on the facts is not simply an example 
of alternative analysis, on which see Birks, “Misnomer”, supra n. 5 at pp. 8-9, and P. Birks, “The Law of 
Unjust Enrichment: A Millennial Resolution” [1999] Singapore Journal o f Legal Studies 318, at pp. 329-331.
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achieve the immediate goal of avoiding intersecting categories, it creates more fundamental 
problems down the line.
2.2 The nature of unjust enrichment
What then o f unjust enrichment? As we have seen, in the framework set down in the 
Introduction, unjust enrichment had a clear, if  rather inert, role. It was simply the generic term for 
any event which gave rise to a right to restitution. However, the admission of the multi-causality of 
restitutionary rights entails that this understanding of the meaning of unjust enrichment can no 
longer hold. We might, therefore, expect Birks to have offered a refined definition of unjust 
enrichment; one that clearly distinguishes it from other restitution-yielding events. However, the 
definition provided in his latter work is in much the same terms as that in the Introduction. “Unjust 
enrichment is a causative event. It is the event that consists in the receipt of an enrichment at the 
expense o f another in circumstances which call for that enrichment to be given up to that other.”7 
Birks himself admitted that such a definition naturally covers all restitution-generating events. 
Therefore, and in order to avoid unjust enrichment overlapping with the other categories of event, 
Birks asserted that the ambit of this definition must be artificially restricted. This is to be done by 
cutting out those cases in which the circumstances which call for the enrichment to be given up - the 
“unjust” element - amount to (and are relied on in their character as) one of the three other basic 
classes of event; consent, wrongs or others.8 With this restriction in place we now have what Birks 
referred to as the narrow meaning of unjust enrichment.
However, this means that, in relation to rights to restitution, we are left with two residual 
categories, defined in each case to catch what is left by the other three. The fourth category, 
miscellaneous other events, comprises those right-creating events left once manifestations of 
consent, wrongs and unjust enrichment are removed. Therefore,fit is necessary to know what falls 
within the first three categories before one can identify what makes up the fourth. When it comes to 
unjust enrichment, however, we are told that it consists in the event which generates rights to 
restitution and which is not a manifestation of consent, a wrong or some miscellaneous other event. 
So, to know what an unjust enrichment is, we must first know what falls within consent, wrongs and 
miscellaneous others. But as we have to be able to define unjust enrichment before we can say 
what falls within the category of miscellaneous others, it becomes impossible to identify which 
restitutionary rights arise from unjust enrichment. Once rights deriving from consent and wrongs 
are put to one side, we are left with a residual jumble of restitutionary claims which we know must
7 Birks, “A Millennial Resolution”, supra n. 5 at pp. 320.
8 Ibid., p. 328.
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be allotted either to the category o f unjust enrichment or to miscellaneous others. However, we are 
not told how this is to be done. Without more, we cannot say what an unjust enrichment is.
We might then look to the detail of Birks’ account to bring us nearer to understanding what 
this narrow conception of unjust enrichment comprises. As restitution means the giving up o f a 
gain made at the claimant’s expense, restitutionary rights arising under each o f the four basic 
categories of event will differ from one another on two related grounds. Firstly, the circumstances 
which lead to the conclusion that the enrichment cannot be retained, and hence the reason(s) why it 
must be given up, (in the terms of the Introduction, what it is that makes the enrichment “unjust”) 
will differ as we move from one category to another. Secondly, the categories will also differ from 
one another in respect o f the way in which the claimant can mark himself out as having an 
entitlement to the gain in the defendant’s hands; in other words the sense in which it can be said that 
the enrichment was made at the claimant’s expense. It may therefore be thought that an insight into 
what distinguishes unjust enrichment from the other categories o f events may be offered by the 
division drawn by Birks in the Introduction between unjust enrichment by wrongdoing and unjust 
enrichment by subtraction,9 as this impacts on both these issues. However, this fails to bring us any 
closer to an answer. For, while unjust enrichment by wrongdoing clearly maps onto the class of 
restitutionary rights arising from wrongs, it is not true to say that unjust enrichment by subtraction 
covers the same ground as that occupied by the narrow conception of unjust enrichment in Birks’ 
modified framework. As Birks pointed out, restitutionary rights arising under any of the four 
categories o f event can concern subtractive enrichments. In particular, restitutionary rights falling 
within the category of miscellaneous other events may involve enrichment by subtraction from the 
claimant.10 Moreover, Birks at one point suggested that the new definition of unjust enrichment 
may extend beyond subtractive unjust enrichments and hence is capable of encompassing instances 
of restitutionary liability which do not effect a return of the enrichment whence it came.11 So, we 
cannot even say with certainty that rights to restitution falling within the category unjust enrichment 
share a common denominator in relation to the source of the enrichment.12
9 See Birks, Introduction, supra n. 1, pp. 23-25 and 40-44.
10 The clearest example of this is the right to the specific transfer of an asset following a successful vindicatio, 
on which see infra, text to nn. 14-15.
11 Birks, “A Millennial Resolution”, supra n. 6, p. 324.
12 Birks, however, latterly maintained that the “at the expense o f ’ element of unjust enrichment claims 
translates as “from”, so that the enrichment is always, in some sense, subtractive, although “from” and 
“subtraction” are capable of being interpreted more or less broadly: see P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment 
(Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2005), pp. 74-98. This would mean that, while we would be no closer to being able 
to classify restitutionary claims arising from enrichments which could be said to be subtractive, we would 
know that, where the enrichment can in no sense be viewed as deriving from the claimant (for example, the 
receipt of income on which tax must be paid to the Inland Revenue), it must fall outside unjust enrichment. 
Birks comes to this conclusion by reasoning that, once enrichment by doing wrong to the claimant is 
excluded, the only remaining possible meaning of “at the expense o f’ is the subtractive sense: ibid. p. 74. 
This is not correct. The “at the expense o f’ element of the claim is designed to establish a sufficient
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Birks provided a number of examples of restitutionary liability which he saw as falling 
within the class o f miscellaneous other events.13 For the most part, however, Birks either simply 
asserted, without explanation, that the event in question is not an unjust enrichment or admitted the 
difficulty of determining whether a given right arises from an unjust enrichment or some other 
event, but without offering guidance as to how this determination could be made. This provides 
little assistance in locating the divide between such other restitution-yielding events and unjust 
enrichment for the very reason that it is possible to define any event which gives rise to a right to 
restitution as an unjust enrichment. Indeed, as we have seen, Birks himself took this approach in 
the Introduction. And, although we know that Birks went on to reject this conception of unjust 
enrichment, we still need some criterion by which we can separate those restitutionary rights which 
can properly be said to arise from unjust enrichment from those that do not. Without this, the bare 
assertion that a particular restitution-yielding event is not an unjust enrichment rather prompts the 
response, “Really? How do you know?”
The closest Professor Birks came to providing such a criterion comes in his analysis of the 
right to demand the specific transfer of an asset following a successful vindication  Having argued 
that such a right is restitutionary, he then discusses the event from which this right arose. Consent 
and wrongs are quickly discounted, leaving a choice between unjust enrichment and miscellaneous 
others. O f these, Birks preferred placing the right in the category other events, defining the 
causative event as receipt o f an asset belonging (in equity) to another. This is on the basis that, 
were we to view the event as an unjust enrichment, it would entail that such a right, and hence the 
vindicatio which it underpins, would be subject to the defence of change o f position. This was seen 
by Birks as entailing an undesirable weakening of property rights and to be avoided. From this, 
therefore, it could be suggested that the hallmark of restitutionary rights arising from unjust 
enrichment is that they are subject to the change of position defence. This would then provide a 
basis for distinguishing unjust enrichment from the miscellany of other events from which rights to 
restitution arise. But this is effectively to abandon, at this point, the taxonomic scheme whereby 
rights are classified by virtue of the events from which they arise. Rather than looking to the event 
itself, that is, the factual circumstances of the case, as providing the basis for distinguishing unjust 
enrichment from events in the miscellaneous class, we are looking to (one aspect of) the law’s
connection between the claimant and the gain received by the defendant (ibid. pp. 73-74). This connection is 
necessarily made out whenever a restitutionary claim exists. Hence, as restitutionary claims extend to some 
enrichments which are neither subtractive nor acquired through wrongdoing, the “at the expense o f’ 
requirement must also be capable of bearing meanings other than “by subtraction from” and “by doing wrong 
to”. If we are to limit it to the subtractive sense we need further justification.
13 See Birks, “A Millennial Resolution”, supra n. 6, pp. 326 and 328; Birks, “Unjust Enrichment and 
Wrongful Enrichment”, supra n. 5, pp. 1775-1776.
14 Birks, “Misnomer”, supra n. 5 at 21-26; P. Birks, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths” 
[1997] N.Z. Law Review 623, at pp. 656-658.
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response to make this distinction. So, as regards restitutionary rights, in place of the fourfold 
categorisation of consent, wrongs, unjust enrichment and others, we would in substance be left with 
consent, wrongs, other events creating rights to restitution which are subject to the change of 
position defence, and other events creating rights to restitution which are not subject to the change 
of position defence. There is no indication that Birks intended this. Indeed, it is the replacement of 
a response-based category, restitution, which has drove Birks’ later work. But, if this too provides 
no basis for locating the divide between unjust enrichment and the miscellany o f other events which 
can lead to restitution, we are still left none the wiser as to what unjust enrichment is.15
2.3 Restitution for wrongs and unjust enrichment by wrongdoing
Thus far, the focus has been the problems in drawing the boundary between unjust 
enrichment and the category o f miscellaneous other events. However, difficulties in Professor 
Birks’ taxonomic scheme also emerge in relation to the divide between unjust enrichment and 
wrongs. This involves returning to the area of law known as restitution for wrongs.
Birks’ position has been summarised already.16 This must now be elaborated. Whereas 
Professor Birks originally saw these as instances of unjust enrichment, with the claimant satisfying 
the “at the expense o f ’ requirement by demonstrating that the defendant acquired the gain by 
breaching a duty owed to the claimant, he latterly argued that in such cases the causative event is 
the wrong itself. For Birks the conclusive factor was that in such cases the claimant can only make 
out an entitlement to the defendant’s gain by characterising the circumstances in which the gain was 
made as involving a breach of duty, or, in other words, the commission of a wrong. And if the
15 There are other problems with this analysis of the right to demand an asset’s transfer following a vindicatio. 
As we have seen, Birks maintained that the causal event in such cases cannot be unjust enrichment as this 
would entail the availability of the change of position defence. This assumes that the all restitutionary rights 
arising from unjust enrichment are subject to the defence and that this is not true of restitutionary rights which 
fall within the miscellaneous others category. This is not verified by authority, as the courts have yet to 
accept the multi-causalist thesis that says unjust enrichment and restitution cover different ground, and Birks 
does not provide any arguments of principle or policy in support. Indeed, Birks had previously suggested that 
there may, albeit exceptionally, be rights arising from unjust enrichment which are not subject to the change 
of position defence: see P. Birks, “The Law of Restitution at the End of an Epoch” (1999) 28 University o f 
Western Australia Law Review 1, at p. 60. Latterly Birks offered a new argument in support of the view that 
the right to demand an asset’s transfer pursuant to a vindicatio does not arise from unjust enrichment, see 
Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra n. 12, pp. 27 and 64-65. Birks argued that, by relying on his subsisting title 
to the asset, the claimant cannot be alleging that the defendant has been enriched by receipt of the asset, and 
hence his claim cannot be viewed as one arising from unjust enrichment. This does not help to draw the line 
between unjust enrichment and miscellaneous other restitution-yielding events as denying enrichment must 
also involve denying that liability is restitutionary. Restitution is gain-based recovery. One cannot have gain- 
based recovery without the existence of any gain.
16 Supra, text to nn. 5-6.
16
claimant is relying on the facts as constituting a breach of duty in order to make his claim to the 
gain, it must be that the event from which the right arises is the wrong.
However, this conclusion does not follow from the premiss. The fact that the claimant 
relies on the facts as involving the commission of a wrong does not entail that the causative event 
from which the ensuing right to recover the defendant’s gain arises must be viewed as the wrong. 
Birks’ argument, as stated, relies on an assumption that, while a given set of facts may be capable of 
alternative analysis, that is, the facts can be conceived differently so as to reveal alternative claims 
arising from different causative events, any single conception o f these events can reveal just one 
causative event. That is to say, where the claimant relies on the events as constituting a wrong, as 
in the restitution for wrongs cases, the causative event can only be the wrong, necessarily 
precluding the identification of some other causative event, such as an unjust enrichment. But this 
assumption is unfounded. Consider claims for breach of contract. These fall within the category of 
wrongs in Birks’ taxonomy as they clearly arise form the commission of a breach of duty. And yet 
a breach of contract necessarily entails that a contract has been entered into by the parties, and 
contract formation is an example of an event falling within the consent category. Therefore, where 
a claimant seeks to bring a breach of contract claim he must not only assert that the facts reveal a 
wrong by the defendant but also that they reveal a manifestation o f consent. Indeed it is only this 
prior manifestation of consent, entry into the contract, which allows us to characterise the facts as 
involving a wrong. The fact that the claimant in a breach of contract claim relies on the facts as 
revealing an example o f the causative event of consent does not entail that his claim must be 
allotted to the consent category. Accordingly, it does not follow from the fact that restitution for 
wrongs cases involve the claimant asserting the commission o f a wrong that his claim must arise 
from that wrong and not an unjust enrichment.
Indeed, restitution for wrongs is susceptible to a similar analysis to breach of contract. We 
could say that when a defendant makes a gain by committing a breach of duty, this gain can be 
viewed as an unjust enrichment while at the same time acknowledging that the claimant is relying 
on the facts as revealing a wrong. Moreover, just as it is the manifestation of consent which makes 
the defendant’s conduct wrongful in the breach of contract example, so here it is the defendant’s 
breach o f duty which makes his receipt of the benefit “unjust”, and hence an unjust enrichment. 
Such an analysis is possible because the facts necessary to establish the right to restitution extend 
beyond the mere commission of the wrong. In addition to proving the wrong, the claimant must 
also show that the defendant received a benefit through his breach of duty. This allows us to say
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that the claimant is relying on the facts in their characterisation as a wrong and yet still maintain 
that the causative event is an unjust enrichment.17
I do not intend to take this competing analysis of the place of restitution for wrongs in the 
event-based taxonomic scheme any further. As I shall argue later, there are indeed good reasons for 
treating such cases differently from other instances of restitutionary liability. What I am 
questioning is whether an event-based taxonomy gets us there. Through this discussion of 
restitution for wrongs, I hope to show that, even where there is agreement as to the facts which must 
be proved to make out the claim, and as to how those facts are to be characterised, there may still be 
no clear answer to the question of how we should class the right. We could say, like Birks, that 
restitution for wrongs cases are instances of rights arising from, and to be placed in the category of, 
wrongs. But we could just as well say that these are instances of unjust enrichment, without leaving 
us with intersecting or overlapping categories. Where we draw the lines between the categories of 
events, and which o f the multitude of facts or events, which must all be established to make out the 
claim, should be regarded as the causative event are matters of choice. Such choices have to be 
made before we can know into which category each right falls, and moreover these choices must be 
justified if the chosen classification is not to appear arbitrary. It is clear that in relation to restitution 
for wrongs, and elsewhere, that Birks made such choices. He clearly took the view that restitution 
for wrongs cases belong under the wrongs heading and that unjust enrichment is to be defined so as 
to exclude such cases. What is missing is any justification of why this version of an event-based 
taxonomy is preferable to any other which similarly avoids overlapping or intersecting categories 
and is not otherwise ‘bent’.18
That Birks’ taxonomy is dependant upon a series of choices, of value judgments, is 
obscured by his presentation of the scheme as being essentially neutral. Nowhere did Professor 
Birks suggest that the placement o f given rights in the scheme, or indeed the catalogue of categories
17 Just as, in breach of contract claims, the claimant must establish both that he entered into a contract with the 
defendant and that the defendant breached his duty, thereby permitting us to say both that the breach of 
contract was a wrong and that the formation of the contract was an event falling within the consent class. The 
opposing analysis presented in the text would suggest additional changes to Birks’ taxonomic scheme, beyond 
a realignment of the wrongs and unjust enrichment categories. In particular, seeing the gain made by the 
defendant as an event “beyond” the wrong, and which therefore takes the claim out of wrongs and into unjust 
enrichment, would also support the view that, in relation to claims for compensatory damages, the loss 
suffered by a claimant from a wrong should be seen as a separate and additional causative event beyond the 
wrong. This would involve the recognition of a new category of “compensable loss” or the like. This would 
leave wrongs to cover those cases where the wrong is actionable without an allegation of loss (or for that 
matter gain to the defendant) and no such allegation is made.
18 Though see Birks, “Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment”, supra n. 5, pp. 1783-1793, where Birks 
offers five “down-to-earth reasons” for separating wrongful enrichment (restitution for wrongs) from unjust 
enrichment. However, for the most part, these seem to be consequences which would follow from such a 
separation being made, without providing independent justifications for making the division in the first place. 
Conversely, see A. Burrows, “Quadrating Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: A Matter of Principle?” [2000] 
R.L.R. 257, especially at pp. 261-268, for a list of practical advantages gained by grouping together all 
restitutionary rights.
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which form the basis o f the taxonomy, are matters of choice. He acknowledged that choices can be 
made as to the basis o f the taxonomy, hence one could choose to class rights by the goals they seek 
to achieve rather than the events from which they arise, but, once this is done, there was a tendency 
to present all further questions as answered by the initial choice o f taxonomic basis. This was 
reinforced by Birks’ frequent analogies to classification in the natural sciences. We are encouraged 
to believe that task o f allotting legal rights to different categories of event is equivalent to that 
facing a scientist who is to classify animals by virtue of what they eat. But, while the latter appears 
to involve little more than careful observation of the natural world, the task o f the legal categorist 
extends beyond mere observation of the legal world, that is, what is said and done by the courts and 
the legislature. This is because, once the combination o f facts which must be ascertained to 
establish the existence of each individual legal right is identified,19 choices remain as to which of 
these multifarious combinations of facts should be regarded as analytically similar and hence 
suitable for collective categorisation, in other words we must decide which cases are to be grouped 
together. These are the choices which will determine the nature and scope of the categories which 
make up the classificatory scheme. However, once it is admitted that, to complete the taxonomic 
project, we must move beyond simple identification of the series o f facts which lie behind 
individual legal rights and instead go on to ask which factual combinations should be grouped 
together, and so treated alike, and which should not, it becomes clear that the true basis of the 
resulting taxonomy is not the events from which rights may be said to arise but the criteria we use 
to answer the prior question as to the make up of the particular categories. These points will be 
expanded below.
2.4 The goal of legal taxonomy
To evaluate Birks’ taxonomy we must first ask what the goal o f legal taxonomy is. We 
cannot measure the success of a taxonomic scheme before we know what it is that it seeks to 
achieve. Professor Birks himself frequently made the case for the importance of taxonomy in the 
law, arguing that it promoted goods as diverse as allowing people to plan their affairs with 
confidence, impeding certain forms of oppression and the separation o f powers.20 However, I
19 By no means a simple task in itself. In relation to the law of restitution, there is considerable disagreement 
as to whether certain cases are instances of restitutionary liability at all, that is to say, whether the 
identification of a gain received by the defendant is necessary to make out the claim. Examples include the 
anticipated or incomplete contract cases, such as William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd. v. Davis [1957] 1 W.L.R. 
932, and the loss of opportunity to bargain or “use claim” cases, exemplified by Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. 
Parkside Homes Ltd. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798.
20 See P. Birks, “Equity in the Modem Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy” (1996) 26 University o f Western 
Australia Law Review 1, especially at pp. 1-4 and 97-99, and P. Birks, “Definition and Division: A Meditation
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suggest that the overriding goal of a taxonomy of legal rights is the promotion of justice. Justice 
can only be done if like cases are treated alike, and legal classification seeks to tell us when cases 
are materially alike and so call for like treatment. Justice demands that the law be rational, coherent 
and consistent. Taxonomy helps us to achieve this.21
Therefore, the key question to which one attempting to draw up a taxonomy of legal rights 
must offer an answer is how do we determine when rights are materially alike. Like cases must be 
treated alike, yet rights may be similar or differ in any number of ways. We need to know which 
similarities and differences matter. Only then can we say which cases should be treated alike and 
hence should be grouped together in the classificatory scheme.
Indications as to how this question should be answered can o f course be obtained by 
looking at what the courts do and what they say they are doing, what cases they do treat alike, what 
cases they say are alike. Indeed, one could hardly produce any taxonomy of the law without paying 
the utmost attention to all the legal material. But it is clear too that the enquiry must extend beyond 
this. If the history of the law of restitution has told us anything, it has told us that we must be 
prepared on occasion to look beyond the wording of a judgment to understand what a case is about. 
Without this we would still be talking in terms of quasi-contract, waiver of tort and the like. 
Furthermore, one object of legal classification is to show where the law has fallen into incoherence 
and contradiction. This cannot be done if our classificatory scheme blindly accepts every judicial 
utterance. So, the legal categorist must ultimately answer the key question himself. Professor 
Birks, by choosing to classify legal rights by causative event, by the event from which the right 
arises, gave his answer. Cases are materially alike when the rights involved arise from materially 
similar events.22
We are now in a position to assess Birks’ taxonomy. This assessment will be in two stages. 
Firstly, we must examine the construction of the taxonomic scheme. Once the decision is taken to
on Institutes 3.13”, ch. 1 of P. Birks (ed), The Classification o f Obligations (Oxford University Press, 1997). 
Useful discussion of the goals of legal taxonomy can also be found in E. McKendrick, “Taxonomy: Does it 
Matter?”, ch. 22 of D. Johnston and R. Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2002), especially at pp. 632-638, and S. Smith, 
“Taking Law Seriously” (2000) 50 University o f Toronto L.J. 241.
21 That Professor Birks sees this as the principal purpose of legal taxonomy seems clear: see the references 
supra n. 20. It is arguable that the other goals of legal taxonomy referred to in the text only require that the 
law is clear and consistently applied, and not that the content of the law is free of inconsistency and 
arbitrariness, though it may very well be that clarity and consistency in the application of the law is facilitated 
by rationality and consistency in the law itself.
22 Though it must be noted that Birks never asked the question in those terms. Instead, he tended to discuss 
the issue of the basis of legal classification in the context of a competition between event-based and response- 
based categories. His reasons for preferring classification by causative event have varied. At one point Birks 
suggested that response-based classification was “less enlightening” as legal responses always have to be 
related back to the events from which they arise: see P. Birks, “Definition and Division”, supra n. 20, pp. 27- 
32. Latterly, Birks’ preference for an event-based taxonomy seemed to be grounded more in convention, the 
established categories of contract and tort being, in Birks’ view, event-based: see Birks, “A Millennial 
Resolution”, supra n. 6, pp. 320-322, and Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra n. 12, pp. 20-28.
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classify rights by causative event, how do we then go about filling in the gaps, arranging the legal 
material on the chosen basis? This involves asking how we identify the causative event of 
individual rights and, having answered this, how we then form the generic categories of causative 
event to complete the structure of the scheme. Secondly, with the taxonomic scheme in place, we 
must ask whether it achieves its purpose; does it treat like cases alike?
2.5 Determining the causative event
For a given legal claim or right to come into existence, a series on individual facts (or 
events) will have to occur. Each of these individual facts is necessary for the establishment of the 
right.23 A taxonomy which classes right by causative event therefore presupposes that, from this 
series o f necessary yet distinct facts, we can identify one which can be regarded as the causative 
event.24 The other facts would accordingly be considered to be in some sense ancillary, or as 
merely forming part of the background, to the “true” causative event. The key question though is 
how this is to be done.
Take the right o f a contracting party to compensatory damages from a defendant for losses 
caused by the latter’s breach of contract. This right may plausibly be said to depend on the 
following facts and circumstances having occurred or being present: each contracting party having 
achieved majority (hence acquiring the capacity to enter into the contract); contract formation, 
which itself can be broken down into offer, acceptance and the provision of consideration; 
satisfaction of any formality requirements; breach o f contract; and loss to the claimant resulting 
from the breach.25 Which of these is the causative event? The immediate problem is that they can 
all be said to be causative events, in that each one must be present if  the claimant is to succeed in 
making out his claim. If any one is absent, then the claimant will have no such right, and, as such, 
each event is a cause of the right’s existence. Moreover, as each is a necessary, yet none a 
sufficient, condition for the existence of the right, it cannot be said that any one of these events is
23 See too W. N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (W. W. Cook (ed.), Yale University Press, 1923), 
pp. 32-33.
24 It may be that “event” is broader than “fact” in that an event may consist in more than one fact. This will 
depend in part on what can be said to constitute a single fact. If events are interpreted as being thus broader, 
then the causative event may be identified in the occurrence of more than one fact. The substance of the 
argument presented in the text does not turn on the answer to such questions.
25 Indeed, this list of events may presuppose too much as it describes such events in legal terms. Contract 
formation, for example, is not an event in the world as much as the law’s reaction to or interpretation of an 
event (or series of events), the event being, in the case of a bilateral contract, an exchange of promises. It may 
well be that, if an event-based taxonomy is to fulfil its purpose of treating like cases alike, we should describe 
events in non-legal terms, so as not to beg the question of whether the law is correct so to analyse them, see 
supra, text to nn. 21-22.
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more causally important than the others. So looking to causation alone will not tell us which event 
is the causative event for the purposes of the event-based taxonomy.
An alternative approach would be to say that the causative event is the final event in the 
series o f necessary factual occurrences. This could be supported on the basis that the right can be 
said to come into existence only when this final piece of the jigsaw is in place, and hence that this is 
event which most immediately triggers the right. However, it is clear that this is not the criterion 
applied by Birks when identifying causative events. For example, Birks regards the making o f a 
will as a causative event falling within the manifestations o f consent category. Yet the intended 
legatee does not acquire a right to the bequeathed asset upon the execution of valid will. More 
needs to happen. The series of necessary events is still incomplete. The will itself will not take 
effect until the death of the testator, and even then property will not vest in the legatee until 
distributed by the executor. Taking the approach that it is the last in the series which constitutes the 
causative event, this would mean that it is the delivery o f the asset to the legatee, rather than the 
making o f the will, which is the causative event here. On this basis, the execution of a will cannot 
be viewed as a causative event. Similarly, this approach would entail that the causative event would 
often be the fulfilment of a formality or registration requirement.26 Such results appear counter­
intuitive and the utility o f a taxonomy which leads to such consequences is highly questionable.27 It 
would also look very different to the version of an event-based taxonomy proposed by Birks. 
Furthermore, the last in the series of events only has the effect of triggering the right because the 
other necessary factual elements are already in place. There is, accordingly, no reason for viewing 
the last event in the series as any more significant for the existence o f the right than those occurring 
earlier in the chain. We simply cannot avoid the fact that each event in the series is necessary, and 
hence equally causally significant. If we are to pick out one from the series as constituting the 
causative event, we must resort to some external set of criteria; external, that is, to the task of 
ascertaining the necessary factual elements for a given right’s existence, to provide us with a basis 
for making this identification. What the identification and application of such criteria means for a 
taxonomic scheme with seeks to classify by causative event will be discussed following the next 
section.
26 At least where the formality requirement is fulfilled after all other elements of the relevant transaction have 
been completed, for example, where a transaction must be evidenced in writing and that written evidence can 
be provided at a later date, such as in relation to declarations of trust in respect of land in s. 53(1 )(b) of the 
Law of Property Act 1925, or where a transfer of title is perfected only upon registration.
27 The reasons for this will be examined below, infra text to n. 35.
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2.6 Form ing the categories
As we have seen, the construction of an events-based taxonomy, such as that proposed by 
Birks, requires more than the identification of the causative event from which each legal right 
arises. It also entails that, from the multiplicity of right-generating events, we can form groupings 
of such events on the basis that they are of the same kind, that they are all particularised examples 
o f the same generic event. Only once this is done will the taxonomic scheme take shape. These 
groups give us the categories which provide the basic structure of the scheme. Thus Birks views all 
right-generating events as reducible to four basic categories, three nominate - consent, wrongs and 
unjust enrichment -  and a residual miscellany. How then is this list of generic event descriptions, 
which is to form the basis for the taxonomy, decided upon?
The problem is that events in the world do not come neatly packaged into pre-established 
categories. We have to do this ourselves. But how do we know whether a mistaken payment is an 
event materially similar to the transfer of an asset made under compulsion or the payment of a tax 
not lawfully demanded? We can o f course draw up a generic description of an event so as to cover 
them all, but the question is not whether we could do this but whether we should. To say that they 
are like events simply because the law treats them the same way, as each gives rise to restitutionary 
liability, is to replace our event-based taxonomy with one arranged by response, and begs the 
question whether this is the correct treatment of such cases in the first place. Is the voluntary but 
innocent receipt of another’s goods, transferred without that person’s authority, materially similar to 
a deliberate punch on the nose? It may well be that English law sees both cases as involving the 
commission o f a breach of duty, but, again, to treat this as determinative looks like reverting to 
classification by (one aspect of) the law’s response to the event Is it right to treat them both as 
wrongs?28
As with the decision as to the identification of a right’s causative event, we can do this only 
by applying some external set of criteria which tell us which events should be treated as materially 
similar and hence suitable for grouping together. Does it matter that the benefit received by the 
defendant took the form of a service rather than a payment? We can look at the facts as long and 
hard as we like but this will not tell us whether this is a difference that matters.29 Once again, the 
events-based taxonomy comes up short. It requires supplementation before it can tell us what we 
want to know. It is clear that Birks had an answer to the question what causative events are 
materially alike, since he gave us his four generic categories. But, as with the identification of
28 On the nature of innocent conversion see Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Co. (nos. 4 and 5) 
[2002] 2 W.L.R. 1153, at pp. 1174-1176, per Lord Nicholls.
29 This is demonstrated by the fact that other restitution scholars, who appear to share Birks commitment to 
classification by causative event, have come up with different categories of causative event: see R. Grantham 
and C. Rickett, Enrichment and Restitution in New Zealand (Hart Publishing, 2000), pp. 43-50.
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causative events, what is missing is any explanation or justification of this answer. There is no 
discussion of why Birks’ view of materiality should be preferred to alternative conceptions. Indeed 
there is no explicit indication that there is a question to be answered here. The notion of materiality 
is treated as self-evident. We are left to second-guess what criteria Birks was applying to determine 
materiality from the answers he arrives at. Even then we would be left to look elsewhere for 
arguments in support o f his position.
2.7 The deficiencies of an event-based taxonomy
The preceding two sections have shown how a taxonomy which aims to class legal rights 
by causative event requires answers to two fundamental and necessarily prior questions. Firstly, 
how do we identify the events which are properly regarded as causative o f individual legal rights? 
Secondly, how do we determine which of these should be grouped together on the basis that they 
are simply particularised instances of a single, more general, causative event, so forming the 
categories within the classification? Without answers to these questions we cannot begin to 
construct the taxonomic scheme, and yet in Birks’ analysis such questions are largely unanswered 
and there fundamentality unacknowledged. Our answers will determine the shape of the 
classificatory scheme. However, as we have seen, these questions can be, and have been, answered 
in different ways, and such differences will necessarily lead to differences in the arrangement o f the 
resulting scheme. How then are we to proceed?
The key must be to return to the purpose o f classification. If our concern is with treating 
like cases alike we need to answer these questions in such a way that like cases will be grouped 
together and unalike cases kept apart. All then turns on how we determine when cases are alike. 
This question will be examined in due course, but before then it should be noted that, however we 
answer it, we are now rejecting the premises of the event-based taxonomy. This purports to classify 
rights by causative event; that is to say, it is the notion of causative events which tells us how cases 
are properly categorised and so when they are materially alike or unalike. However, we have now 
seen that the structure of the scheme and the place of individual rights within it is dictated by the 
two fundamental preliminary questions of how to identify and classify such events, or, more 
precisely, the shape of the scheme is determined by the criteria, the considerations, we apply in 
coming to these answers. We are no longer looking to causative events to tell us when cases are 
materially alike. Rather we are asking if cases are materially alike in order to determine what the 
causative event is and what such events can be grouped together as individual instances of some 
broader generic causative event.
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As causative events can be identified and categorised differently, we need some grounds, 
some set of criteria, to determine which method of identification and categorisation is preferable. 
Yet, once we do this it is these criteria which form the basis o f our classificatory scheme. We may 
still choose to use the notion of causative events to mediate our presentation of what cases are 
materially alike, but this can only obscure the fact that it is not causative events that determine the 
structure of the scheme but a prior decision, founded on unspoken factors, as to which cases should 
be treated alike. So it may be that cases are materially alike when the rights concerned arise from 
events which are materially alike, but this is not because it follows from the similarity in causative 
event that the cases call for like treatment. Rather it follows from the prior conclusion that the cases 
should be treated alike that the relevant causative events are to be viewed as materially alike.
The conclusion then is that, if we want our taxonomic scheme to treat like cases alike, we 
must abandon the project of classifying legal rights by causative event. We simply cannot answer 
the questions that need to be answered in order to build an event-based taxonomy without first 
deciding which cases we want to treat as alike. And, once we have these answers, an event-based 
taxonomy serves no purpose. It serves only to obscure why it is that we view these cases as 
deserving like treatment. Wo would be better served bringing out into the open the criteria we 
apply in making these decisions in the first place and using these as the basis of our taxonomy. 
What these criteria may be and how a taxonomy based around them may look will be examined 
below.
Before then it is worthwhile to examine more closely the premiss of Birks’ taxonomic 
scheme, that rights arise from, are caused by, events in the world. Here too I think the event-based 
taxonomy can be seen to be flawed, and, again, analysis of these shortcomings will show us the way 
to an improved method of classification and a better understanding of legal rights.
2.8 The relationship between rights and events
The preceding sections alone tell us that the project of classifying legal rights by causative 
event is destined for failure and so should be abandoned. It may also be, however, that the event- 
based taxonomy is premised on a misconception as to the nature of the relationship between legal 
rights and events.
Legal rules, norms, state the consequences in law of factual occurrences, or events. When 
things happen, when events occur, legal rules tell us what significance, if  any, they have in law. 
Thus perhaps the key legal question, at least for judges, academics and students, is what legal 
consequences do and should flow from - and hence how the legal positions of the parties involved 
are and should be changed by - the occurrence of such factual events. It is this reality which may be
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regarded as providing the foundation to the events-based taxonomic scheme constructed by Birks. 
He sought to classify legal rights, that is, rights arising from the application of legal rules, by 
reference to the factual situations which give rise to them. As such, it is clear that by “event”, Birks 
did indeed mean factual occurrence or event “in the world”. Grantham and Rickett have, however, 
argued that, while the notion of causative events provides the correct basis for the classification of 
private law, “events” should be understood not as factual occurrences but as legal constructs.30
This, rather odd, claim is not always clearly spelt out. At times, Grantham and Rickett’s 
criticism of Birks’ use of “event” appears simply to be that Birks misdescribed the relevant factual 
occurrence(s) lying behind the recognition of particular legal rights. For example, they challenge 
Birks’ view that contractual rights arise from the event of agreement on the basis that contract law 
clearly tells us that agreement alone is not enough for contractual rights to arise; in addition there 
must, at the very least, be consideration and an intention to create legal relations.31 This is, of 
course, true, but it says nothing which requires a rejection of Birks’ understanding of events as 
factual occurrences.32 At other points, however, it is apparent that Grantham and Rickett see their 
argument as going further than this. They state that “[pjhysical events in and of themselves have no 
meaning”33 and that “legal rights and duties do not arise from raw and unreconstructed happenings 
in the physical world, but from an interpretation of these physical happenings within the intellectual 
framework o f the law.”34 Now, o f course, it is true that without legal rules, without law, the mere 
occurrence of a given combination of facts necessarily has no legal meaning or significance. But, 
once legal rules are in place, this no longer holds. Legal rules mean that the occurrence of certain 
physical events does change the legal relations of the parties involved, does alter the legal status 
quo. By virtue o f legal rules, factual occurrences have normative, legal consequences. Grantham 
and Rickett maintain that, for factual events to give rise to legal rights, they must first be interpreted 
within the law’s intellectual framework. So, they state:35
The notion of contract is thus both a factual and a legal one, dependant upon an interpretation of the 
physical occurrence of statements as amounting to an agreement as that latter concept is understood by the 
law, a task which is performed by interpretative constructs such as that of offer and acceptance, the doctrine
30 R. Grantham and C. Rickett, “Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event” [2003] C.L.J. 717.
31 Ibid., pp. 723-724.
32 Moreover, Birks was no doubt fully aware that the bare fact of an agreement was insufficient for contract 
formation. That Birks did single out agreement as “the” causative event does, however, raise the question of 
the basis upon which these other elements of contract formation can be excluded from the definition of the 
causative event (or, alternatively, the basis on which certain aspects of contract formation, such as 
consideration, can be said simply to be elements of the event of agreement). This is an example of the 
problems inherent in Birks’ scheme discussed supra, text to nn. 23-26.
33 Grantham and Rickett, supra, n. 29, at p. 722.
34 Ibid., p. 723.
35 Ibid, p. 724.
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of consideration, the rules on contractual capacity and the notion of an intention, objectively determined, to 
create legal relations.
But this process of interpretation does not involve anything more than an examination of 
the facts in the context of the legal rules in order to determine what legal result is required by the 
application of those rules to the facts. It may be true to say that we conventionally approach the 
question whether a contract has been formed (and hence whether contractual rights have arisen) by 
asking a series o f further questions, employing an array of additional legal concepts: was there an 
offer? Was that offer accepted? Was there consideration? But this does nothing more than to 
break up the larger question of contract formation into smaller, more manageable pieces. So, to 
answer the question whether there is an offer, we need to know what the law says amounts to an 
offer, that is, what facts constitute an offer, and whether such facts are present in the case at hand. 
At the end o f the process, the application of the legal rules to the facts either leads to the finding of 
a contract or it does not. The fact that such conclusions are mediated through the language of offer, 
acceptance and consideration changes nothing. None of this challenges the truth underlying Birks’ 
scheme, that, where there is law, factual occurrences have legal consequences. Of course, one can 
argue that it would be better to classify the law by some means other than events, but if  one is to 
adopt an events-based taxonomic scheme, there seems to be no other option than to understand 
events as factual occurrences. To reject classification by the factual event which provides the basis 
for the legal right is to reject an event-based taxonomy.36
So, when examining the events-based taxonomy, it is clear that “events” must be 
understood as factual occurrences. How then should we understand the relationship between events 
and legal rights? Certainly, as we have seen, events have legal consequences. The occurrence of a 
particular fact may give an individual a legal claim or subject him to a liability where none existed 
previously. Nonetheless, I believe that it is misleading to view such rights as arising from, or 
created by, such events, and that an analysis which seeks to do so is in danger of being drawn into 
making baseless distinctions. The point can best be made by an example.
Where two debtors are jointly and severally liable in respect of the same debt, the creditor 
can have recourse to either debtor to recover the full amount owed. However, as between the two 
debtors, the law may take the view that the burden of paying the due sum should not be borne
36 Grantham and Rickett’s proposed scheme fails as it seems to leave no room to question the conventional 
conceptual framework of the law. If we classify by legal event, that is, by reference to how the law 
understands, conceptualises the things that happen in the world, our taxonomy will necessarily follow the 
conceptual distinctions which the law draws. We are then unable to challenge the validity of such 
distinctions. As we have seen, supra, text to nn. 20-22, the principal goal of legal taxonomy is to help us to 
ensure that the law treats like cases alike. It cannot do this if we are compelled to view cases as alike 
wherever the law treats them as alike (see further, chapter 3, text to n. 4). A similar criticism can be made of 
Birks’ scheme in relation to the class of “wrongs”, which is defined simply by reference to, and hence blindly 
follows, the law’s current classification of such cases as involving a breach of duty.
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entirely by the party called upon to pay by the creditor. In such cases the debtor who makes the 
payment to the creditor is entitled to reimbursement or contribution from the other debtor. Many 
view this right as arising from an unjust enrichment, as the second debtor, the defendant, is enriched 
by the payment made by the first debtor, the claimant. This is enriching because the payment in 
satisfaction of the creditor’s claim precludes him from claiming that sum from the defendant.37 To 
the extent that the law takes the view that the burden o f paying off the creditor should not be borne 
by the claimant, that enrichment can then be said to be “unjust” and should be given up to the 
claimant. This right, therefore, fits neatly into Birks’ classification by causative event. When the 
claimant pays the creditor, this is an example of the event of unjust enrichment and the claimant’s 
right arises from that unjust enrichment.
However, a claimant who would be entitled to reimbursement or contribution from the 
defendant in the event o f being called upon to pay by the creditor may be able to bring a claim 
before paying. He can seek a quia timet order that the defendant pay his own share. This is 
problematic for a taxonomy based on causative events as, in this case, it seems impossible to argue 
that the right arises from an unjust enrichment. Until the claimant pays, there is no event which can 
be viewed as an unjust enrichment. The most we can say is that the right to such an order exists so 
as to ensure that the defendant does not become unjustly enriched. It is designed to see that he does 
not receive the benefit which he would receive if the claimant paid the creditor in full.38 This being 
so, a taxonomy founded on the notion of causative events is compelled to see this right as falling 
within a category other than unjust enrichment. A right cannot arise in response to, be created by, 
the event o f unjust enrichment if  its effect is to preclude receipt o f the benefit which would be 
unjustly enriching if received.39 And yet, it is clear that the law is doing the same thing here and for 
the same reasons as where the claim follows payment. The only difference is one of timing.
The obvious problem here is that classification by causative event requires the separation of 
claims which are materially alike. The former claim would fall within unjust enrichment, whereas 
the latter would have to be categorised differently, presumably within the class of miscellaneous 
others. However, I think the objection can alternatively be expressed in terms which suggest that 
Birks’ scheme misunderstands how rights and events connect. One can say that these two claims 
reflect not two distinct rights but one. Both the claim to reimbursement following payment to the
37 Although it will not strictly be true to say in all cases that the debt is thereby discharged, as the debt may in 
law be held to subsist so that the claimant may be subrogated to the creditor’s position in order to obtain 
reimbursement or contribution.
38 See C. Mitchell, The Law o f Contribution and Reimbursement (Oxford University Press, 2003), at pp. 49- 
51.
39 One cannot argue that the right to the quia timet order response to unjust enrichment without thereby 
collapsing the fundamental distinction Birks consistently drew between rights which reverse unjust 
enrichment and those which prevent unjust enrichment: see Birks, Introduction, supra n. 1, pp. 25-26; Birks, 
Unjust Enrichment, supra n. 12, pp. 36.
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creditor and the right to a quia timet order to see that the defendant pay his fair share to the creditor 
stem from the same basic right. How we should express that right is a separate question, but, using 
Birks’ preferred terminology, we could describe it as the right that, should the claimant pay off the 
creditor entirely, the defendant would be unjustly enriched. So, while both claims can be said to 
relate to or to be concerned with the same event, it is clear that an analysis which insists on treating 
rights as created by events is compelled to deny the common basis of the two claims.
This analysis is applicable to all legal claims. The fact that the claimant has the right to 
bring a claim on the occurrence of certain facts will mean that, prior to such facts occurring, he has 
a right that, should those facts occur, he has a claim.40 So, a contracting party has a right to 
compensatory damages to recover losses caused by a breach of contract. But this necessarily entails 
that he has a right, existing before the event of breach, that, should the defendant commit a breach 
o f  contract, he is entitled to compensatory damages. Such statements hold true because this is the 
way rights work; this is what it means to have a right. The claimant’s entitlement to compensatory 
damages does not lie at the discretion of the court. This is why we say he is entitled to this “as of 
right”.41 The claimant is entitled to the award simply by establishing the incidence of the necessary 
facts. From this it follows that he has a right to the award should those facts occur. Again it can be 
said that both versions of the right relate to the same event, breach o f contract, but it cannot be said 
that both rights arise from the event of breach as the second, more abstract version of the right is 
premised on the breach not having occurred. Birks’ taxonomy manages largely to rid itself of the 
inconsistencies created by the notion of causative events by limiting itself to classing only those 
legal rights which are realisable in court.42 This means that the more abstract versions of the legal 
rights which underlie legal claims are more often than not excluded, because courts tend only to 
realise such rights in their specific form, once the relevant event has occurred. For instance, the 
courts are not asked to realise the more abstract right that, should a contract be breached, the 
claimant is entitled to compensatory damages. They only have to realise the specific conception of 
this right, when the claimant seeks damages following the event o f breach. However, the example
40 Broadly the same point is made in D. Friedmann, “The Protection of Entitlements via the Law of 
Restitution -  Expectancies and Privacy” (2005) 121 L.Q.R. 400. For instance, Friedmann states, ibid., p. 402, 
that “the entitlement precedes the event that gives rise to the cause of action”.
41 The position in relation to rights which lie at the discretion of the court is more complex. Much depends on 
what we mean by discretion. If we mean that the claimant’s entitlement depends on the interplay of a number 
of factors which must be balanced by the court, such that it will not be clear in advance whether the claimant 
can make out his claim, this is not inconsistent with the analysis presented in the text. The position is 
different if we take discretion to mean that, on a given set of facts, the court is free to choose whether the 
claimant has such an entitlement. It is not clear whether the latter sense of discretion has a place in English 
law as it entails judicial freedom not to treat like cases alike.
42 Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra n. 12, p. 30. It is questionable whether Birks did in fact exclude all rights 
which are not realisable in court as this would involve excluding from the classificatory scheme legal property 
rights (excluding those relating to land), as Birks repeatedly asserted that the common law has no vindicatio 
in respect of such rights, and contractual rights to performance which the courts would not specifically 
enforce. Such rights are realisable only indirectly through ancillary claims.
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cited above o f quia timet orders between joint debtors shows that such more general rights are on 
occasion realisable, and so to persist in treating rights as created by events is to treat like cases 
differently and to misunderstand the way rights relate to events.
This, therefore, provides a further reason why a taxonomy which aims to class rights by 
causative event can not succeed. Its premiss, that rights arise from  events, is not true.43 We need a 
taxonomy which better understands the way that rights relate to events in the world, and which 
thereby ensures that we have a scheme which treats like cases alike.
2.9 Moving on
Categorising legal rights by causative event will not work. The notion of causative events 
cannot tell us what cases and claims should be regarded as alike. Indeed, on closer analysis, it is a 
misconception to regard rights as arising from events. However, through highlighting the failings 
of Professor Birks’ model we can begin to see how we might develop a classificatory scheme which 
succeeds in treating grouping together materially alike cases and segregating those which are 
materially distinct. The key is to get to grips with what we mean when we say that like cases 
should be treated alike. A legal taxonomy will stand or fall by its ability to comply with this 
precept o f justice, and, if we are to construct a scheme which achieves this purpose, we must 
confront this question directly.
43 Or, perhaps more accurately, it is true only in the, analytically uninteresting, sense that legal rights will all 
stem from the act of some legal institution, whether the legislature or the courts.
Chapter 3
The Search for Principle
Treating like cases alike requires that we be able to identify like cases. What then does it 
mean to say that cases are alike? By cases we mean sets of facts (series o f events, situations). The 
key question is when are such sets of facts alike. It is clear that likeness in this context does not 
mean factual identicalness. Cases can be alike in the relevant sense despite being, at least in part, 
factually dissimilar. Indeed, no two cases can be in all respects factually alike, if  only because of 
differences in time, location or the identities of those involved. We may then say that what we are 
looking for is material likeness. But that still leaves us with the question of what is meant by 
material. How do we determine when cases which are factually dissimilar are nonetheless 
materially alike?
3.1 Determ ining the likeness of cases
Whether two cases are alike depends on the application of standards or criteria by which 
such likenesses are to be determined. However, cases can be alike or unalike in different ways 
reflecting different criteria of likeness which may be adopted. What we need to identify is the 
proper criterion o f likeness in the present context. The key to this is to understand the purpose of 
the principle that like cases should be treated alike. This principle is a guide to deciding cases, to 
determining the correct legal consequences of particular combinations of facts. If legal response X 
follows from the occurrence of set of facts A, then X should likewise follow from set of facts B, 
where A and B are alike. We can say, therefore, that cases are materially alike when they require 
like treatment. Now this may not seem to take us much further; like cases are those which should 
be treated alike.1 However, what it tells us is that whether cases are materially alike depends on 
whether the factual differences between them have a bearing on the way those cases should be 
decided; do their factual dissimilarities justify differing treatment?
Determining the likeness of cases therefore requires inquiry into the reasons for attaching 
particular legal consequences to given sets o f facts. Cases A and B will accordingly be alike where
1 Or more precisely, like cases are those which should be treated alike for the same reasons. Hence, not all 
cases which give rise to a restitutionary claim are alike if the reasons for restitution are different.
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the reasons2 for attaching legal response X to case A apply equally to case B. An alternative way to 
express this is in terms of principles. Our generic reason for assigning a particular legal response to 
a given set o f facts is that the response reflects or gives effect to principles3 we believe should be 
embodied in or effectuated by the law. Cases are alike where they raise the same questions of 
principle, where the principles which we believe should be reflected in the law apply to them in the 
same way. Where cases raise the same questions they should receive the same answers. Disputes 
as to the likeness of cases are therefore disputes as to what are good reasons for legal decisions 
and/or their application to the facts at hand, or, in other words, as to the principles which do or 
should shape the law and/or as to what the application of those principles to the facts entails.
It is important to stress that we can, and often do, argue that cases are alike even though the 
law may not treat them alike. Indeed, the principle that like cases should be treated alike is most 
commonly invoked to test the legal rules we have. So, we can always ask whether the law is in fact 
succeeding in treating like cases alike. Necessarily, therefore, disputes as to whether cases are alike 
cannot be resolved by appeals to what cases the law treats as alike. Put another way, disputes as to 
what the law should be cannot be settled solely by reference to what the law is.4 What we are 
seeking to determine is whether the cases that the law treats as alike really are alike; whether the 
cases it treats differently really are different. Answering this question requires an inquiry into the 
principles which are or should be reflected in the law and what their application requires on the 
facts.
This is not to say that the data of court decisions, judicial dicta and legislation can have no 
part to play in making and resolving arguments as to what the law should be. In particular, different 
legal systems may choose differing combinations of principles on which to base their laws. Even 
those which choose to give effect to the same principles may find different ways of applying them 
and resolving conflicts between them. Because of this, there are different types of argument that 
can be made concerning the likeness of cases. Firstly, one may accept (or seek to identify and 
defend) the particular combination of principles adopted within the relevant system, and argue that, 
on that basis, given cases are or are not alike. Such an argument then turns in part on the correct
2 This covers not just the positive reasons for that legal response but also the absence of reasons for rejecting 
that response. Two cases may both includes facts which, taken in isolation, supply the same reason for a 
particular result. However, they will not be materially alike where the one case includes additional facts 
which provide a reason for rejecting that result. The clearest examples of this are where the facts of each case 
raise the same cause of action, but in one a defence is available (at least where the defence does not deny an 
element of the cause of action, such as the contributory negligence defence to tort claims).
3 Dworkin famously distinguished principles and policies (see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(Duckworth, 1977), pp. 22-23, 90-100). The reference to principles in the text is intended to embrace both of 
these, though I also take the view that we can identify sub-divisions within this class of principles as broadly 
defined.
4 For present purposes, nothing turns on the answer to the question of where to locate the line between what 
the law is and what it should be. It is, I think, clear that such a line exists. One may prefer to express the 
same distinction in terms of what we do (or have been doing) and what we should do.
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identification o f the principles recognised in that system. Analysis of case law and legislation will 
then be central to this identification process. However, ascertainment of the principles which 
underlie the system’s rules may also lead one to view some of this data as erroneous, unsupportable 
on the basis o f any principle which the law does embody. As such, even in relation to this type of 
argument, one cannot determine the likeness of cases solely by reference to the distinctions 
currently drawn by the law. Secondly, and alternatively, one may argue that given cases are alike 
on the basis of a particular preferred combination of principles, without contending that those are 
the principles currently embodied within the system. Such an argument is, to this extent, an 
argument about what principles should be reflected in the law, and, in resolving such questions, 
case and statute law will carry little weight.
Clearly, if  one’s concern is with a particular type of claim or case, it will rarely be 
necessary to identify the full set of principles which do or should underlie the law. Instead it will be 
sufficient only to deal with those principles relevant to the sort of case under discussion. A 
common form of legal argument works in this way: seeing that we (or if we are to) respond to case 
A with legal response X, we should also provide response X in case B, which is materially identical. 
This form of argument may appear to obviate the need to locate the justification in principle of 
response X to cases A and B, focussing instead on the question o f their likeness. However, as we 
have seen, the question o f whether A and B are materially alike requires inquiry into the reasons for 
attributing the given legal response to them since, as we have seen, it is only on this basis that their 
material likeness can be determined.
This section thus far may appear to have done little more than state the obvious. It is, 
however, necessary at this early stage to make clear on what terms discussion of the likeness of 
cases, and hence of the relationship between the variety of claims being examined here, must be 
conducted. As we shall see, though many defend the law’s divergent responses to misapplications 
of assets, few attempt, let alone manage, to identify any justificatory principle to support these 
differences o f approach.
3.2 Reasons for restitution
If  we are to treat like cases alike, we cannot avoid an inquiry into the principles embodied 
in and furthered by the law and their application to the facts; in short, the reasons for deciding cases. 
So, to understand unjust enrichment claims and their relationship to other types of claim we must 
inquire into the principles which underlie them.
If  restitution is defined as the giving up of a received benefit, then the law of restitution 
comprises those cases to which the law responds by placing on the defendant a duty to give up a
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benefit received by him.5 What we must ask is why the law requires that the defendant give up a 
benefit he has received, that is, what are the reasons for ordering restitution.
3.3 Unjust enrichment: the broad view6
We saw in the previous chapter that the event-based taxonomy of rights must be rejected, as 
must the understanding of unjust enrichment as a category of causative event to which it gives rise. 
However, there is also support amongst restitution scholars for an alternative understanding of 
unjust enrichment. This sees unjust enrichment not as an event but as the basis of a principle 
explaining some or all instances of restitutionary liability.7 Framed in terms o f a reason for ordering 
restitution, this is an improvement on the event-based scheme and its conception of unjust 
enrichment, since it shows that we are at least asking the right question. So employed, “unjust 
enrichment” seeks to answer the call to identify a basis in principle for restitutionary claims, and 
hence, as we have seen, a basis for determining their material unity. However, the answer it 
provides is unsatisfactory.
Though it is common to find reference simply to “the unjust enrichment principle” or “the 
principle o f reversing unjust enrichment”, it is clear that this is shorthand for a fuller expression of 
principle. This can and has been expressed variously; “a person has a right to have returned to him 
a benefit gained at his expense by another, if the retention of the benefit by the other would be 
unjust”,8 “no-one ought to be unjustly enriched at the expense of another”, “the law does not permit
5 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn. 2005), at p. 3; G. Virgo, The Principles o f the Law o f 
Restitution (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2006), at p. 3. Not all would agree with this definition of 
restitution. It is used only as a convenient starting point and the subsequent argument certainly does not 
depend upon its validity. Firstly, some would not extend “restitution” to all instances of gain-based recovery: 
see, e.g., L. Smith, “The province of the law of restitution” (1992) 71 Can. Bar. Rev. 672 and J. Edelman, 
Gain-based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property (Hart Publishing, 2002) (both 
preferring the language of disgorgement in relation some gain-based claims pursuant to wrongs); A. Burrows, 
“Quadrating Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: A Matter of Principle” [2000] R.L.R. 257, at pp. 258-259 
(not extending “restitution” to primary contractual obligations to confer benefits). Secondly, some do not see 
the law of restitution as focussed solely on gain-based claims: see, e.g., S. Hedley, A Critical Introduction to 
Restitution (Butterworths, 2001); P. Jaffey, The Nature and Scope o f Restitution (Hart Publishing, 2000). I 
think there is also a problem identifying whether particular claims are truly gain-based: see in particular the 
claims concerned with anticipated contracts which never materialised, e.g., William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd. v. 
Davis [1957] 1 W.L.R. 932, and the “user-principle” cases, such as Strand Electric and Engineering Co. Ltd. 
v. BrisfordEntertainments Ltd. [1952] 2 Q.B. 246.
6 Hedley has previously referred to broad and narrow views of unjust enrichment: see S. Hedley, “Unjust 
Enrichment: A Middle Course?” (2002) 2 O.U.C.L.J. 181. His distinction, however, is not the same as that 
drawn in the text.
7 See, e.g., A. Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (Butterworths, 2nd edn. 2002), at pp. 1-2, 5-7; Virgo, supra n. 
5, at pp. 6-9; G. Jones, Goff and Jones: The Law o f Restitution (Sweet and Maxwell, 6th edn. 2002), at pp. 3, 
13-17; R. Grantham and C. Rickett, Enrichment and Restitution in New Zealand (Hart Publishing, 2000), at 
pp. 3-4.
8 W. Seavey and A. Scott, “Restitution” (1938) 54 L.Q.R. 29, at p. 32.
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one person to be unjustly enriched at the expense of another”.9 And, though there are differences of 
opinion as to the ambit of the principle, the idea is the same throughout: the defendant must give up 
to the claimant a benefit where its retention would leave him unjustly enriched at the claimant’s 
expense. Much then depends on what is meant by unjust enrichment at the claimant’s expense, as 
this will determine not only the scope of the principle but also whether it does indeed identify a 
unitary principle underlying a class of legal claim.
On one view10 the unjust enrichment principle explains all instances of restitutionary 
liability. This builds on Birks’ original quadration thesis o f the relationship between unjust 
enrichment and restitution, examined in the previous chapter. As we saw, under the perfect 
quadration thesis unjust enrichment not only explains all restitutionary claims but is defined in such 
a way as to ensure this. To say that there had been an unjust enrichment is simply to say that the 
facts support a restitutionary claim. This conception of the unjust enrichment principle adds little to 
this. Where there is a restitutionary claim there must, by definition, have been an unjust 
enrichment, and unjust enrichments must be reversed. The definition o f the event and o f the 
principle follow from, and add nothing to, the initial definition of restitution and the identification 
of a case as one where restitutionary liability arises. We know there has been an unjust enrichment 
because the facts give rise to a right to restitution, we know unjust enrichments must be given 
because unjust enrichments are those enrichments which the law requires to be given up.
The logic of the process cannot be faulted, but its utility can. We know that the law 
responds to certain cases by requiring the defendant to make restitution. What we need to identify 
is why this is. A principle designed specifically to embrace all restitutionary claims and simply to 
reflect the fact that restitution must be made does not and cannot do this. And this is true whether 
one interprets the principle as downward-looking, tying it to the instances of restitutionary liability 
found in case and statute law, or whether one decouples it from the authorities, embracing the 
possibility of novel forms of restitutionary claim. The former version o f the principle amounts to 
saying that restitution must be ordered where the authorities say it must, the latter that restitution 
must be ordered when there is good reason (in principle) to do so. In either case unjust enrichments 
are those enrichments which must be given up, those that require restitution, and the principle 
simply states that enrichments which must be given up must be given up. Unjust enrichment and 
the principle o f reversing unjust enrichment, without further elaboration, neither help us to identify 
which enrichments must be given up nor provide a reason for requiring defendants to give up such 
enrichments.11
9 Both taken from P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law o f Restitution (Clarendon Press, rev. edn. 1989), at p. 
23. It should be noted that Birks did not favour using “unjust enrichment” in this form.
10 See, e.g., Burrows, supra, n. 5; Jones, supra, n. 7, at pp. 3, 13-14.
11 The same is also true of “restorable enrichment”, the term preferred by Grantham and Rickett (see 
Grantham and Rickett, supra, n. 7, at pp. 18-20. Grantham and Rickett prefer “restorable” to “unjust” on the
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This upshot of this is that the unjust enrichment principle fails to aid analysis of 
restitutionary claims. It does not answer any o f the questions that need to be answered if we are to 
understand when and why restitutionary liability arises, and so to ensure that we treat like cases 
alike. Moreover, a second and more serious criticism can be made of this conception of the unjust 
enrichment principle. This version of the principle encourages us to believe that all cases to which 
the law responds by ordering restitution are founded.on the same principle and hence are materially 
alike. This unity is misleading however. As we have seen, despite being framed as a principle, the 
unjust enrichment principle does not identify a reason for restitution. The principle states that 
unjust enrichments must be given up, but, since unjust enrichments are those which must be given 
up, the principle adds nothing. The only unity it identifies is one of response. This would not be so 
important if  in fact all restitutionary claims did derive from a single principle, and so there was just 
the one reason for requiring restitution. The principle would still require identification, but at least 
the impression of material likeness created by talking of a single unjust enrichment principle would 
not be inaccurate. It seems clear, though, that there is no such unity in the law of restitution. There 
is not one reason for restitution but many. A number of distinct principles, each supporting 
instances o f restitutionary liability, may be identified.
The aim here is not to draw up an exhaustive list of such principles. An example will 
suffice to demonstrate the disunity within the law of restitution. In the following chapters, I shall 
argue for a particular understanding of a class restitutionary claims exemplified by mistaken 
payments. However, even before I begin the analysis of such claims, it should be clear that these 
cases are materially different from at least a significant number of the cases which are standardly 
grouped together under the heading “restitution for wrongs”. They reflect different reasons for 
restitution. The considerations of principle12 which led, for instance, the courts in Attorney-General 
fo r  Hong Kong v. Reid13 and Attorney-General v. Blake14 to order the defendant to make restitution 
are distinct from those which support the reversal of a mistaken payment. And, though they may 
not express it in these terms, this explains why most restitution lawyers see an important analytical 
difference between restitution for wrongs and what Birks called “autonomous” unjust enrichment 
claims.
basis that “unjust” fails to capture the reason for restitution or the circumstances in which restitution will be 
ordered. However, at least on the downward-looking approach, “unjust” and “restorable” are synonymous. 
Certainly, “restorable” provides no better an explanation of why the law requires such gains to be given up.
12 Primarily that it would be wrong to allow the defendant to be able to profit from his unlawful conduct, and 
perhaps also that others should be discouraged from acting similarly.
13 [1994] 1 A.C. 324.
14 [2001] 1 A.C. 268.
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3.4 Unjust enrichment: the narrow view
There is a second conception of the unjust enrichment principle which may seem to avoid 
some of the failings of the broad view. This sees the principle as explaining some but not all 
instances o f restitutionary liability, thus rejecting the perfect quadration thesis.15 On this view, the 
unjust enrichment principle is just one of a number of principles and policies which support 
restitutionary claims. Therefore, this version of the unjust enrichment principle cannot be accused 
of presenting the false unity suggested by the broad view; indeed it openly acknowledges that there 
exists a multiplicity of reasons for restitution.
Nonetheless, this approach too must be rejected. The first reason for this is that, like the 
broad unjust enrichment principle, it does not identify a reason for restitution. We saw in the 
previous chapter that when Birks’ refined his notion of unjust enrichment as an event, there was no 
corresponding change in the terms he used to express it.16 The same is true of the narrow version of 
the unjust enrichment principle. Though the scope of the principle has been reduced, the terms in 
which it is defined remain substantially the same.17 The difference between the broad and the 
narrow views is that proponents o f the narrow view identify additional principles which explain 
certain instances o f restitutionary liability. Such cases are then cleaved off from the body of law 
explained by the unjust enrichment principle. The refinement of the unjust enrichment principle is 
then solely in negative terms; we learn what it is only through being told what it not. Just as Birks’ 
later definition of unjust enrichment could be reduced to “the event giving rise to restitutionary 
rights which does not fall within one of the other categories of causative event”, so the unjust 
enrichment principle becomes “the principle underlying those instances o f restitutionary liability 
left once those explicable on the basis of some other principle or policy are removed”. In this sense 
it resembles a residual category, a collection of cases held together simply by the restitutionary 
response and that fact that no other identified principle explains them. Once could say that the 
narrow view of the unjust enrichment principle reflects a state of work in progress. It is a product 
of an as yet uncompleted process of identifying the distinct reasons for restitution, the distinct 
principles which support restitutionary claims. As further reasons are identified, so the area covered 
by the unjust enrichment principle reduces. But, no matter how much material is excised from it, 
unjust enrichment does not itself provide a reason for restitution.18
15 See, e.g., Virgo, supra, n. 5, at pp. 6-18.
16 Supra, ch. 2, text to nn. 7-8.
17 See, e.g., Virgo, supra, n. 5, at p 51-52: “Whenever it can be shown that the defendant has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the claimant the defendant will be obliged, by operation of law, to restore to the 
claimant the value of the benefit which he or she has received.”
18 In the first edition of his textbook, Virgo stated (G. Virgo, The Principles o f the Law o f Restitution (Oxford 
University Press, 1st edn 1999), p. 10): “The justification for the award of restitutionary remedies where the 
defendant has been unjustly enriched at the plaintiffs expense is that, by virtue of the relevant ground of
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There is a second reason for rejecting this narrow view of the unjust enrichment principle. 
Although the narrow view, unlike the broad version of the principle, acknowledges the variety and 
multiplicity of principles underlying restitutionary claims, it too suggests the unity, the material 
likeness, o f those cases that do fall within it. And again this impression is likely19 to be false. For 
example, Virgo’s conception20 of the unjust enrichment principle covers Woolwich Equitable 
Building Society v. I.R.C.,21 where the restitutionary claim was explained on the basis of the 
constitutional principle that the Government should not be able to levy taxes without the authority 
of Parliament, and hence should not be entitled to retain tax money so levied. If we are to endorse, 
as Virgo does,22 this explanation of Woolwich, then it is clear that the reason for restitution is 
different from that supporting the restitutionary claim in the standard case of a mistaken payment; 
the cases are not materially alike. The same general point is evidenced by the terms in which Virgo 
introduces his account o f the unjust factors, or what we may call reasons for restitution. When 
looking at what makes a particular enrichment unjust, he says, “this notion of injustice derives from 
three different principles, which can usefully be summarised as claimant-oriented, defendant- 
oriented and policy-oriented.”23 Again, if Virgo is right to say that within the unjust enrichment 
principle there are distinct principles providing distinct reasons for restitution, then the unjust 
enrichment principle groups together cases which are materially dissimilar.24
The unjust enrichment principle then, in both its wide and narrow forms, not only fails to 
identify a reason for restitution - a principle explaining why particular gains must be given up - but 
also groups together cases which are not materially alike. The need to treat like cases alike requires 
that we look past unjust enrichment for an understanding of the bases o f restitutionary liability.
restitution, the defendant cannot be considered to have any right to retain the value of the benefit.” This says 
no more than that, where the facts of such cases reveal a ground, or reason, for restitution, the defendant must 
make restitution. Perhaps tellingly, this passage appears to have been removed from the second edition.
19 “Likely” rather than “certain” only because of the remote chance that a proponent of the narrow principle 
identifies, and hence removes from its scope, all but one of the other principles supporting restitutionary 
claims, thus leaving a unitary residual category for the unjust enrichment principle.
20 Virgo’s is not the only possible conception of the narrow unjust enrichment principle. The content of the 
narrow version of the principle will vary depending on which cases are seen as explicable on the basis of 
other principle. So the identification of a different set of (other) restitution-supporting principles would lead 
to differences in the scope of the unjust enrichment principle. Different conceptions of the narrow view 
would then provide different examples of disunity.
21 [1993] A.C. 70.
22 Virgo, supra, n. 5, at pp. 400-404, 408-416. The possibility exists, however, of justifying a restitutionary 
claim on the facts of Woolwich on the same basis as a claim in respect of a mistaken payment (c.f Birks, 
supra, n. 5, at pp. 133-135). This does not entail that the reasoning of the House of Lords and the accounts 
which support it are defective. Rather it would mean that this would be an example of what Birks called 
alternative analysis; and, in so far as a claim could be supported on the basis of the constitutional principle, it 
would be materially dissimilar to mistaken payments.
23 Ibid., at p. 119.
24 Though is should be stated that, like his unjust enrichment principle, none of Virgo’s three sub-principles 
identifies a reason for restitution.
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3.5 Non-voluntary benefits
Many restitution scholars have noted that in a number of instances o f restitutionary liability 
a material factor is that the claimant benefited the defendant without a fully or properly formed 
intention to confer that benefit. Even amongst those who see a role for unjust enrichment in 
explaining restitutionary liability, there is recognition that often it is a defect in the claimant’s 
intention to benefit the defendant that underlies the conclusion that the defendant’s enrichment is 
unjust, and hence to be given up. Virgo, for instance, states, “[wjhere the claimant’s intention has 
been affected in some way he or she cannot be considered to have voluntarily transferred a benefit 
to the defendant and so the defendant can be considered to have been unjustly enriched.”25 Birks 
split the unjust factors into three families, each identifying a distinct reason for restitution. One of 
these was “non-voluntary transfer”, where the facts entitle the claimant to assert “I did not mean 
him/her to have it”.26 What needs to be addressed is why and when the claimant’s intention should 
determine the defendant’s entitlement to retain benefits he has received.
Our general dissatisfaction with the distribution of wealth in society does not provide the 
basis of a legal claim. If the claimant is to make out a claim to wealth in the defendant’s hands his 
argument must go further than asserting his preference for such a redistribution. So, it is clear that 
there must be a particular connection between the claimant and the benefit received by the 
defendant, which makes the claimant’s intention in respect of the defendant’s receipt and retention 
of that benefit a relevant consideration in determining the latter’s entitlement to it. What sort of 
connection is needed? Orthodox accounts of the law of restitution connect the claimant and the 
enrichment claimed through the “at the expense o f ’ requirement, and, in relation to the types of case 
regarded as instances of non-voluntary transfer, this requires that the defendant receive the 
enrichment “by subtraction from”, or simply “from”, the claimant.27 However, the simplicity of the 
language conceals ambiguities. “From” is capable of encompassing a range of different types of 
connection between claimant, defendant and enrichment. The central case of enrichment received 
from the claimant would be the receipt of a benefit held by the claimant immediately prior to 
receipt. However, the terminology comfortably accommodates indirect enrichments, where the 
benefit passed from the claimant through the hands of third parties, before being received by the 
defendant. It can also cover instances where the defendant received a benefit which was on the way
25 Virgo, supra, n. 5, at p. 120.
26 See P. Birks, “The Law of Restitution at the End of an Epoch”, (1999) 28 U.W.A.L.R. 13, at pp. 24-27; P. 
Birks and R. Chambers, The Restitution Research Resource (Mansfield Press, 2nd edn. 1997), at 2-3; c.f. 
Birks, supra, n. 5, at 104, 108 and 116, where he argued that, should all unjust enrichment claims be founded 
on an absence of basis for the transfer, all such claims would be examples of non-voluntary benefit.
27 Birks, supra, n. 9, at pp. 23-25, 132-133; Birks, supra, n. 5 at pp. 73-75; Burrows, supra, n. 7, at pp. 25-26.
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to the claimant and which, but for the defendant’s intervention, would have been received by him. 
There are also cases where the benefit received by the defendant neither was held previously by the 
claimant nor would have come his way, but derived from the claimant’s labour or skills or from 
some source of wealth held or previously held by the claimant.
Do all these senses of “from” count? If not, where do we draw the line? These questions 
can be answered only by inquiring into the principle underlying these claims, for this will determine 
their proper scope. As such, it is unsurprising that those wedded to the view that unjust enrichment 
provides the organising principle have come up with conflicting and usually unsatisfactory answers, 
seeing that “unjust enrichment” identifies no true principle, and that this simple verbal formulation 
is apt to cover any number o f different positions. Accordingly, unjust enrichment theorists have 
had little choice but to fall back on the authorities and the intuition that liability has to stop 
somewhere.
What is clear is that there are situations where a benefit is received by the defendant which 
comes “from” the claimant in one of the aforementioned ways and where the claimant did not 
intend the defendant so to benefit and yet, even before we get to the question of defences, no claim 
is recognised. Many of these situations have received little attention by restitution scholars, yet 
seeing why claims for restitution do not succeed in such cases tells us something important about 
the basis of liability where they do.28 The point can be made by examining three cases, two of 
which are not commonly regarded as bearing on the law of restitution, while the third receives at 
best passing reference in the leading English texts.
The first is Bradford Corporation v. Pickles}9 There, a substantial part of the town’s water 
supply derived from natural spring water which passed under the defendant’s land. The defendant 
then made excavations into his land which had the desired effect o f drawing off much of this water 
and consequently reducing the flow of water into the town. Though the defendant claimed that the 
water he was extracting was required for work on his land, the suspicion was that the defendant’s 
motive was to induce the corporation to purchase his land or to pay him for refraining from 
interfering with the natural flow of the water. The corporation sought an injunction to restrain the 
defendant from continuing these activities, and the case turned on whether the defendant’s motive 
could render unlawful what was otherwise a lawful use of his property. The House of Lords 
concluded that his motive did not affect the lawfulness of his conduct and the corporation’s claim 
failed. The case is now seen as a leading authority in the law of torts. However, the case also 
important implications for the law of restitution.
28 There appears to be greater recognition of this point in civil law jurisdictions: see, e.g., E. von Caemmerer, 
“Grundprobleme des Bereicherungsrechts” in H. Leser (ed.), Gesammelte Schriften I  (Mohr, 1968), at pp. 
374-375; R. Zimmermann, The Law o f Obligations: Roman Foundations o f the Civilian Tradition (Juta & 
Co., 1990), p. 889.
29 The Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses o f the Borough o f Bradford v. Pickles [1895] A.C. 587.
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The defendant, by diverting and retaining for his own use the water which flowed through 
his land, was enriched. This enrichment came from the plaintiff corporation, in the sense that, 
barring the defendant’s intervention, it would have made its way to the corporation instead. It 
therefore provides an instance of what Birks called “interceptive subtraction”.30 Moreover, this 
enrichment o f the defendant was certainly not intended by the claimant. Would then a claim for 
restitution against the defendant have succeeded? The answer must be no. Though the issue of 
restitutionary liability was not raised, the judgments are incompatible with any such claim arising 
on the facts. Lord Halsbury L.C. held:31
... the interference ... is an interference with water, which, but for such interference, would 
undoubtedly reach the plaintiffs’ works, and in that sense does deprive them of the water which they would 
otherwise get. But although it does deprive them of water which they would otherwise get, it is necessary for 
the plaintiffs to establish that they have a right to the flow of the water, and that the defendant has no right to 
what he is doing. ... The very question was then determined by this House,32 that the landowner had a right to 
do what he had done whatever his object or purpose might be, and although the purpose might be wholly 
unconnected with the enjoyment of his own estate.
The key point is that the corporation could not make out any entitlement to the flow of the 
water onto their land. They had no right that the defendant refrain from diverting and retaining the 
water. And clearly if the defendant was legally entitled to take the water for himself, he should 
come under no liability to give up this enrichment if he goes ahead and does this.
30 See Birks, supra, n. 9, at pp. 133-138; Birks, supra, n. 5, at pp. 75-77. I refer to Birks’ theory of 
interceptive subtraction not because I wish to endorse it, but because the language of unjust enrichment is 
naturally capable of extending to such cases, and yet it is clear that, at least on occasion, liability is 
nonetheless denied. The key question is why. Birks’ theory has come in for criticism, notably in L. Smith, 
“Three-Party Restitution: A Critique of Birks’s Theory of Interceptive Subtraction” (1991) 11 O.J.L.S. 481. 
Smith’s main argument is that Birks’ theory is flawed in so far as it suggests that a single instance of unjust 
enrichment can be at the expense of more than one party -  the person from whom it was received (A), and the 
person to whom, but for the defendant’s intervention, it would have come (B). Smith then argues that to 
know at whose expense the enrichment was made we must inquire into the relationship between A and B to 
ask how the defendant’s receipt impacted on their rights and liabilities inter se. So, if, for example, despite 
the defendant’s intervention, A’s transfer discharged a liability to B, the defendant’s enrichment would be at 
B’s expense, not A’s. As such, unjust enrichment is a “zero-sum game” (ibid., p. 483). I am largely in 
agreement with Smith on the fact that there will usually only be one proper claimant, but differ from him as to 
how he is to be identified. Moreover, given relativity of title and the fact that more than one person may be 
able to make out an exclusive (at least vis-a-vis the defendant) entitlement to an asset or benefit received by 
the defendant, it is not impossible that there may be, in an appropriate case, more than one potential claimant.
31 [1895] A.C. 587, at pp. 591-592. To similar effect is Lord Ashbourne, ibid., at p. 598: “The plaintiffs have 
no case unless they can shew that they are entitled to the flow of the water in question, and that the defendant 
has no right to do what he is doing.”
32 In Chasemore v. Richards (1859) 7 H.L.C. 349.
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The second case is Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Company Ltd. v. 
TaylorP  The plaintiff company owned a racecourse on which they held horse races. It made 
money by charging spectators for admission. One of the defendants, the Commonwealth 
Broadcasting Corporation, viewing the races from a platform built on neighbouring land owned by 
another of the defendants, began live radio broadcasts of these races. This gave would-be racegoers 
an alternative way of following the races and attendance at the racecourse dropped off, causing the 
plaintiff a loss in revenue. The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain these broadcasts on the 
ground that they constituted a nuisance or, alternatively, that the construction and use of the 
platform constituted an unreasonable user of the neighbouring land.
The claim failed. A bare majority of the High Court o f Australia held that the facts 
disclosed no actionable wrong on the part of the defendants. The following passage from the 
judgment of Latham C.J. encapsulates the majority’s reasoning:34
I am unable to see that any right of the plaintiff has been violated or any wrong done to him. Any 
person is entitled to look over the plaintiffs fences and to see what goes on in the plaintiffs land. ... The 
defendant does no wrong to the plaintiff by looking at what takes place on the plaintiffs land. Further he 
does no wrong to the plaintiff by describing to other persons, to as wide an audience as he can obtain, what 
takes place on the plaintiffs ground. The court has not been referred to any principle of law which prevents 
any man from describing anything which he sees anywhere if he does not make defamatory statements, 
infringe the law as to offensive language etc., break a contract, or wrongfully reveal confidential information. 
The defendants did not infringe the law in any of these respects.
What does any of this have to do with the law of restitution? Certainly this case, like 
Bradford Corporation v. Pickles, is concerned primarily with answering a question of torts law, and 
the emphasis was on the loss caused to the plaintiff rather than any gains made by the defendants. 
However, the defendants were no doubt enriched through their enterprise. Moreover, this 
enrichment could be said to have come from the plaintiff, in that the value received by the 
defendants derived, in part, from the plaintiffs work and activities on, and the use to which it put, 
its own land.35 Yet, despite the plaintiff clearly not intending the defendant to receive this 
enrichment, a restitutionary claim would have failed.
33 (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479.
34 Ibid., at p. 494.
35 Of course, the enrichment received by the defendants also derived from their own work in broadcasting the 
race reports, though this in itself would not be sufficient reason to deny a restitutionary claim. An analogy 
can be drawn with restitutionary claims where the asset received by the defendant has been profitably 
invested, repaired or improved by him while in his hands. The case would be clearer, but the result no doubt 
the same, if the neighbouring landowner had simply put up seating on the platform and charged admission for 
people to come and view the races. A clearer connection could then be identified between the loss suffered 
by the claimant and the gain made by the defendant.
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The restitutionary consequences of the majority’s reasoning are brought out most clearly in 
the judgment of Dixon J:36
So far as freedom from view or inspection is a natural or acquired physical characteristic of the site, 
giving it value for the purpose of the business or pursuit which the plaintiff conducts, it is a characteristic 
which is not a legally protected interest. ... [Cjourts of equity have not in British jurisdictions thrown the 
protection of an injunction around all the intangible elements of value, that is, value in exchange, which may 
flow from the exercise by an individual of his powers or resources whether in an organization of a business or 
undertaking or the use of ingenuity, knowledge, skill or labour.
Referring to the dissenting judgment of Brandeis J., in International News Service v. 
Associated Press,37 he continued:38
His judgment appears to me to contain an adequate answer both upon principle and authority to the 
suggestion that the defendants are misappropriating or abstracting something which the plaintiff has created 
and alone is entitled to turn to value. Briefly, the answer is that it is not because the individual has by his 
efforts put himself in a position to obtain value for what he can give that his right to it becomes protected by 
law and so assumes the exclusiveness of property, but because the intangible or incorporeal right he claims 
falls within a recognized category to which legal or equitable protection attaches. ... [T]he right to exclude 
the defendants from broadcasting a description of the occurrences they can see upon the plaintiffs land is not 
given by law. It is not an interest falling within any category which is protected at law or in equity.
Though the plaintiffs use o f the land generated value, this does not mean that the plaintiff 
had an exclusive entitlement to that value. In respect o f the value in the view of the plaintiffs land 
from neighbouring land, the law recognises no entitlement in the plaintiff. The plaintiff had no 
right that others not watch, commentate upon, and thereby profit from the activities carried out on 
its land. From this it follows that the plaintiff had no right to the value, the enrichment, received by 
the defendants in so doing.
Finally there is the Scottish case of Edinburgh and District Tramways Company Ltd. v. 
Courtenay.39 The claimant company let the right to advertise on their tram cars to the defendant. 
The contract provided that the defendant was to supply the fittings needed to mount the 
advertisements. However, new cars put into service by the claimant had the necessary fittings 
already built onto them, enabling the defendant to mount the advertisements without itself providing 
fittings. The claimant sought recompense, what would be called restitution in English law, from the
36 (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479, at pp. 508-509.
37 (1918) 248 U.S. 215.
38 (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479, at p. 509-510.
39 1 90 8 S.C. 99.
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defendant for its use o f such fittings. This claim failed. Firstly, it was held that the contract 
between the parties imposed no obligation on the defendant to pay for such use. Nor was the 
claimant entitled to recovery on non-contractual grounds. In giving his judgment, the Lord 
President disapproved o f the definition of principle underlying claims to recompense given in Bell’s 
Principles o f  the Law o f  Scotland,™ which stated, “where one has gained by the lawful act of 
another, done without any intention of donation, he is bound to recompense or indemnify that other 
to the extent o f the gain.” To support his rejection of any such principle, the Lord President, Lord 
Dunedin, used the following example:
One man heats his house, and his neighbour gets a great deal of benefit. It is absurd to suppose that 
the person who has heated his house can go to his neighbour and say, “Give me so much for my coal bill, 
because you have been warmed by what I have done, and I did not intend to give you a present of it.”
It was accordingly held that the claimant could not make out a claim in respect of the 
benefit received by the defendant simply by showing that this benefit had resulted from the 
claimant’s actions and without any intention on the claimant’s part that the defendant should receive 
such a gratuitous benefit. This then makes explicit what was implicit in Bradford v. Pickles and 
Victoria Park Racing. Though many restitutionary claims are founded on the receipt of a benefit 
deriving from the claimant and without the latter’s consent, something more is needed if such a 
claim is to be recognised.41 Lord Dunedin considered that this additional element could be found in 
a requirement that the claimant have lost something.42 This, though, brings its own problems. For 
one thing, any claimant who is able to identify a benefit received by the defendant that has come 
from him can argue that this benefit is something he has, in some sense, lost, yet this, of course, is 
the very notion that Lord Dunedin was rejecting. Bradford v. Pickles and Victoria Park Racing
40 G. Bell, Principles o f the Law o f Scotland, (W. Guthrie (ed.), T. & T. Clark, 10th edn, 1899), at sec. 538.
41 Birks, supra n. 5, at pp. 158-159, argued that the denial of a restitutionary claim in Lord Dunedin’s example 
of the house being heated is best explained on the basis that the claimant does in fact intend to confer such a 
benefit on his neighbour. Clearly this was not Lord Dunedin’s view of the case; his point in using it was to 
refute the argument that all non-intended benefits coming from the claimant would give rise to restitutionary 
liability. Moreover Birks’ argument is flawed. Birks reasoned that, since the heating of the neighbour’s 
home was an inevitable side-effect of the claimant’s (intended) heating of his own home, the benefit to the 
neighbour must also be regarded as intended. This notion of oblique intention is philosophically suspect (see 
J. Finnis, “Intention and Side-effects”, ch. 2 of R. Frey and C. Morris (eds), Liability and Responsibility 
(Cambridge University Press, 1991)), and it is not clear that consent to the one, intended, result involves or is 
only consistent with consent to the other. However, even if we take the two consequences as a package, such 
that consent must be to both or to neither, the claimant would still be entitled to argue that, had he known that 
the defendant would be benefited, he would have acted differently. Yet the claimant would surely not 
succeed even if he could persuade the court that he would not have heated his house had he realised that the 
defendant’s house would also have been heated. Moreover, it certainly does not follow that the claimant’s 
consent was to the defendant receiving that benefit gratuitously (c.f Birks, supra n. 5, at p. 159).
42 “ ... there are certain marks or notes of the situation in which recompense is due, and I think that one mark 
or note is that the person who claims recompense must have lost something.” 1908 S.C. 99, at p. 106.
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point us in the right direction. The extra element in such claims is better expressed by saying that 
the benefit received by the defendant must be one to which the claimant was exclusively entitled, 
one which the law had reserved for him. If we wanted to rescue Lord Dunedin’s requirement of 
loss, we could then say that the claimant has only really “lost” something where he can establish 
some exclusive entitlement to what the defendant received. But we would be better off if we 
avoided the confusion engendered by introducing such a conception o f loss and instead talked 
simply in terms of entitlements.
3.6 The need for exclusivity
Bradford v. Pickles, Victoria Park Racing and Edinburgh and District Tramways v. 
Courtenay all provide instances where, despite the defendant receiving an enrichment which came, 
in one way or another, from the claimant and was not intended by him, no restitutionary claim was 
available.43 The important point is why in each case such a claim (would have) failed. In none of 
these cases was the claimant able to establish an exclusive entitlement to the type of benefit 
received by the defendant. So in Bradford, the defendant was entitled to draw off as much of the 
water as he liked; in Victoria Park Racing, the defendants were at liberty to profit from the view 
they had of the plaintiffs land.
By contrast, where the claimant can show that, at the very least vis-a-vis the defendant, he 
was exclusively entitled to the benefit the defendant received, then this gives us a reason to 
recognise a claim for restitution of that benefit.44 The law sets down individuals’ entitlements to 
wealth and sources o f wealth. Sometimes the law allocates wealth to one or more people, giving a 
right to the sole enjoyment of that wealth and with a right to exclude others from its enjoyment. At 
other times, the law makes no such allocation. Where no such exclusive entitlement is granted, any 
person is free to share in it, so far as he is able to, but without any right that others should not 
similarly benefit. What was at stake in Bradford and, more explicitly, in Victoria Park Racing was 
the nature o f the claimant’s entitlement to enjoy or share in a particular source of wealth: was it or 
was it not exclusive?
Where the law recognises a claimant as having an exclusive entitlement to a particular item 
of wealth certain consequences are likely to follow. Firstly, seeing that the law has allocated that
43 These are not the only possible examples. Another, similar to the variant on the facts of Victoria Park 
Racing at n. 33, supra, would be the setting up of a rival business, whereby custom moves from the claimant’s 
business to the defendant’s. A further, hypothetical, example is discussed in J. Penner, “Basic obligations”, 
ch. 5 of Birks (ed.), The Classification o f Obligations (Clarendon Press, 1997), at pp. 111-113.
44 See too J. Gordley, Foundations o f Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp. 424-426.
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wealth exclusively to the claimant, it then has good reason to give protection to the claimant’s 
interest by prohibiting interference with his enjoyment of i t  This explains the relevance of 
determining the nature of the claimant’s entitlement to the particular item of wealth to the tort 
claims brought in Bradford Corporation v. Pickles and Victoria Park Racing. Secondly, where 
there is an exclusive entitlement to an item or source of wealth, this will usually carry with it the 
power to determine who benefits from that wealth, one aspect o f which will be the power to dispose 
of that exclusive entitlement. Where wealth to which the claimant is exclusively entitled is received 
by the defendant, and the claimant has not given his consent to his receipt of that benefit, then a 
claim to the recovery of that wealth can be justified on the basis that such wealth is reserved for the 
claimant until he has made an effective disposition of it, and that, given he gave at most defective 
consent to its receipt by the defendant, no such disposition was made. In other words, this gives us 
a reason for restitution. Effectively, the restitutionary claim follows from the fact that the relevant 
item of wealth has been reserved for the claimant, and hence our ultimate justification for the 
restitutionary claim in such cases is the same as our justification for allocating certain items of 
wealth to individuals in the first place.
This then explains the common features of a class of restitutionary claims. The reason the 
gain is normatively significant is because the law allocates certain items of wealth exclusively to 
individual members o f society. If the claimant can say that an enrichment in the defendant’s hands 
is one to which the law had given him an exclusive entitlement, then, unless he had effectively 
consented to the defendant being so benefited, he should continue to be able to assert his 
entitlement to it. Mistake, failure of basis, coercion and the like are accordingly material factors as 
they go to the question of whether the claimant effectively consented to the defendant’s benefit.
We have so far avoided making reference to a concept which is usually central to issues of 
wealth allocation and entitlement. That concept is property. The relationship between property and 
restitutionary claims is one of the most controversial, and one of the least well understood, 
questions within the law of restitution. In the following chapter, we shall confront this question and 
we shall see how the notion of property should be understood as providing the basis of what may be 




O f the many valuable resources in the world, some1 are allocated by law to particular 
individuals or groups. This allocation frequently takes the form of a protected and exclusive 
entitlement to use that resource in whatever way one chooses, subject to any specific limitations set 
down in law. In addition to the liberty so to use the resource, the entitled individual or group will 
generally have the power to allow others to use and so benefit from it. This often extends to a 
power to transfer to another the entirety o f one’s entitlement. Where the law recognises such an 
entitlement in an individual, it not only allocates such wealth to him but also confers on him powers 
of reallocation. The allocation o f wealth through exclusive entitlements to use and to control 
others’ use of resources is conventionally seen to be the role o f the legal institution of property,2 
and such entitlements to resources can usefully be termed ownership interests.3
A central aspect of property institutions is, therefore, the power they give to owners to 
control the use others may make of and the benefits they may derive from particular items and 
sources o f wealth. This control entitles the owner, so far as his exclusive interest extends, to 
exclude others from use and enjoyment of that resource.4 It also allows him to grant others some 
enjoyment o f it, whether through outright transfer of his entitlement or some more limited grant of 
use privileges in relation to it. Such a grant may be gratuitous but it may also be made in exchange 
for the use o f or an entitlement to some other valuable resource. An owner’s interest in a resource 
therefore typically comprises an exclusive entitlement in relation to both its use and enjoyment and 
its potential as a means o f acquiring other forms of wealth through exchange.
These two dimensions o f ownership interests are reflected in the distinction sometimes 
drawn between “property as things” and “property as wealth”.5 However, the property as wealth 
aspect of ownership can be regarded as secondary to and derivative of its use dimension. Firstly,
1 Though not all: see K. Gray, “Property in Thin Air” [1991] C.L.J. 252.
2 See, e.g., J. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 3-4, 26-27; J. Penner, The 
Idea o f Property in Law (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 68-75; Gray, supra, n. 1 at p. 294.
3 See Harris, supra, n. 2 at pp. 5, 28-32. We may put to one side the objection that, in the absence of any 
claim directly asserting or vindicating one’s interest in an asset, there is no ownership of assets in English 
law: see W. Swadling, “Unjust Delivery”, ch. 15 of A. Burrows and Lord Rodger, Mapping the Law: Essays 
in Honour o f Peter Birks (Oxford University Press, 2006), at pp. 281-282. One may choose to define 
ownership so as to make it dependent on the availability of such a claim; many others, and I, choose not to.
4 See, e.g., Anchor Brewhouse Developments Ltd. v. Berkley House (Docklands Developments) Ltd. (1987)
38 Building L.R. 82, at p. 102,per Scott J.
5 See, e.g., Harris, supra, n. 2, pp. 140-141; B. Rudden, “Things as Things and Things as Wealth” (1994) 14 
O.J.L.S. 81.
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resources have value, and hence the potential to be used to acquire new items of wealth, precisely 
because o f the uses to which they can be put. We seek, and so are willing to pay for, resources 
because o f what we can do with them. Even if something is acquired solely as an investment, the 
purpose is to put oneself in a position to acquire other useful assets in the future. Secondly, an 
owner’s power to transfer or to grant use of that resource follows from the idea that, subject to legal 
limitations, he is free to do whatever he pleases with it. Grants o f use privileges or transfers of 
entitlement are just one type of use. It is therefore incorrect to view the entitlement of an owner as 
being limited to, or even primarily concerned with, the resource’s exchange value.
Legal protection and delineation o f an owner’s interest in a resource is provided by duties 
imposed on others in respect o f their dealings with it.6 In so far as the owner is granted exclusive 
use privileges over the resource, there will be primary duties requiring others to act consistently 
with the owner’s interest.7 This will include, for instance, obligations not so to use the resource 
without the owner’s consent and not to interfere with the owner’s own use o f it. These primary 
duties can be enforced through the provision of injunctive relief restraining imminent or continuing 
contraventions and through self-help remedies. They can also be given effect by duties requiring 
that other to act in a way which gives positive effect to the owner’s interest. Respect for the 
owner’s entitlement to the resource also provides the basis for the imposition o f secondary duties on 
those who have dealt with the resource in a prohibited manner. The most common example of this 
is an obligation to make compensation for any losses the defendant has caused the owner in so 
acting. The breach o f primary duties may also give rise to the imposition of penalties. In both 
cases, competing principles will generally restrict liability to those at fault.8 These rules are in the 
main part to be found in the criminal law and the law of torts. They are also, however, to be found 
within the law of restitution, and they includes the class of liability typified by cases of mistaken 
payments.
We have seen that ownership interests provide exclusive use privileges and control powers. 
The resource is the claimant’s to use and enjoy so far as his interest in it extends. Within this 
sphere o f exclusive entitlement, others may use and benefit from it only where and to the extent that 
the owner has given his consent. The relevance of this to the law of restitution should be clear. If, 
without the claimant’s consent, a defendant receives or uses or in some other way benefits from a 
resource which the claimant owns, and such use or benefit is of a type which falls within the 
exclusive entitlement o f the claimant, then that defendant obtains something to which he is not
6 Harris, ibid., pp. 5, 24-26 termed the rules imposing such duties “trespassory rules”.
7 For discussion of the terminology of primary and secondary duties see C. Webb, “Performance and 
Compensation: An Analysis of Contract Damages and Contractual Obligation” (2006) 26 O.J.L.S. 41, at pp. 
42-49. See further J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy o f Law, (R. Campbell (ed.), John 
Murray, 4th edn 1873), Lecture XLV.
8 See chapter 5, text to nn. 69-73 and chapter 6, n. 8 and accompanying text
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entitled. Moreover, what he obtains is something to which the claimant is entitled. This justifies, 
where possible, the return of what the defendant has obtained.
All this suggests a rather straightforward explanation o f the type of restitutionary liability 
arising in cases o f mistaken payments and the like. It rests on and gives effect to the claimant’s 
exclusive interest in what was obtained or received by the defendant. The claim that property or 
ownership offers an explanation o f such cases has been made before.9 It has, however, tended to be 
given short shrift. It is important to examine the criticisms which have been made of this argument 
and why they miss their mark.
4.1 The law
Much of the criticism which a property based explanation o f restitutionary liability has 
attracted is premised on a perceived lack of fit between the theory and the law. It is therefore useful 
as a starting point to set out how English law responds in such cases.
For ease, we shall initially look only at cases of receipt o f tangible personal property to 
which the claimant was beneficially entitled10 immediately prior to its receipt by the defendant and 
where the claimant’s consent to its receipt by the defendant is absent or defective. We shall also 
assume that the defendant gave nothing to the claimant in return for his acquisition of the asset and 
that no contractual relationship exists between the parties. At present, English law provides a 
variety o f responses, the applicability of which depends variously on the type o f asset involved, the 
nature of the claimant’s entitlement to it and the nature of the defect in the claimant’s consent.
If the claimant gives no consent11 to its receipt by the defendant or if his consent to its 
transfer is caused by a mistake which the law classes as fundamental,12 then the claimant will retain
9 See, e.g., S. Stoljar, The Law o f Quasi-Contract (Law Book Company, 2nd edn. 1989), pp. 5-9; D. Stevens, 
“Restitution, Property, and the Cause of Action in Unjust Enrichment: Getting by with Fewer Things” (1989) 
39 U. Toronto L.J. 258 and 325; B. Fitzgerald, “Ownership as the Proximity or Privity Principle in Unjust 
Enrichment Law” (1995) 18 U. Queensland L.J. 166; P. Watts, “Restitution - A Property Principle and a 
Services Principle” [1995] R.L.R. 49, at pp. 49-70; J. Dietrich, Restitution: A New Perspective (The 
Federation Press, 1998), pp. 208-213; P. Jaffey, The Nature and Scope o f Restitution (Hart Publishing, 2000), 
pp. 275-279. Links between “property” and “unjust enrichment” or “restitution” are also identified in S. 
Gardner, An Introduction to the Law o f Trusts (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2003), pp. 132-137; Gray, supra, n. 1 
at pp. 279-280; J. Harris, “Property -  Rights in Rem or Wealth”, ch. 4 of P. Birks and A. Pretto, Themes in 
Comparative Law: In Honour o f Bernard Rudden (Oxford University Press, 2002), at p. 59.
10 I.e. either the claimant held legal title and subject to no trust or the asset was held on trust for him 
absolutely. The question whether the receipt of trust property raises different issues, and hence calls for 
different treatment, from receipt of assets to which no trust was attached will be examined later: see, chapter 
5, text to nn. 74-98.
11 This covers situations where the claimant is ignorant of the asset coming into the defendant’s hands but 
should also extend to cases of “powerlessness”, where the claimant, though aware of the defendant receiving 
the asset, is unable to prevent it. See P. Birks and R. Chambers, The Restitution Research Resource
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his title to the asset, despite the defendant now having physical possession. Where the claimant’s 
consent is defective in some other way, for instance it is founded on a non-fundamental mistake, is 
given on the basis o f some condition which fails, or is the product o f compulsion, the claimant’s 
title will pass to the defendant.
In those cases where the claimant retains his title to the asset he will then be entitled either 
to specific recovery o f the asset or to a claim against the defendant for its value. Where the 
claimant has an equitable title, he can recover the asset itself from the defendant. There is no 
suggestion that change of position is a potential defence to such a claim13 and the claimant will have 
priority in the event o f the defendant’s insolvency. Where the claimant’s title is legal, he will 
generally have a claim in the tort of conversion. This entitles the claimant to recover the monetary 
value o f the asset received by the defendant, as well as compensation for further losses. Specific 
recovery is available only at the discretion of the court.14 Again the claimant is given priority in the 
defendant’s insolvency. No change of position defence is available, though the suggestion that it 
should be has received some judicial support.15 In the case of receipt of money, the claimant may 
also have a claim for money had and received. This entitles the claimant to recovery o f the 
equivalent sum from the defendant, but this time with no priority in insolvency and, it seems,16 the 
claim is subject to the change o f position defence.
Where the defect in consent does not prevent title passing to the defendant, a claimant who 
previously held legal title can recover the value of the transferred asset by virtue of a quantum 
valebat claim or an action for money had and received. Change o f position is a defence to such 
claims and they carry no priority in the event of the defendant’s insolvency. It also appears that, in 
some cases, in place of the legal title which has passed to the defendant, the claimant will acquire a 
new equitable title to that asset.17 The exact circumstances in which this will occur are
(Mansfield Press, 2nd edn 1997), p. 3: G. Virgo, The Principles o f the Law o f Restitution (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd edn 2006), p. 589.
12 The clearest example is where the claimant’s mistake is as to the identity of the transferee: see, e.g., Cundy 
v. Lindsay (1878) 3 App. Cas. 459. It seems that, at least some, mistakes as to the identity of the asset 
transferred may also be classed as fundamental: see Virgo, supra n. 11, pp. 586-588. Virgo also suggests that 
title will not pass in extreme cases of compulsion; ibid. pp. 589-590.
13 See Foskett v. McKeown [2001] 1 A.C. 102.
14 Under s 3(3) of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977.
15 See Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Co. (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] 2 W.L.R. 1353, para. 79 per 
Lord Nicholls.
16 Birks argued that all claims for money had and received are unjust enrichment claims and that all unjust 
enrichment claims (and, it seems, only such claims) are subject to the defence of change of position. The first 
part of this argument has however been challenged: see R. Grantham and C. Rickett, Enrichment and 
Restitution in New Zealand (Hart Publishing, 2000), pp. 32-34, 277-279; Virgo, supra n. 11, pp. 575, 645- 
646. In the shadow of Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548, Grantham and Rickett and Virgo 
nonetheless accept that change of position should be available in respect of such claims; Grantham and 
Rickett, ibid., pp. 360-361; Virgo, supra, n. 11, pp. 710-711.
17 E.g. Re Trusts o f the Abbott Fund [1900] 2 Ch. 326; Vandervell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1967] 2 
A.C. 291; Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. [1981] Ch. 105. See more
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controversial. Where it does, the claimant is entitled to specific recovery o f the asset and has 
priority in insolvency. At present, change of position is no defence, though there is academic 
support for the view that it should be.18 The position is less clear with respect to claimants who 
held an equitable title. In most cases the defendant will have received the asset as the result of an 
improper transfer by the claimant’s trustee, in which case the claimant will most likely have been 
ignorant of the transfer and hence his title will remain. Furthermore, as we are looking at cases of 
physical receipt o f the asset, defective dispositions by the claimant o f his equitable interest are not 
in point, since the asset will in such cases remain in the trustee’s hands. The only cases in point 
then would seem to be where the claimant directs his trustee to transfer the asset to the defendant 
absolutely and where the claimant releases his equitable interest such that the defendant trustee 
becomes absolutely entitled to the asset.19 Should the claimant’s consent to the transaction be 
defective, then the likely result is that the claimant could ask for the disposition to be rescinded.
So, there is no doubt that as the law stands, a variety of responses exist to defective or non- 
consensual transfers of property. The key question then is whether these different responses can be 
attributed to material differences between the cases. If not, we are failing to treat like cases alike.
4.2 The passing of title
Most restitution writers support the distinction between, and different treatment of, on the 
one hand, those cases where the claimant’s absent or defective consent has the effect of precluding 
title passing to the defendant recipient and, on the other, those in which the claimant’s title 
nonetheless does pass. If this distinction is to be justified it must be on the basis that it reflects and 
supports a material dissimilarity between the two classes o f case. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, the material likeness of cases can only be determined by identifying those principles which 
we believe should be reflected in the law and examining their application to the facts.20 What we 
should not do is to conclude that cases are materially alike simply because they are treated alike or 
that they are materially different because they are treated differently.21 Therefore, the clear fact that 
the law does draw a distinction between those cases where title does pass and those where it does 
not, does not in itself tell us whether it should.
generally R. Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Clarendon Press, 1997); c.f Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] A.C. 696.
18 See, e.g., P. Birks, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths” [1997] N.Z. Law Review 623, at 
pp. 632-635; Chambers, supra, n. 17, p. 237.
19 In both cases, the defendant would end up with legal beneficial title, the claimant’s equitable title having 
been extinguished. They therefore differ in structure from those cases discussed previously where the 
claimant’s is a legal title and it is this title which passes to the defendant.
20 See chapter 3, supra, text to nn. 1-4.
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Many of the arguments that have been made in support o f this distinction can be rejected on 
this basis. For example, a number of writers seek to justify the distinction between claims where 
title has not passed and those where it has on the basis that the courts approach matters differently 
in each case, for example by not requiring the identification of an “unjust factor” in the former class 
o f case.22 Even if  this were true,23 all this would show is that the courts currently treat these cases 
differently, not that they are different.
Similarly misconceived is the argument that only where the claimant’s title passes to the 
defendant recipient can it be said that he has been enriched or that his enrichment comes at the 
claimant’s expense, and hence that his liability is founded on his unjust enrichment.24 From this it 
is thought to follow that liability in those cases where title does not pass must be explained on some 
other basis. The standard counter-argument is that, though the defendant may not as a matter of 
“technicality” be enriched, as a matter of “factual reality” he is, since, in spite of his lack of title to 
it, the asset is at his disposal.25 A stronger point perhaps is that if  we are to view enrichment as 
precluded by the claimant’s retention of title to the asset received by the defendant, then we should 
also say that the defendant is not enriched where he does acquire title but comes under an 
immediate obligation to give up its value. In both cases the law has provided a mechanism which 
prevents the defendant from benefiting from his receipt.26 The more fundamental objection,
21 Ibid.
22 See, e.g., A. Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (Butterworths, 2nd edn 2002), pp. 61-62; Virgo, supra, n. 11, 
pp. 11-14, 570-574; L. Smith, “Unjust Enrichment, Property and the Structure of Trusts” (2000) 116 L.Q.R. 
412, at p. 420.
23 And, as regards the role of “unjust factors”, it may not be. Though the courts may not use this language in 
those cases where title does not pass, it is clear that the determination that title has not passed requires first 
identifying a relevant and sufficient defect in consent on the part of the claimant to the asset’s receipt by the 
defendant.
24 See, e.g., W. Swadling, “A Claim in Restitution” [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 63; A. Tettenbom, “Restitution of 
Property you do not Own Anyway”, ch. 11 of A. Hudson (ed.), New Perspectives on Property Law, 
Obligations and Restitution (Cavendish Publishing, 2003). C.f. Portman Building Society v. Hamlyn Taylor 
Neck [1998] 4 All E.R. 202.
25 See Birks, supra, n. 18 at pp. 654-656; c.f. R. Grantham and C. Rickett, “Restitution, Property and 
Ignorance -  A Reply to Mr Swadling” [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 463; Grantham and Rickett, supra, n. 16, pp. 34-35. 
It seems, however, that Birks subsequently changed his view on the factual enrichment point, see P. Birks, 
Unjust Enrichment (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2004), pp. 27, 64-68, arguing that title does indeed preclude 
enrichment and so that, where title does not pass, the success of an unjust enrichment claim requires the 
claimant effectively to renounce his title. Grantham and Rickett’s line on the factual enrichment argument 
appears to fluctuate; compare the citations above with the following: R. Grantham and C. Rickett, “Trust 
Money as an Unjust Enrichment: A Misconception” [1998] L.M.C.L.Q. 514, at pp. 517-518; R. Grantham and 
C. Rickett, “Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event” [2003] C.L.J. I l l ,  at pp. 738, 742-743.
26 For instance, Grantham and Rickett, in R. Grantham and C. Rickett, “Property Rights as a Legally 
Significant Event” [2003] C.L.J. I l l ,  at p. 742, deny the existence of enrichment where title does not pass on 
the basis that “[t]he defendant’s receipt was always encumbered with an obligation, arising from the 
claimant’s right in rem, to return the property”. But, if the defendant cannot be regarded as enriched where he 
is liable to give up the asset received or its value (and it is clear that Grantham and Rickett see their argument 
as applying as much to the latter type of claim as to the former), the same argument denies enrichment in 
respect of those claims where title does pass. Essentially the same point is made in P. Watts, “Property and 
‘Unjust Enrichment’: Cognate Conservators” [1998] N.Z. Law Review 151, at p .161.
52
however, is that, irrespective o f what the law may treat as an enrichment, the notion of enrichment 
cannot establish the material dissimilarity of the two types o f case we are looking at. If, for 
example, we compare the cases of an asset transferred to the defendant on the basis of a mistake as 
to his identity and o f the same asset transferred on the basis of the claimant’s mistaken belief that he 
is under an obligation to do this, it is plain that they are not to be materially distinguished on the 
issue of the defendant’s enrichment. In both cases the same asset comes into the defendant’s hands. 
If asking whether the defendant is enriched is a relevant question, and this needs first to be 
established, then the answer must be the same in both cases, namely yes.
If the current division between claims where title subsists and those where it does not is to 
be justified, more must be done than simply to fall back on the reality that such a division is an 
established part of the law. What is needed is an explanation o f why we should maintain this 
distinction.
One such argument is that while the property explanation can account for those cases where 
the claimant’s title to the asset subsists after receipt by the defendant, it cannot explain those cases 
in which it passes since, by definition, the claimant’s property, in the sense of title, in that asset has 
been lost. For example, Burrows, in rejecting Stoljar’s version o f the property explanation, writes:27
... as an explanation of the usual case of restitution, where the claimant has itself paid its money to 
the defendant, the theory is seriously deficient for only in a limited number of cases does the property in the 
money not pass to the payee.
Now it would be astonishing if Stoljar and all those putting forward similar views had 
overlooked the passing of title in these cases. But of course they have not. They are not arguing 
that such restitutionary claims follow from the fact that, as a matter o f law, the claimant retains title 
to the asset following its receipt by the defendant. Plainly in many cases it does not. Rather their, 
and my, argument is that it is only by reference to the interest, or property, that the claimant had in 
that asset at the outset that we can explain why it is that he is able to bring a claim when that asset 
then comes into the defendant’s hands following a transfer to which the claimant’s consent was 
either flawed or wholly absent. The defendant is liable precisely because this interest entitled the 
claimant alone to determine who should use and enjoy that asset, and his decision to allow the 
defendant to receive and benefit from it was, at best, defective.
It is, at the very least, misconceived to look simply at the rules on the passing of title and to 
conclude from these that property can have no role to play in justifying the claims that arise in these 
cases. For a start, this assumes the correctness o f these rules, and yet the very question in issue is 
whether the law is right to respond the way it does in such cases. So, we know that title does pass
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in many cases of defective transfers, but one of the questions we need to address is whether and 
why it should. More fundamentally, however, the Burrows argument reflects a common failing in 
unjust enrichment writing, namely to ignore the fact that the rules on the passing of title are 
themselves a part of, but crucially only one part of, the law’s regime to deal with defective transfers. 
So, the Burrows argument would have us believe that in those cases where title passes, the transfer 
of the asset from claimant to defendant is itself perfect, that the claimant successfully and 
effectively disposed of his interest in the asset, notwithstanding any flaws in his decision-making 
faculties or process. It is because of this that so many commentators then feel driven to look 
elsewhere for an explanation for the claims that lie in such cases. Yet, if  we really did believe that 
the transfer was entirely effective and beyond challenge, we would have no reason to give any 
claim to the claimant. The asset was the claimant’s to dispose of, but he did so. That should be the 
end of the story. The fact that the law, even as it is, does not take this view but instead imposes a 
liability on the defendant to give up the asset’s value tells us that it does not consider the claimant to 
have made a straightforward and effective disposition of his interest in the asset.28
Now, it can certainly be argued, as I shall later, that the fact that, in many of these cases, the 
law treats title as having passed notwithstanding the claimant’s flawed consent to the transfer means 
that the law’s protection of the claimant’s interest in his assets is sometimes incomplete or 
inadequate.29 But, even as the law stands and even in those cases where title is, at present, held to 
pass to the defendant, we can justify the claims that arise following a defective transfer or 
misapplication of assets only by reference to the notion of property, to the fact that the law gives 
exclusive entitlements to determine who can use and enjoy assets, since only then can we account 
for why the law considers that this claimant consent is relevant to, and determines the existence of 
claims in respect of, this defendant’s receipt of this asset or benefit.
27 Burrows, supra, n. 22, p. 9.
28 Conversely, there is a tendency to view recovery in those cases where title does not pass as resting simply 
on the claimant’s subsisting title to the asset in the defendant’s hands (see, e.g., Burrows, supra, n. 22, pp. 61- 
62; Virgo, supra, n. 11, pp. 11-17, 570-574; Grantham and Rickett, n. 16, pp. 30-41). However, holding the 
title is retained by the claimant despite the asset having physically changed hands is itself a legal response, a 
legal state of affairs, which requires justification.
29 Moreover, the end result in such cases is not far different to the majority of cases where title does not pass, 
for here too the claimant can usually obtain no more than the monetary value of the asset, with the defendant 
retaining the asset and, ultimately, acquiring title to it. To similar effect, in Roman law, successful vindicatio 
claims, whereby the claimant asserted his entitlement to an asset held by the defendant, gave rise only to an 
obligation to pay over to the claimant a sum of money equal in value to that asset (see, e.g., B. Nicholas, An 
Introduction to Roman Law (Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 100-102). So, here too the law left the defendant 
free to keep the property. As such, we can see that typically, whether or not title is held to pass in the first 
instance, the claimant position in substance is much the same. And, just as the fact that the claimant does not 
ultimately recover the asset and indeed loses his title to it does not lead us to view vindicatio claims as 
anything other than assertions of the claimant’s interest in his assets, nor should we reject the view that the 
claims available in respect of defective transfers where title is held to pass are to be explained by reference to 
the claimant’s interest in the asset.
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Accordingly, we can and should say that the reason that title does not pass, and that the 
defendant is then liable to the claimant, where the asset is received without the claimant’s 
knowledge or by virtue o f a fundamental mistake is the same as that underlying the defendant’s 
liability in the more typical case where the claimant’s flawed consent is not considered sufficient to 
prevent title passing. In both cases the same principle is being applied, the same interest 
protected.30 And that interest is the one identified at the beginning of this chapter: the interest in 
exclusively determining the use, enjoyment and disposition of those resources which the law, 
through the institution o f property, allocates to each of us.
Now, though the facts both of those cases where title passes and those where it does not call 
for the application o f the same principle, and though the responses English law has adopted in these 
cases are best explained as applications of this common principle, it is nonetheless clear that 
English law does draw a distinction between these two classes of case, providing different 
responses in each. Two conclusions are possible. One is that, because of the factual differences 
between them, the application of the principle to them requires a different response in each class of 
case. The other is that the law has gone wrong and is failing to treat like cases alike.
4.3 The defect in the claimant’s consent
The only factual differences between the two classes o f case we have been discussing thus 
far lies in the nature of the defect of consent on the part of the claimant to the defendant’s receipt of 
the asset. On the one hand we have instances of a complete absence o f consent and consent brought 
about by a mistake o f a type the law classes as fundamental; on the other we have all other defects 
sufficient in law to found a restitutionary claim.31 Two distinct arguments have been made which 
seek to justify the law’s differing treatment of these cases on this basis.
The first argument maintains that the question whether the claimant intended title to pass is 
distinct from the question whether the claimant intended the defendant to be benefited. Virgo, for 
instance, writes:32
...[tjitle will not pass to the defendant either where the claimant lacks an intention that title should 
pass or where the claimant’s intention can be treated as vitiated. ... Analysis of the categories of cases in 
which the claimant’s title is vitiated suggests that they mirror the recognised grounds of restitution within the
action founded on the reversal of unjust enrichment. But it must be emphasised that these categories have a
30 See too Watts, supra, nn. 26, pp. 152-153.
31 See supra, text to nn. 10-19.
32 Virgo, supra, n. 11, p. 583. See too Swadling, supra, n. 24 at pp. 64-65, G. Jones, Goff and Jones: The Law 
o f Restitution (Sweet and Maxwell, 6th edn 2002), p. 243.
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different function in the context of proprietary restitutionary claims and are consequently defined in a 
different way from the recognized grounds of restitution. For in this context we are not concerned with 
whether the claimant actually intended to benefit the defendant. Rather, we are concerned to determine 
whether the claimant actually intended that title in the property should pass to the defendant.
The suggestion then is that there is no inconsistency in the law in the law responding 
differently to different defects in consent because there is no inconsistency in our saying that the 
claimant did consent to his title passing to the defendant but that he did not effectively consent to 
the defendant being benefited through his receipt of the asset. This does not deny that we are in 
both cases concerned with the claimant’s interest in determining the disposition of those assets 
allocated to him.33 Rather, the differing treatment of such cases is attributable to the different types 
of disposition the claimant may make of his assets. The application o f the principle, and hence the 
precise legal response, is accordingly dependent on the particular disposition o f the asset to which 
the claimant’s consent was defective.
That the intention to pass title is not the same as the intention to confer a benefit through 
one’s asset is clear. Transfer of the entirety of one’s entitlement is just one way of using that asset 
to benefit another. The grant of more limited or temporary use privileges is another possibility. 
However, what this tells us is that it is possible to intend to benefit another through one’s property 
without having an intention to transfer title to that other. This does not aid the argument. What 
needs to be established is whether and how it is possible for the claimant to intend title to pass but 
not to intend the recipient to benefit.
Now the law does provide a mechanism which enables an owner to transfer title to another 
without conferring any corresponding benefit on him. That mechanism is the trust. This means that 
the combination o f an intention to pass title and a lack of intention that the recipient should benefit 
is neither nonsensical nor a legal impossibility. But it is clearly not consistent with the intentions of 
the claimant in the cases we are looking at.
In those cases where English law holds that title passes but imposes on the defendant a 
liability to give up the asset’s value, for instance where the transfer is caused by a non-fundamental 
mistake or is made under compulsion, it is a fiction to say that, though the claimant did not intend 
the defendant to benefit, he did intend title to pass. Save where an owner makes a transfer on trust, 
the intention to pass title is an intention to benefit. Where, for example, a claimant mistakenly pays 
the same debt twice, his purpose in making the second payment is to transfer title to, and thereby 
the benefit of, that money. Had he remembered the prior payment, he would have intended the
33 Though Virgo does view the two types of case as involving distinct principles. His view that distinct 
principles are involved in essence rests on the different ways in which the law responds to these cases. As we 
have seen, chapter 3, text to nn. 1-4, the material likeness or dissimilarity of cases cannot be established this 
way.
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defendant neither to obtain title to it nor to derive any benefit from it. The intent to pass title and 
the intent to benefit go hand in hand. It is unreal to insist that the claimant’s consent to title passing 
is intact and it is only his intent to confer a benefit that is vitiated. Moreover, because of this, the 
basis of the restitutionary claim contradicts the reason for holding that title has passed. The law has 
a choice to make as to what defects of consent will prevent title passing and will give rise to 
restitutionary liability, but it cannot consistently conclude both the that title passes because this is 
what the claimant intended and that the defendant must nonetheless give up the benefit he received 
because the claimant did not consent to this.34 My point here is simply that such a response, and the 
distinction between these cases and those where title does not pass, cannot be supported on the basis 
that it reflects the claimant’s intentions or the way in which his consent was defective.
The second argument does not draw any such distinction between the intention to pass title 
and the intention to benefit. Instead, it seeks to justify the law’s different responses in such cases on 
the basis that they reflect the different degrees to which a claimant’s consent to the defendant’s 
receipt is absent or defective. The greater the defect in the claimant’s consent the greater the level 
of protection he merits. Accordingly, the retention of title in cases o f ignorance reflects the 
claimant’s complete absence o f consent to the defendant’s receipt, whereas the passing of title 
where the claimant makes a non-fundamental mistake is said to mirror the fact that his consent, 
though defective, is not wholly absent. Another way of viewing this would be to say that where 
consent is absent or seriously defective the transfer has no legal effect whatsoever, whereas where 
the defect is more minor, the transfer is prima facie  effective.
Two principal objections could be made. Firstly, one may question the premiss of the 
argument, that defects o f consent differ not just in kind (for instance as between mistaken and 
compelled consent) but in degree. It is clear, for example, that there is a factual distinction between 
the state of mind o f a claimant whose asset is taken without his knowledge and that of one who 
transfers it on the basis of a liability mistake. What is not so clear to me is whether the claimant’s 
consent is any greater, any more real, in the latter case than in the former. It seems to me that in the 
case of mistake, as in the case of ignorance, in the circumstances, the claimant gives no consent to 
the defendant’s receipt. O f course it is true that the claimant knows o f the transfer and, on his 
understanding of the facts, intends it. But if this is our proper focus then there should be no 
recovery at all. Similarly, I am far from sure how we are to distinguish greater from more minor 
mistakes; in what way is a fundamental mistake (more) fundamental? When we distinguish “big” 
and “small” mistakes in everyday speech we are generally distinguishing the consequences of those 
mistakes, rather than the nature o f the misapprehension or its effect on the individual’s decision-
34 This is not to say that holding title to have passed and limiting the claimant to recovery of the asset’s value 
may not be justified. However, if we are to do so it can only be through the application of competing 
principles which counter the need to give full protection and effect to the claimant’s interest in his assets.
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making. Looking to the effect of mistake in the law of contract provides no assistance. The 
division between mistakes as to identity, which render a contract void, and mistakes as to 
“attributes”, which do not, is not drawn on the basis of the extent to which the claimant’s consent is 
defective,35 nor do the courts resolve onto which side o f the divide a particular case falls by looking 
at the size or significance of the mistake.36 Other types of mistake which make a contract void 
similarly are not defined by reference to the degree to which they render the parties’ consent 
defective but are instead identified by their impact on the performance o f the purported contractual 
obligations.37
An alternative approach would be to look at causation, differentiating “significant” or 
“predominant” causes from those which are not. And yet, despite the frequent appearance of such 
notions in discussion of causation,381 am sceptical as to how we distinguish causes on the basis o f 
significance, that is, on the basis of the size of their contribution to the result. Once we have a list 
o f causae sine qua non for the claimant’s decision, it seems idle to inquire as to their relative 
significance since, ex hypothesi, the absence of any one of these would have resulted in a different 
outcome. We can ask which factors were at the forefront o f the claimant’s mind when he made his 
decision, but it does not follow that these are any more important, or deserving of attention, than his 
background assumptions. Another approach would be to ask how great the claimant’s desire was 
that the defendant not benefit, as this more clearly is a question of degree. But this question looks 
unanswerable, certainly unquantifiable, and in any case would not lead to the neat distinctions 
currently drawn between mistakes as to different factors (identity, subject matter and so on).
I shall not, however, pursue this objection further, as it would take far more than the space 
available here to substantiate. There is a second objection though. As we have seen, not all factual 
differences between cases are material differences. Accordingly, even if  it is true that there are 
degrees to which one’s consent can be defective, so that this provides a basis for factually 
distinguishing these cases, it does not necessarily follow that this also gives us a reason for
35 See, e.g., Shogun Finance Ltd. v. Hudson [2004] 1 A.C. 919, at p. 948,per Lord Millett, “... it is difficult to 
see why a mistake induced by fraud should make a contract altogether void if it is a mistake as to the offeror’s 
identity (whatever that may mean) and not if it is a mistake as to some other attribute of his such as 
creditworthiness which may be equally or more material”.
36 That is assuming that such a division can be supported. Criticism of the identity and attributes distinction is 
widespread: see, e.g., Ingram v. Little [1961] 1 Q.B. 31, at pp. 64-65,per  Devlin L.J.; Lewis v. Averay [1972] 
1 Q.B. 198, at p. 206, per Lord Denning M.R.; Shogun Finance Ltd. v. Hudson [2004] 1 A.C. 919, at pp. 931- 
932, per Lord Nicholls, and at p. 948,per Lord Millett.
37 See, e.g., Bell v. Lever Bros [1932] A.C. 161, at p. 218 per Lord Atkin, “ ... a mistake [as to quality] will 
not affect assent unless it ... is as to the existence of some quality which makes the thing without the quality 
essentially different from the thing as it was believed to be”; Great Peace Shipping Ltd. v. Tsavliris Salvage 
(International) Ltd. [2003] Q.B. 679, at p. 703, per Lord Phillips M.R., “ ...if  common mistake is to avoid a 
contract... the non-existence of the state of affairs must render performance of the contract impossible”.
38 See, e.g., Barton v. Armstrong [1976] A.C. 104, at p. 121; R. v. Cheshire [1991] 1 W.L.R. 844, at p. 851- 
852; Huyton S.A. v. Peter Cremer GmbH & Co. [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 620, at pp. 636. See too the reference
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according them different treatment. It has never been suggested, nor is there any basis in principle, 
for limiting the claimant’s recovery for the simple reason that his consent, though flawed, could 
have been even more defective. An owner’s interest in those assets allocated to him justifies the 
defendant’s liability wherever such an asset comes into his hands without the claimant’s consent, 
and whatever the defect in that consent. If limitations are to be imposed on the claimant’s recovery 
then these must come from the application of principles which compete with or qualify the 
protection of the claimant’s ownership interest; principles which carry more weight (or are not so 
easily outweighed) where the flaw in the claimant’s consent is more minor.
An analogy can be drawn with the law of torts. Where the claimant seeks compensation for 
the losses caused to him by the defendant, there is no suggestion that the claimant should have his 
damages reduced just because the defendant could have fallen even further below the standards 
expected of him. However, there are distinct principles which do justify limiting the amount 
recoverable, and these principles receive greater recognition where the defendant’s wrongdoing is 
less serious. For instance, the rules of remoteness apply so as to limit the types of loss for which the 
claimant receives compensation, and these rules have greater scope where the defendant’s 
wrongdoing is less serious.39
The resolution of this question therefore depends on the identification and application o f the 
principles which compete with the principle of protecting and effectuating the claimant’s ownership 
interest in his assets. These will be examined in chapter 6. For now, it can be said that, even if  it 
we were to accept the argument that the extent of the claimant’s recovery should depend on the 
degree to which his consent to the defendant’s receipt is defective, this would not justify the law as 
it stands. Firstly, there is no reason to assume that mistakes as to identity are any more 
“fundamental”, in the sense of being destructive of the claimant’s consent, than mistakes as to other 
factors.40 Secondly, it is not an accurate representation of the law to say that the claimant is better 
protected where title does not pass than where it does.41 Sometimes the claimant is indeed better 
off. The absence o f a change of position defence to conversion claims is one example. However, 
there are also instances when a claimant is in a better position if title is held to pass, particularly in 
those cases where the claimant acquires a new equitable title in the asset.42 For instance, it is only 
in this latter case that the claimant is entitled to the specific recovery of the asset transferred. In 
addition, due to the more generous rules of tracing and claiming in equity, in such cases the
of to “causative potency” in Brian Warwicker Partnership v. H.O.K. International Ltd. [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 
962, at para. 37.
39 Compare, for instance, the test set down in Overseas Tanks hip (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engineering 
Co. Ltd., The Wagon Mound [1961] A.C. 388 with that in Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour 
Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd. [1997] A.C. 254.
40 Remembering that we cannot distinguish these cases on the basis that it is only in the former case that the 
claimant’s intention to pass title is vitiated: see supra, text to nn. 32-34.
41 See S. Worthington, Equity (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2006), pp. 290, 294-303.
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claimant is also in a stronger position should the defendant have exchanged the original asset or 
mixed it with other assets. The position presently taken by English law in these cases cannot, 
therefore, be regarded as carrying through a clear policy of providing better protection to a claimant 
whose consent is more seriously defective.
4.4 Terminology
We have seen that the law responds in a variety of ways to cases where an asset to which 
the claimant is exclusively entitled is received by the defendant, without the claimant’s consent. 
However, all these cases raise the same question of principle and the varying responses of the law to 
such cases can all be seen to be applications of the same principle. However, the fact that there are 
differing responses shows that the law is effecting this principle in different ways at different times. 
Even if we can say that defects in consent vary in degree, and that this justifies varying degrees of 
protection, this cannot justify the current legal position. Like cases are not being treated alike. In 
the next chapter we shall examine what response principle requires in these cases.
Before this, it is helpful to recap and to make clear why I see little or no role in the analysis 
of the types of claim under discussion for two concepts or expressions, one or both of which are 
central to most analyses o f the law of restitution: unjust enrichment and the vindication of property 
rights.
4.4.1 Unjust enrichment
As we saw in chapter 2, the notion of unjust enrichment as an event, and the event-based 
taxonomy into which it fits, must be rejected. Justice requires that we treat like cases alike, and the 
identification o f like cases requires analysis of the principles to be embodied in and effectuated 
through our legal rules. The project of classifying rights by causative event, at best, distracts us 
from these tasks. At worst, it leads us in the wrong directions. The alternative conception of unjust 
enrichment, as a principle, is little better as, however broadly or narrowly it is defined, it fails to 
identify a reason for requiring the defendant to give up his gain. The analyses of those who employ 
unjust enrichment, whether as an event or as a principle, as a basis for the classification and 
differentiation of cases fail because they either do not ask what is it that makes Cases materially
42 See supra, n. 13-14.
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alike and unalike or their answer to this question is inadequate. The end result of this is the 
grouping together o f cases which are materially dissimilar.43
We can now see that unjust enrichment reasoning also leads to the segregation of cases 
which raise common questions of principle. Under Birks’ event-based taxonomy, in those cases 
where title passes, the claimant’s right o f recovery arises from the unjust enrichment of the 
defendant. However, where title does not pass, the claimant’s subsisting rights in the transferred 
asset are nothing to do with unjust enrichment44 since they were held by the claimant before the 
asset ever came into the defendant’s hands. But once we realise that this is not the correct question 
to ask, and once we ask why it is that the claimant does retain title in such cases, then it is clear that 
we are dealing with the same principle in each case. Birks came very close to admitting this, but his 
reliance on classification by causative event required firmly distinguishing the prevention and the 
reversal of unjust enrichment.45 One might have thought that when unjust enrichment is used as the 
basis of a principle, so avoiding the distinctions entailed by the event-based taxonomy, there would 
be no such difficulty recognising the common principle underlying both types of case. However, 
for the most part,46 those who have employed a version of the principle have supported a distinction 
between the cases where title passes and those where it does not, primarily on the grounds that the 
courts deal with these cases differently and that there is no enrichment where title does not pass. 
These arguments have been dealt with already.47
43 See chapter 3, infra, text to nn. 12-14 and 20-24.
44 The only slight qualification is that, on Birks’ analysis, there will be some cases where the claimant’s 
subsisting title to the asset arose in the first place as a response to an earlier unjust enrichment. However, in 
such instances, although the claimant’s rights arise from an unjust enrichment, this is not an unjust enrichment 
of the defendant recipient and indeed, at least where the claimant does not disclaim his title, there is no unjust 
enrichment when the defendant receives the asset.
45 P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law o f Restitution (Clarendon Press, rev. edn 1989), pp. 25-26. Aside from 
the fact that this distinction followed inevitably from the process of classifying by causative event, Birks also 
offered a practical reason fof maintaining a distinction between cases where title passes and those where it 
does not, namely that law on the acquisition of property rights would become dragged into the law of 
restitution, leaving the subject which is too large to be manageable: see ibid., p. 15. This can be criticised on 
two grounds. Firstly, there is no reason to assume that the rules on the acquisition of title would then have to 
be seen as part of the law of restitution. The fact that there exist tort claims in respect of damage to or 
interference with the claimant’s property in no meaningful way entails that the rules as to acquiring title are 
subsumed within the law of torts. And, in any case, the claimant’s title to the asset transferred is just as 
important to the success of those claims where that title passes. In either case, the claimant will not succeed 
unless he has title to the asset immediately prior to the defendant’s receipt. Secondly, it does not follow from 
the fact that the size of a subject requires it to be divided for the purposes of exposition and learning that such 
divisions are to be respected when it comes to deciding cases. Classification for the purposes of exposition 
has a different function from and so need not mirror classification for the purposes of the analysis and 
resolution of cases.
46 Though see A. Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (Butterworths, 1st edn 1993), pp. 362-375, for an instance 
of the unjust enrichment principle being used to explain thos^ cases where title does not pass. Burrows, 
however, changed his mind on this, supporting a distinction between the two types of case primarily on the 
issue of enrichment: see Burrows, supra, n. 22, pp. 61-62.
47 See supra, text to nn. 20-26.
61
Could we rescue the terminology of unjust enrichment by using it to describe the principle 
underlying all these claims, the principle we have so far expressed in terms of the protection o f the 
claimant’s property or ownership interest? This would give it a material unity which other 
conceptions o f unjust enrichment have lacked. This is, in essence, the position taken by Gordley.48 
Consistently with the analysis presented here, Gordley stresses the role of exclusivity in 
restitutionary claims. A claimant will be able to recover where the benefit received by the 
defendant derived from a resource to which the defendant had an exclusive right to benefit. It is not 
enough simply to show that the benefit came from the claimant without the latter’s consent. 
Accordingly, as Gordley acknowledges, the conceptions of the unjust enrichment principle adopted 
by most commentators are on this basis defective. However, rather than rejecting the language of 
unjust enrichment, Gordley argues that we need simply to refine our understanding of it. Once we 
appreciate the requirement that the claimant has an exclusive right to benefits of the kind received 
by the defendant, we can continue to talk meaningfully o f a principle against unjust enrichment. 
Indeed, Gordley contends that we cannot dispense with unjust enrichment since it is only by 
reference to the principle that we can explain when and why the law provides for the recovery of 
benefits.
As will be clear, I agree with much of Gordley’s analysis. However, I find his use of unjust 
enrichment unpersuasive. In restitutionary claims of the kind under consideration, the key question, 
as Gordley notes, is whether the claimant has an exclusive interest in benefits o f the kind received 
by the defendant. But “unjust enrichment” provides no assistance in determining the existence, 
nature or scope of such interests.49 As a matter of authority, the resolution of such issues requires 
us to turn to the law of property. To answer these questions at the level of principle we must 
inquire into the reasons the law recognises such interests at all. However, once we identify and 
understand the nature of such interests, we already have our explanation o f why such benefits are 
recoverable. “Unjust enrichment” tells us nothing we do not already know.
So, while it would be possible, instead of speaking in terms o f the protection of property or 
ownership or exclusive interests in assets, to redeploy the language o f unjust enrichment to explain 
these claims, this is dependent on a refinement of unjust enrichment which makes the concept 
superfluous. Indeed, continued reference to unjust enrichment is likely to be counter-productive. 
One problem is that, though “unjust enrichment” is a more convenient, and more familiar, 
expression, it is not as revealing. It tells us that the defendant has come under a liability by virtue of 
his receipt but it does not tell us why this is. The words “unjust enrichment”, by themselves, give 
us a conclusion - that the defendant has something that he should not, that he must give it up - not a
48 J. Gordley, Foundations o f Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University 
Press, 2006), pp. 419-432.
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reason. Now it is possible that we could all learn to understand unjust enrichment as referring to the 
principle of protecting and effectuating a claimant’s ownership interest when, without his consent, 
an asset of his comes into the defendant’s hands. But it would increase the risk of confusion. There 
are already established definitions of unjust enrichment which we would have to take care to excise, 
and the difficulty o f this task would be compounded by the need to battle against the natural 
implications o f the language of unjust enrichment, which embraces all benefit based claims. 
Elegance is not to be pursued at the risk of inaccuracy and injustice. And if constant reference to 
the protection o f ownership interests in the event of unintended transfers is thought unwieldy or 
inelegant, we should look for terminology which does not carry with it preconceptions or 
implications at odds with the idea we are seeking to identify.
It may be argued that we should be wary of abandoning the language of unjust enrichment. 
Much progress has been made in recent years in judicial and academic understanding of the law of 
restitution, and this has been due in a large part to the acceptance o f theoretical models which have 
unjust enrichment as their foundation. There is a fear that much of this good work will be lost by 
abandonment o f traditional unjust enrichment analysis.50 It is difficult to see why this would 
happen. Faced with competition between orthodox analyses o f restitution and modem 
reinterpretations, judges are unlikely to pick neither, and run for the cover of quasi-contract and the 
like. In any case, when justice, the like treatment of like cases, is in issue, the comfort of sticking 
with what we have carries little weight. We should not be scared off debate about key theoretical 
issues simply because some find them bothersome or unpalatable. These things matter; they affect 
the outcome of cases and hence the rights and liabilities of litigants.
If it is to be used at all, the terminology of unjust enrichment should be reserved for those 
occasions when we need a common term for all cases where the defendant comes under a liability 
to give up a gain. Restitutionary liability means that there has been unjust enrichment and vice 
versa. This is essentially the sense in which unjust enrichment was first used by Birks. Moreover, 
it is consistent with the natural meaning of the words and so should not be a source of confusion. 
But it should also be clear that when unjust enrichment is used in this way it contributes nothing to 
our understanding o f restitutionary liability. To say there is an unjust enrichment is to say that the 
defendant has received something which must be given up, but it says nothing as to when or why 
this is the case. This leaves unjust enrichment with the same role in the exposition of restitutionary 
liability as a notion o f unjust or recoverable loss would have in describing claims for compensation. 
It is telling that accounts and analyses of compensatory claims get by and are intelligible without 
reference to any such notion.
49 Indeed, Gordley acknowledges this; see ibid., at p. 425: “ ... to apply the principle, one has to know whether 
the claimant has an exclusive right. The principle itself does not tell us what exclusive rights people have.”
50 See, e.g., Burrows, supra, n. 22, p. 6.
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4.4.2 The vindication o f property rights
“The vindication of property rights” may appear more in keeping with the analysis 
presented here. In this chapter we have used the notion o f property to explain the basis of claims an 
individual has when, without his consent, an asset to which he is exclusively entitled then comes 
into the defendant’s hands. However, those theorists who use the vindication of property rights 
have in mind something different from the property explanation put forward here. Such analyses 
employ the vindication idea alongside unjust enrichment, with the former explaining those claims 
where title does not pass and the latter those where it does. The vindication of property rights 
accordingly describes the assertion of subsisting title in the received asset and claims pursuant to 
such an assertion. This division between vindication claims and unjust enrichment claims, founded 
as it is on the differences in the treatment given in each case, ignores the common principle 
underlying them both.51 If we were to adopt the terminology of the vindication of property rights 
we would accordingly risk confusion with this different notion of vindication used by other 
theorists. Moreover, the language of vindication of property is sufficiently broad to embrace claims 
to assets in the defendant’s hands founded on principles other than the protection of the claimant’s 
ownership prior to receipt, such as many of the claims traditionally discussed under the heading 
“restitution for wrongs”.
There is a further reason to be cautious about adopting the language of the vindication of 
property rights, and which also requires us to refine the property explanation developed thus far. 
We have seen already that property can be regarded as having a dual dimension, reflected in the 
terminology of property as things and property as wealth.52 We shall see in the coming chapter that 
these different aspects of ownership support distinct types o f claim that can follow when an asset 
comes into the defendant’s hands without the owner’s consent.
51 See supra, text to nn. 27-30.




In the preceding chapter we saw that that the claims arising where an asset held by the 
claimant comes into the defendant’s hands without the former’s consent are best explained on the 
basis that they protect and give effect to the claimant’s interest in that asset. We have also seen 
that, at present, English law does not provide a uniform response in such cases, and, in so doing, 
that it fails to treat like cases alike. If we are to avoid such injustice, we must develop a principled 
scheme of the claims available in such cases. Since such claims exist to give effect to the 
claimant’s interest in the asset received by the defendant, the form these claims will take turns in the 
first instance on the nature and scope of this interest. We must therefore begin by examining the 
content of such interests and asking what form of recovery their protection requires. Secondly, the 
claims available in such cases will also be shaped by other principles whose application militates 
against an unqualified assertion of the claimant’s interest. We must therefore ask what these 
principles are and inquire into the effect their recognition should have on what the claimant is 
entitled to recover.
We shall again start with a central case, namely, where the claimant, prior to the 
defendant’s receipt, had possession of and held legal beneficial title to the asset. Where an asset to 
which the claimant has such title is received by the defendant without the former’s effective 
consent, the claimant’s interest in the asset can support distinct claims. These can be said to reflect, 
roughly, the distinction drawn between property as things and property as wealth.
5.1 Specific recovery: ownership as the right to a thing
Legal beneficial title is an example, indeed the paradigm instance in English law, of an 
ownership interest. As we have seen,1 such interests, in so far as they extend, comprise not just an 
exclusive entitlement to the wealth the asset represents, to its potential as a means of acquiring new 
items of wealth, but also an exclusive entitlement to use and enjoy, and to determine others’ use and 
enjoyment of, that asset. That legal beneficial title entails such a right to use the asset and is not 
restricted to a right to its value or the economic benefits to be derived from it is clear. The law of 
torts imposes on us a duty not to take or to interfere with assets to which another has title. The duty
1 See chapter 4, text to nn. 1-5.
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is not either to refrain from such interference or to account for the benefits so derived. If I take 
your sandwiches but leave you a sum of money to cover their value to you, I have committed both 
the tort of conversion and the criminal offence of theft. This can only be because an owner has an 
interest in the asset beyond its value. Accordingly, the claimant should in principle be entitled, 
where possible, to the specific recovery of the asset. This is the only response which gives full 
effect and protection to the claimant’s interest. Any other form of recovery leaves the asset in the 
hands of the defendant, with him free to deal with it as he wishes. This is plainly inconsistent with 
the claimant being exclusively entitled to determine its use and enjoyment.
One objection would be that, while it may be conceded that the claimant had such an 
entitlement prior to the defendant’s receipt, it does not follow that he has any such interest in the 
asset once it is in the defendant’s hands. Certainly, in the majority of defective transfer cases 
English law holds title to the asset to have passed to the recipient despite the flaw in the claimant’s 
consent.2 But why is this? Why should the claimant’s entitlement to the asset should be lost or 
otherwise affected by its physical transfer to or receipt by the defendant? The claimant is of course 
able to transfer his entitlement to the asset to another, but not every change in possession entails a 
transfer of ownership.3 Whether the claimant’s interest in the asset passes with possession depends 
on the claimant’s intention, on whether he has effectively exercised his power to dispose of his 
interest. In the cases we are looking at the claimant’s consent to such a transfer of his interest, if not 
wholly absent, is in some way defective. And, even if we admit that it is not every defect in the 
claimant’s consent which will render a purported disposition o f his interest ineffective,4 we can say 
that, where the law provides a claim in respect of the defendant’s receipt o f the asset, this must be 
because the claimant did not properly exercise his power o f disposition. By contrast, where the 
claimant has effectively exercised his power to transfer his interest, we have no reason to give him 
any claim, whether for specific recovery, the value of the asset, or of some other kind. After all, as 
we have seen,5 the intention to pass title and the intent to benefit the defendant through his receipt 
of the asset are, in such cases, indivisible. Either both must be regarded as defective or neither. As 
such, we cannot say that, while the claimant consented to the transfer of his interest in the asset, he 
did not consent to the defendant receiving any benefit. He no more intends the former than the 
latter.
2 See chapter 4, text to nn. 11-12.
3 See J. Penner, The Idea o f Property in Law (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 146.
4 Which I think we must. Even if we allow recovery in all cases of mistaken transfers through a causative 
mistake test (as is the current position in English law: see Barclays Bank Ltd. v. W. J. Simms, Son & Cooke 
(Southern) Ltd. [1980] Q.B. 677), in relation to claims to transfers brought about by coercion or other forms 
of pressure, the law must decide what degree or type of pressure will give rise to a claim, since pressure of 
some form is almost inevitably present in any disposition.
5 See chapter 4, text to nn. 32-34.
66
So, any claim the claimant has in respect of the defendant’s receipt of the asset depends 
upon, and can only be justified on the basis of, an ineffective exercise of his power to transfer his 
interest. And, where the claimant has not properly exercised his power to transfer his entitlement to 
the asset, in the absence of any principle applying which would justify its expropriation from him, 
that entitlement should remain the claimant’s, irrespective of who currently has factual possession 
o f the asset.6 Accordingly, the claimant should be able to call for the return of the asset, not simply 
on the basis that he did not properly consent to the defendant receiving it in the first place, a 
decision which was for the claimant alone to make, but on the basis that he should be regarded as 
having a continuing interest in the asset.7
The claim for specific recovery clearly provides for recovery o f the asset originally held by 
the claimant so long as and to the extent that it remains in the defendant’s hands.8 The claim should 
also extend, however, to certain other assets not previously being held by the claimant, but to which 
he can establish an entitlement through their connection with or derivation from the original asset.
5.1.1 Fruits
The first example of this is where the original asset produces what we may term fruits. 
Where an asset has the capacity for bearing fruit, that is, generating new, distinct assets, title to 
those fruits will commonly vest in the owner of that initial asset from the moment of the fruit’s 
generation and without the need for any further act, such as seizure, on the part of the owner. In 
such cases, ownership of the fruit-bearing asset carries with it the exclusive entitlement to 
(ownership of) those fruits. As such, we can say that such an entitlement to the fruits is an incident
6 As such, the position English law takes in many such cases, namely that title to the asset passes but the 
claimant is entitled to recover its value, can only be justified on the basis of principles which require us to 
limit or deny a full assertion of the claimant’s ownership interest, thus effectively justifying its expropriation. 
The question of what principles may limit or deny such an assertion of the claimant’s interest in the asset shall 
be examined in chapter 6.
7 An analogy can, perhaps, be drawn with claims following a breach of contract. There, even where the court 
awards compensation, and hence does not give effect to his interest in performance, the claimant’s right to 
performance necessarily underlies the claim. As Lord Clyde stated in Panatown Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine 
Construction Ltd, [2000] 4 All E.R. 97 at 111, “a failure in the obligation to perform does not destroy the 
asset [the bargained for contractual rights]. On the contrary it remains the necessary legal basis for a remedy.”
8 Difficult questions will arise where the claimant’s asset is mixed with or joined to another asset, whether the 
defendant’s or a third party’s, when in the defendant’s possession. Where, or in so far as, the claimant’s asset 
can still be physically separated from the conglomeration, there is no barrier to its specific recovery. There is 
good sense in a similar approach being taken to mixtures of fungibles. However, where such separation is no 
longer possible, specific recovery of the conglomeration or any part of it can not be justified on the simple 
basis of the claimant’s pre-existing and continuing entitlement to it, since ex hypothesi, the asset claimed is 
not the asset to which the claimant initially held title. If the claimant is to make out some entitlement to the 
conglomeration it would be by virtue of principles analogous to those supporting claims to substitute assets 
acquired in exchange for the original asset: on which see infra, text to nn. 11-16.
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of title to the original asset. Where this is so, the claimant should be entitled to specific recovery of 
not just the original asset but also any fruit generated by it while it is in the defendant’s hands.
What counts as a fruit in this sense will often not be straightforward. Fruit from a fruit- 
bearing tree may appear the most obvious example, such that ownership of an apple tree entails 
ownership of its apples. However, the law may take a different view where the apples fall onto a 
neighbour’s land. Similarly a legal system may hold that ownership of a litter of piglets depends 
not (only) on ownership o f the sow but (also) on ownership o f the boar.9 For present purposes such 
questions need not be addressed more fully. Whether title to the fruit does indeed rest solely on title 
to the other asset is a question of the same order as what the conditions of title to that original asset 
are and whether the claimant has met them. While fundamental to the success of such a claim, they 
are logically prior to the question of what claims lie when an asset to which the claimant is 
exclusively entitled comes into the defendant’s hands. So just as we can say that there should be 
specific recovery where the claimant has title to an asset which is then received by the defendant 
without the former’s consent, we can simply say that, where (first) title to the fruit is dependent 
solely on title to the asset which produced it, the claimant should be entitled to specific recovery not 
only of the fruit-bearing asset first received by the defendant but also o f any such fruits produced by 
it whilst in the defendant’s possession.10
5.1.2 Substitutes
A second example is where the defendant exchanges the asset received from the claimant 
for another asset. In such cases, the law commonly extends to the new, substitute asset the claims 
which were available in respect of11 the original asset. Where this is so, the claimant is said to be 
able to “trace (the value inherent in the original asset) into” the substitute acquired with it. 
However, the language o f tracing sheds no light on why it is that, in certain situations, claims 
available in respect of the asset to which the claimant did originally hold title can also attach to the
9 For example, in English law, first ownership of the young of animals usually goes to the owner of the other; 
partus sequitur ventrem. There is an exception though in the case of cygnets, where ownership is divided 
between the owners of the cob and hen: see W. Swadling, “Property: General Principles”, ch. 4 of P. Birks 
(ed.), English Private Law: Volume I  (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 350; W. Blackstone, Commentaries 
on the Law o f England: Volume 2 (1766), pp. 390-391.
10 Similarly we can, and torts textbooks do, say that an owner has a claim for compensatory damages where 
the defendant intentionally or negligently damages his asset, without full explanation of when a claimant will 
be able to establish such an ownership interest.
11 This formulation is used to accommodate not just claims to specific recovery but also claims against the 
defendant for his handling of the asset, claims for money had and received and knowing receipt.
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substitute asset -  an asset to which, prior to the exchange, the claimant had no entitlement.12 A 
sustained argument has been made that the claimant’s ability to asset an interest in the substitute 
asset rests on the reversal o f unjust enrichment. However, we have already seen that “unjust 
enrichment” has no explanatory force, failing to identify a principle or reason justifying the 
existence of rights and claims. These failings are clear enough when dealing with claims in respect 
o f the defendant’s receipt o f the original asset from the claimant. Once we come to claims to 
substitutes, these problems are compounded. An unjust enrichment analysis requires us to say not 
only that the defendant is (further) enriched each time he makes such an exchange, but that such 
enrichment comes each time at the claimant’s expense. It is unsurprising that some unjust 
enrichment adherents have found this a bridge too far.13 In any case, even if  we could find a way of 
stretching these notions to accommodate such claims, the point is that this would nonetheless fail to 
provide an adequate account of why such claims exist. What we need to know, and what unjust 
enrichment fails to tell us, is why the claimant acquires some entitlement to the substitute asset. 
How do we get from his title to the original asset to an interest in the substitute for which it was 
exchanged?
Perhaps the best explanation is as follows. Ownership interests, so far as they extend, entail 
the exclusive entitlement to determine the use and enjoyment o f the relevant asset. This will 
generally entitle the owner, inter alia, to permit others to use and enjoy that asset and even to 
transfer his interest in that asset to another outright. Moreover, the owner is free to set the terms of 
such a disposition.14 It may be gratuitous or he may make it conditional on the disponee providing 
some asset or service in return. Because of this latter possibility, ownership gives one the power to 
use the asset to acquire other items of wealth through exchange.15 Therefore, so long as the asset 
has some value to others, ownership interests provide the owner with a potential for acquiring new 
assets and other forms o f wealth. Moreover, this power falls within the exclusive province of the 
owner, such that he and he alone is entitled to take advantage of this potential.
Accordingly, where the defendant receives an asset to which the claimant is entitled without 
the latter’s effective consent, just as we should not view the claimant as having transferred or lost
12 Indeed, the modem tendency is to say that tracing is simply the process of identifying the location of value, 
and so is “neutral” as to rights: see, e.g., L. Smith, The Law o f Tracing (Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 6-18, 
277-279; P. Birks, “The Necessity of a Unitary Law of Tracing”, ch. 9 of R. Cranston (ed.), Making 
Commercial Law (Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 242-243; Foskett v. McKeown [2001] 1 A.C. 102, at p. 113, 
per Lord Steyn, and at p. 128,per Lord Millett. As such, it is not tracing itself which requires explanation but 
the claims that may be made pursuant to such an exercise. This view may be called into question seeing that 
the tracing “rules” vary depending on the positions, and in particular the culpability, of the parties involved. 
In any case, the key question remains, namely, on what basis the claimant is able to assert rights in the 
substitute.
13 See, e.g., Swadling, supra, n. 9, p. 354.
14 See, e.g., Anchor Brewhouse Developments Ltd. v. Berkley House (Docklands Developments) Ltd. (1987) 
38 Building L.R. 82, at p. 102,per Scott J.
15 See J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 172.
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his entitlement to the asset, we should not view him as having lost this exclusive power to take 
advantage of the potential to acquire new items of wealth that ownership entails. While the original 
asset remains in the defendant’s hands, this aspect of the claimant’s entitlement is protected, as are 
all aspects o f his ownership interest, by allowing specific recovery o f that asset. However, where 
that asset has, in whole or in part, been exchanged by the defendant for some other asset, specific 
recovery of the substitute can be justified on the basis that this gives effect to the claimant’s 
ownership interest in the original asset in so far as that interest provides the owner with a means of, 
a capacity for, acquiring other items of wealth. Recognition of the claimant’s entitlement to the 
substitute, and allowing him specific recovery o f it, can be viewed as reflecting the fact that it is the 
claimant alone who is entitled to take advantage of the original asset’s potential to be used to obtain 
new items o f wealth.16
In summary, the claimant should be entitled to specific recovery not only of the original 
asset to which he held title prior to the defendant’s receipt but also o f any fruits of that asset and 
assets acquired by the defendant in exchange for that original asset.
5.2 Non-specific claims17
The claim for specific recovery gives fullest expression and protection to the claimant’s 
interest in his asset. However, it will not be available in all cases. This will clearly be so where the 
defendant has retained neither the original asset nor any substitute asset acquired in exchange for it. 
In addition there may be cases where, though the asset remains in the defendant’s hands, competing 
principles require us to reject a specific recovery claim. However, the unavailability of specific 
recovery does not mean that the claimant’s ownership interest is no longer capable of protection. 
Whether or not we embrace the notion of proprietary interests as consisting in a bundle of rights, it
16 It would be possible to make essentially the same argument in terms of “value”, the notion central to most 
modem accounts of tracing. On this basis, ownership of the asset could be said to carry with it the exclusive 
entitlement to the value inherent in it. When the asset is exchanged for another, that value can then be found 
in the substitute, and which in turn supports a claim to the substitute. However, I think the analysis presented 
in the text is preferable. Firstly, it provides a clearer explanation of how and why we can say that the 
entitlement to or value in the original asset is transferable to the substitute. Secondly, an analysis centred on 
value fails to account for why the claimant should have an interest not just in the value inherent in the 
substitute, which could accordingly be given effect by requiring the defendant to give up the equivalent 
monetary sum, but in the thing itself. Where one’s interest is solely in value, its present form and location are 
irrelevant.
17 This expression, though inelegant and not particularly revealing, is preferred to “money claims” on the 
basis that money may be the object of a specific recovery claim and to “personal claims” on the basis that this 
may wrongly suggest that such claims do not give priority in insolvency; on which see Chapter 7, text to nn. 
29-53.
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is clear that we can identify and isolate distinct aspects or strands of an ownership interest.18 
Consistently with this, in principle there may also exist claims which give partial, more limited 
effect to the claimant’s entitlement, embodying and effectuating particular aspects of his interest.
5.3 Ownership as the potential to acquire new items of wealth
As we have just seen when examining claims for the specific recovery of substitute assets, 
among the uses an owner may make of his asset is to grant use privileges to others or to make an 
outright transfer o f his entitlement. Since the owner can set the terms of such a grant or transfer, the 
asset, at least so long as it is valued by others, provides the owner with a means of, a capacity to, 
acquire other items of wealth. Accordingly, one aspect of an owner’s interest is an exclusive 
entitlement to take advantage of the asset’s potential as a means of acquiring other wealth.19 More 
simply, we can say that the owner is entitled to the asset as a source o f wealth or as a store of 
exchange-value.
Where the defendant receives an asset to which the claimant is entitled and without the 
latter’s effective consent, the defendant receives a source of wealth. Moreover, this source of 
wealth is one to which the claimant is exclusively entitled. This entitlement justifies a claim to the 
return o f that source of wealth to the claimant. The source of wealth being the asset, this is most 
obviously achieved by specific recovery. However, when viewed as a source of wealth, an asset is 
significant not for its physical form and its inherent usability but for what can be acquired with it. 
Because o f this, it is possible to protect this aspect o f the claimant’s interest other than through 
recovery of the specific asset. All that is needed is for some equivalent source of wealth to be given 
up to the claimant. Though the source of wealth returned is not the source of wealth to which the 
claimant is entitled, when assets are viewed as sources o f wealth they are essentially fungible, 
differing only in the measure of exchange value they provide. As such, it is convenient and 
unobjectionable to allow the claimant to recover an alternative but equivalent source of wealth. The 
upshot of such a claim is that the defendant retains the asset20 but the improvement to his capacity 
to acquire new wealth which he gains from the asset is offset by the award which entails an 
equivalent store of exchange value being given up to the claimant.
18 See, e.g., A. Honore, “Ownership”, ch. 5 of A. Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: 1st series 
(Oxford University Press, 1961).
19 See too P. Birks, ‘“ At the Expense of the Claimant”: Direct and Indirect Enrichment in English Law”, ch. 
18 of D. Johnston and R. Zimmermann, Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002), at pp. 509-510.
20 Indeed the defendant acquires title to it. A claimant may not recover both the asset itself and a sum of 
money reflecting its wealth-acquiring potential since this would be a form of double recovery. Hence, where
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This claim is justified only where and in so far as the defendant retains possession of an 
asset to which the claimant can establish an exclusive entitlement. Like specific recovery, the claim 
here is premised on the claimant being able to point to some asset in the defendant’s hands and 
assert an exclusive entitlement to it. The only difference is that the claimant is not asserting his 
interest in the asset as a thing physically to be used and enjoyed in and for itself, rather he is 
asserting his interest in it solely as a means to obtain other items o f wealth. Where the defendant no 
longer holds the asset or a substitute, the claimant cannot assert an exclusive interest in any source 
of wealth held by the defendant. This means that such a claim will be unavailable not only where 
the defendant has given away the asset gratuitously or where it has been destroyed but also where 
he has exchanged it for some benefit which does not leave him with any exchange product which 
can itself be turned to value.21 In the latter case, the defendant, though he no longer retains any 
relevant asset, may still be viewed as having been enriched by his receipt o f and dealings with the 
asset, particularly where this has saved him some otherwise necessary expenditure. As we shall 
see,22 this enrichment or benefit may itself provide the basis of a claim. However, such a claim 
must rest on a distinct basis, a distinct aspect of the claimant’s interest in his asset.
This aspect of the claimant’s interest can most conveniently be effectuated by requiring the 
defendant to transfer to the claimant a sum of money sufficient to enable his acquisition of such 
items o f wealth as he could have acquired through exchange of the asset. The principal question is 
how we quantify this sum. Where there is a market in assets of the type to which the claimant is 
entitled, his interest will be effectively protected by a monetary award equal to the market value of 
an asset of the same type and in the same condition. This is not (simply) because this is the sum the 
claimant could have obtained had he decided to sell the asset. Indeed, given the imperfections of 
markets, a particularly industrious or persuasive seller may be capable o f obtaining over the odds 
for such an asset. Rather, such a sum enables the claimant to acquire for himself an equivalent 
substitute, which he can then exchange for new items of wealth as and when he chooses, just as he 
could when in possession of the original.
Where there is no market in such assets, quantification is less straightforward. Since there 
is no clear way to enable the claimant to obtain an equivalent substitute asset, we must ask how else 
the claimant’s interest in using his asset to acquire new items of wealth can be protected. The 
starting point is that, without the asset, the claimant is prejudiced to the extent that there are items of 
wealth which are now beyond his reach, that is, items which he could have acquired in exchange for 
the asset and which he is now no longer in a position to acquire. In principle, therefore, and 
remembering that we are still to examine the principles which require such recovery to be limited,
the defendant recovers on the latter basis, he must thereby lose his entitlement to the asset, which passes to the 
defendant (at least in so far as the non-specific claim extends).
21 Such as where the asset is exchanged for a service which leaves no marketable residuum.
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the claimant’s interest is protected by an award which ensures that his ability to acquire new items 
of wealth is not diminished through loss of the asset. This requires us to ask what is the most the 
claimant could have obtained in exchange for the asset, and awarding him the sum it would take to 
allow him to acquire this. This is essentially to ask what is the highest price the claimant could 
have obtained for the asset. This question, while difficult, should be no more challenging than the 
task the courts face when putting a value on unique goods for compensation claims. Moreover, the 
courts elsewhere have confronted quantification questions o f no lesser difficulty, relying where 
necessary on educated guesswork and common sense.23 In any case, this question will rarely need 
to be answered since, as we shall see, competing principles will generally restrict recovery to a 
lesser sum.
5.4 Ownership as control over benefits
It is clear that ownership interests confer an exclusive right to determine how and by whom 
the asset is used. This entails that, in so far as use of the asset is something of value to the owner 
and others, the owner has control over access to the benefits to be obtained from use of that asset. 
Where the defendant receives an asset to which the claimant is entitled without the latter’s effective 
consent, the defendant, to the extent that he values the use he then makes of that asset, receives a 
benefit which the claimant did not intend him to have. Does this justify a claim for the recovery or 
giving up of that benefit? Not in itself.
The claimant’s interest in determining the use of the asset justifies preventing others 
making use of it without his consent. Where the asset is in the defendant’s hands, this interest 
supports a claim for specific recovery of the asset, since this prevents future unauthorised uses.24 
However, it does not in itself provide a basis for a claim in respect of the use the defendant has 
already made of the asset and the benefit he has already derived from so doing. The claimant 
cannot prevent what has already happened and the use to which the asset was put cannot be undone 
or reversed. What can be reversed is the benefit the defendant received from so using the asset. To 
make out such a claim, however, the claimant must go further and establish that he has an interest
22 Infra, text to nn. 24-68.
23 Particularly in relation to the issue of the consumer surplus in damages awards for breach of contract, on 
which see infra, text to nn. 65-66. Damages awards for pain and personal injury are another example of the 
courts not being deterred by difficult, if not impossible, questions of quantification.
24 This interest also justifies injunctive relief to prevent the defendant interfering with the use of the asset by a 
claimant in possession of it.
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not only in determining how and by whom the asset is to be used but also in any benefits which 
accrue from its use.25
5.4.1 Establishing an exclusive interest in benefits
Do ownership interests extend this far? Like the questions of which resources can be 
owned and what uses o f those resources are reserved for the owner, this is a question upon which 
legal systems may reasonably differ. Such questions o f the scope o f proprietary interests turn to a 
significant extent on our reasons for adopting the institution o f property in the first place,26 and 
accordingly the resolution of such issues will not be attempted here.27 What we can examine is the 
stance taken in English law on this.
If an owner does have such an interest in the benefits derived from his asset, then we should 
expect this interest to be manifested in a claim to recover any benefits derived by the defendant 
from it when made without the claimant’s consent. Does English law recognise such claims? The 
difficulty in answering this question is that, as we have just seen, we can justify non-specific claims 
following defective transfers and misapplications of assets on the basis of the claimant’s interest in 
the asset as a source o f wealth. Accordingly, what we need to look for is cases of beneficial receipt 
or use of another’s assets where this alternative explanation for non-specific recovery is not 
available. The clearest example of this is where the defendant receives and/or makes beneficial use 
of the claimant’s asset, but, at the time of the claim, the defendant retains neither the original asset 
nor any substitute acquired in exchange for it. In such cases the claimant’s interest in his asset as a 
source of wealth cannot justify recovery since no relevant asset is in the defendant’s hands. If 
ownership interests do, however, entail an exclusive entitlement to benefits derived from the asset’s 
use, then we should nonetheless expect a claim to succeed here.
25 A similar distinction is drawn in P. Jaffey, The Nature and Scope o f Restitution (Hart Publishing, 2000), pp. 
149-151. It is clear that the former does not entail the latter, in that there is no illogic in recognising a person 
as having an interest in determining the use of an asset without also giving him an interest in the benefits such 
use gives. Arguably this is the case in respect of benefits derived from a person exercising his capacity for 
action, on which see infra, text to nn. 106-117.
26 I.e. understanding why we sometimes grant to individuals exclusive interests in items of wealth should help 
determine the extent of such interests.
27 An interesting starting point to the examination of such questions is provided in K. Gray, “Property in Thin 
Air” [1991] C.L.J. 252.
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5.4.2 Use claims
It is clear that English law does reveal examples o f claims in such instances.28 However, 
these cases are not conclusive on the point since they may be explicable on other bases. For 
instance, it has been argued that such claims should be viewed as applications of the principle that 
nobody should be allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing, an analysis reflected in the 
conventional categorisation of such claims as examples of restitution for wrongs.29 On this basis, 
the justification for such claims lies not in the need to respect the claimant’s ownership interest, 
which extends to an exclusive entitlement to any benefits derived from the asset’s use, but rather in 
ensuring that those who have acted wrongfully do not gain through so doing. Alternatively it can be 
argued such claims are compensatory, designed to make good the loss caused to the claimant by the 
defendant’s wrongful use of the asset.30
In truth, all three are, in appropriate cases, defensible bases for a claim and it is likely that, 
to the extent that they have chosen between them, different judges at different times have had in 
mind differing rationales for such claims. Perhaps the strongest argument that these cases 
demonstrate an entitlement to benefits received from one’s assets comes from the fact that liability 
is strict. This suggests that the reasons for holding the defendant liable do not lie in the quality of
28 E.g. Strand Electric and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd. [1952] 2 Q.B. 246; Penarth 
Dock Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Pounds [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 359; Ministry o f Defence v. Ashman [1993] 2 
E.G.L.R. 102.
29 See, e.g., A. Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (Butterworths, 2nd edn, 2002), p. 455; G. Virgo, The 
Principles o f the Law o f Restitution (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2006, pp. 11, 431. One weakness with 
this explanation of such claims is that they can arise even in the absence of fault on the defendant. Where this 
is so, the principle that no man should profit from a wrong, whether it is viewed as a moral principle or as an 
instrument to deter future wrongdoing, has, at most a much reduced application. The law’s classification of 
such conduct by the defendant as a breach of duty does not change this. A second problem with interpreting 
these claims in this way is that it cannot explain the measure of recovery awarded, since this rarely extends to 
all the profits made by the defendant, on which see infra, nn. 33.
30 See, e.g., Strand Electric and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd. [1952] 2 Q.B. 246, at p. 
256, per Romer L.J.; R. Sharpe and S. Waddams, “Damages for Lost Opportunity to Bargain” (1982) 2 
O.J.L.S. 290; cf. Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798. The standard 
objection to this analysis is that, where the claimant would not himself have used the asset for the period in 
which the defendant had possession of it, and the defendant’s use of it did not decrease its value, the claimant 
suffers no loss, so any award cannot be compensatory. This criticism is misplaced though. There is no fiction 
in saying that the claimant suffers a loss where the defendant uses the claimant’s asset without his consent, 
and the claimant would not have consented to the defendant so using the asset gratuitously. The only issue 
then is as to quantification of this loss. One possible way of measuring the loss is to ask what price the 
claimant would have charged the defendant in return for permitting such use of the asset. Since English law 
still for the most part measures loss on an objective, market value basis, we should not be surprised to see the 
courts approaching the issue through the language of reasonable sums and market price. It is true, of course, 
that the claimant may not have been willing to grant permission in return for such a sum. But it does not 
follow from this that he has suffered no loss { c f  J. Edelman, Gain-based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity 
and Intellectual Property (Hart Publishing, 2002), pp. 101-102; Burrows, supra, nn. 29, at p. 477). On the 
contrary, it shows that his “subjective” loss exceeds the objective, market-based measure; that is, it provides 
an example of a consumer surplus. The valid criticism of these cases then is that they under-compensate the 
claimant.
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his conduct but in what he has obtained from it. In essence, the same point is made by those who 
argue that liability in the torts of conversion and trespass became strict in order to make up for the 
lack of a vindicatio claim at common law.31
However, it must also be acknowledged that there are features of these cases inconsistent 
with such an interpretation. Firstly, it is clear that, as things stand,32 the law responds in the same 
way to innocent interferences with the claimant’s assets as it does where the defendant is at fault, in 
particular by holding him liable for certain consequential losses. Such a result cannot be justified 
on the basis that liability exists here only to ensure that the defendant gives up benefits to which the 
claimant is exclusively entitled. Secondly, the measure of recovery in such cases is difficult to 
square with any of the rationales put forward for such claims.33 In particular, if  the claimant has an 
exclusive interest in benefits derived from his asset, this justifies recovery o f all such benefits 
received by the defendant. However, recovery in these cases is limited to the sum the claimant 
could reasonably have charged the defendant for the use he made o f the asset. As such, the case 
law provides only equivocal support for the notion that ownership interests give the holder an 
exclusive right to benefits derived from the asset.34
31 See, e.g., P. Birks, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths” [1997] N.Z. Law Review 623, at 
p. 646; J. Davies, “Tort”, ch. 14 of P. Birks (ed.), English Private Law: Volume II (Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 502-503; J. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (Butterworths, 4th edn 2002), p. 399.
32 Though see Iraqi Airways Corporation v. Kuwait Airways Co. (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] 2 A.C. 883, at p. 1093, 
per Lord Nicholls.
33 As an application of the principle that no man should profit from his wrongdoing, such awards are 
inadequate since recovery generally does not extend to all the profits made by the defendant. If such awards 
are compensatory, we should expect the courts to pay greater attention to the valuation the claimant himself 
put on the avoidance of such infringements (see infra, n. 65-66). And, if such awards are designed to reverse 
benefits obtained from the use of the claimant’s asset and to which the claimant is exclusively entitled, the 
courts should take more care to establish and to measure the benefit obtained by the defendant. There is no 
reason to assume that the defendant places the same value on such use as does the market. Indeed this would 
be as much of a fiction as the assumption that the market rate is the correct measure of the claimant’s loss in 
such cases: see M. Gamer, “The Role of Subjective Benefit in the Law of Unjust Enrichment” (1990) 10 
O.J.L.S. 42, at pp. 50-52; c.f. Edelman, supra, n. 30, at pp. 70-71. However, see Jaffey, supra, n. 25, pp. 135- 
138, 146-151, for an attempt to justify both the existence of such claims and the measure of recovery granted 
on the basis of the claimant’s exclusive entitlement to the value generated by his asset.
34 Further judicial support, though only indirect, for the existence of such an interest in benefits derived from 
one’s assets comes from the recent adoption of Birks’ framework for identifying and analysing liability in 
unjust enrichment, which clearly suggests that claims to involuntarily conferred benefits are not dependent on 
the defendant retaining the asset from which they were derived: see Banque Financiere de la Cite v. Parc 
(Battersea) Ltd. [1999] A.C. 221, at p. 227, per Lord Steyn. However, in so far as it suggests that all 




Turning to the academic literature, there is a similar ambivalence. Among some restitution 
lawyers there is clearly an assumption that such an interest exists.35 The orthodox framework for 
establishing a claim in unjust enrichment, whereby, subject to defences, an enrichment received by 
the defendant can be recovered by the claimant upon establishing that the enrichment came at his 
expense and the presence of an unjust factor,36 suggests that a claimant has an interest in all benefits 
deriving from him. However, as we saw in chapter 3,37 this assumption that all involuntarily 
conferred benefits are prima facie  recoverable is incorrect, and so we should be wary of following 
blindly the implications o f this conceptual structure. Rather, the recoverability of benefits will in 
the first instance turn on the claimant establishing some exclusive interest to them, and this is of 
course the question we are now addressing.
Moreover, other theorists have preferred an interpretation o f enrichment which entails that 
there is no recovery in respect of, and hence the claimant has no interest in, the benefits derived 
from use of his asset. As will be seen, such arguments are best interpreted as denials of any 
exclusive interest in an owner in the benefits his asset brings.38 Beatson, for instance, argues that a 
defendant is enriched, and so liability on the basis of unjust enrichment will lie, only where he has 
enjoyed an increase in wealth.39 He then says that the hallmarks of wealth are exchange-value, 
transferability and/or the capacity to produce income. This leads him to conclude that unjust 
enrichment reasoning cannot justify recovery in respect of what he terms “pure” services, namely 
those actions of the claimant which neither leave the defendant with some marketable residuum, 
such as some new asset or an improvement to an existing asset, nor save him a necessary expense, 
since in such cases the defendant ends up with nothing he can exchange for value or which 
produces an income. However, this argument also requires the rejection of liability in respect of 
benefits derived from use of the claimant’s asset, where such use leaves neither a marketable 
residuum in the defendant’s hands nor saves him a necessary expense, as again in such cases the 
defendant does not, under Beatson’s definition, enjoy any increase in his private wealth.
35 See, e.g., P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2005), pp. 83-86; D. Friedmann, 
“Restitution of Benefits Obtained through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong” 
(1980) 80 Columbia L.R. 504.
36 First developed in P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law o f Restitution (Clarendon Press, rev. edn 1989), 
though later adopted by most of the texts.
37 Text to nn. 25-44.
38 In addition to the writers discussed in the text, such a position is taken in R. Grantham and C. Rickett, 
Enrichment and Restitution in New Zealand (Hart Publishing, 2000), p. 61; though for criticism of Grantham 
and Rickett’s argument see infra, n. 38 and accompanying text. See too J. Stevens, “Vindicating the 
Proprietary Nature of Tracing” [2001] Conv. 94, at p. 99: “It is submitted that value cannot subsist in the 
abstract, but only in respect of specific assets, whether tangible or intangible. In other words, value can only 
endure in the form of a property right.”
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The standard response to Beatson’s argument is to state that he is simply wrong to say that 
a defendant cannot be benefited without an increase in the assets at his disposal, and in particular to 
say that pure services cannot constitute a benefit.40 This is, however, to misconstrue Beatson’s 
point. He does not claim that pure services are not beneficial. Indeed he acknowledges that a 
money value can be put on them. Rather he is saying that it is not all unintended benefits which are 
capable of founding a claim in unjust enrichment, and that such claims should be limited to those 
instances where the defendant’s benefit takes the form of an increase in his private wealth. The 
difficulty with his argument is that nowhere does he offer any clear reason for adopting this 
narrowed definition o f enrichment and the consequent limitation on such claims. Having accepted 
Birks’ equation o f enrichment with wealth, he goes on to reject Birks’ understanding of wealth on 
the basis that this is not the “ordinary sense of the word”41 and inconsistent with how it is used by 
economists. But there is little explanation of why the latter interpretation is preferable.42
A similar argument, with similar implications for cases where the defendant benefits from 
use of an asset, is made by Muir.43 He explicitly accepts that the concept o f benefit extends beyond 
the receipt of assets. However, he argues that, within the law of unjust enrichment, benefit must be 
given a narrower meaning, or, in other words, that the law must provide for recovery only in respect 
o f certain types o f benefit. According to Muir, we should distinguish acts which “confer a benefit” 
on the defendant, which equate to transfers of wealth, and acts which are “of benefit” to the 
defendant, which, at most, merely create wealth.44 His argument is that an unjust enrichment claim 
can only lie in the former case. As with Beatson, the difficulty comes in identifying Muir’s reasons 
for rejecting liability where no wealth (as defined by Muir) is transferred to the defendant.45 That
39 J. Beatson, “Benefit, Reliance, and the Structure of Unjust Enrichment”, ch. 2 of The Use and Abuse o f 
Unjust Enrichment (Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 29-32.
40 See, e.g., Birks, supra n. 36, pp. 449-451; Burrows, supra, n. 29, pp. 17-18.
41 Beatson, supra, n. 39, p. 24.
42 See Jaffey, supra, n. 25, pp. 90-91. One has to look elsewhere in Beatson’s essay to piece together his 
reasons for taking this view. His principal concern is that Birks’ understanding of enrichment threatens the 
homogeneity of that concept and hence also the homogeneity of the legal category of unjust enrichment. On 
Birks’ approach, a finding of enrichment will sometimes require an inquiry into the defendant’s choices and 
preferences (in order to establish whether the defendant can subjectively devalue his receipt). Beatson 
appears to believe that this compromises the clean division between unjust enrichment and other legal 
categories, such as contract: see ibid., pp. 36-39. Beatson’s fears are surely unfounded. Acknowledging that 
benefit is subjective, and so, in a sense, choice-dependent, does not entail that any liability in respect of the 
receipt of benefits is chosen, that is, voluntarily undertaken.
43 G. Muir, “Unjust Sacrifice and the Officious Intervener”, ch. 9 of P. Finn (ed.), Essays on Restitution (Law 
Book Company, 1990), pp. 297-305.
44 Muir does not offer a clear definition of wealth, but it appears that he interprets it similarly to Beatson. 
Their analyses differ, however, in that Beatson would allow for claims where the claimant benefits the 
defendant by saving him a necessary expense. Muir, by contrast, requires some transfer from claimant to 
defendant and accordingly excludes such cases: ibid., p. 302.
45 Muir, ibid., p. 299, talks of the need for a narrowed notion of benefit to preclude liability in instances of
unintended benefit in which liability has not been recognised and would be undesirable. I agree that there
should not be liability in all cases of unintended benefit, but the better way to achieve and to explain this is 
through examination of the interests we protect by, and the principles which support, such claims. Muir by
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we can distinguish cases where the defendant is benefited through the receipt of assets from those 
where he is benefited by some other means is clear. But what we need to know is whether this 
factual distinction is also a material one, one which justifies according to these two classes of case 
different treatment.
If this limitation is to be anything other than arbitrary, it must be grounded in some feature 
unique to the receipt o f assets. What distinguishes the receipt of assets from other situations in 
which the defendant is benefited is that the defendant acquires something which he can exchange 
for other items o f wealth.46 If recovery in respect of unintended benefits is to be limited to those 
cases where the defendant receives something which he can then use to acquire other items of 
wealth, this suggests that the only benefit the law is concerned with, the only benefit in respect of 
which liability will arise, is the benefit of receiving something which enables one to acquire further 
wealth. But then the interest in benefits we are recognising and effectuating through such claims is 
no more than the claimant’s exclusive interest in the asset’s potential as a means to acquire wealth 
through exchange. This interest was examined above, where we saw that it justifies a non-specific 
claim in its own right. If we interpret enrichment so as to apply only to the receipt of things which 
can be exchanged for value then we are effectively denying any legally recognised interest in 
benefits distinct from the interests we have already examined. Accordingly, if we take Beatson and 
Muir’s view of enrichment, we are denying that an owner has an exclusive interest in the benefits 
his asset produces beyond its potential as a source of wealth, and, as such, we cannot justify any 
claims beyond those we have examined already.
One final point must be dealt with. Birks latterly made an argument which, if  correct, 
would entail that there would be no liability in cases of beneficial receipt where the defendant does 
not retain the original asset or a substitute. As such, the argument is similar in its consequences to 
Beatson’s and, as with Beatson, Birks’ attention was focused on claims in respect of pure services.47 
Contrary to what he understood Beatson to be arguing, Birks acknowledged that pure services could 
be beneficial. However, he claimed that, nonetheless, no claim would lie in such cases since, in the 
absence o f any marketable residuum or saving of expenditure, the defendant could not be said to 
have retained any benefit derived from the claimant’s actions.48 The same reasoning must also 
require us to deny restitutionary liability for the use o f assets in the absence of their retention, at
contrast offers no analysis of why liability is desirable in cases where the claimant confers a benefit but not 
where his actions are merely of benefit. Muir’s other concern is with the difficulties in quantifying certain 
benefits. Again, it is unclear why he thinks such difficulties are greater where there is no transfer of wealth.
46 Here I am using the term “wealth”, as in earlier chapters, and in contrast to Beatson and Muir, to encompass 
not just the receipt of assets but also other items of value.
47 Supra, text to nn. 39-40.
48 Birks, supra, n. 35, pp. 62-63; see also P. Birks and C. Mitchell, “Unjust Enrichment”, ch. 15 of P. Birks 
(ed.), English Private Law: Volume II (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 542. In Birks’ terms the defendant 
is entitled in such cases to raise the defence of change of position, a defence which, in the absence of 
wrongdoing on the defendant’s part, limits recovery to the value of the enrichment retained by him.
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least where such use does not save the defendant any expenditure. As such, Birks’ argument seems 
to be that, though a claimant has an interest in all benefits deriving from his assets or actions,49 no 
claim will lie where the defendant is left with no marketable residuum nor saves any expenditure for 
the simple reason that, in such cases, there is no benefit retained for the claimant to recover.
The argument is open to objection however. Firstly, if  we are to say that a defendant can 
only retain a benefit where there is a retention of, improvement to or preservation of assets, we are 
making the notion of benefit co-extensive with an increase in the assets at the one’s disposal. But, 
on this basis, we should not regard pure services as beneficial. Where no asset is received and no 
saving made there is, on this view of benefit, no point in time when the defendant is benefited. 
Therefore, rather than viewing the receipt of pure services as an example of enrichment followed by 
instantaneous disenrichment, we should regard them as cases o f no enrichment. This is, of course, 
contrary to what Birks long argued. The argument is also inconsistent with Birks’ own view that a 
restitutionary claim can lie in cases where the defendant has used but not retained the claimant’s 
asset, even without an assertion of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant.50 More fundamentally, 
Birks’ argument entails that all those who pay for services or the use of property are left worse off, 
and should consider themselves worse off, once the transaction is complete. Indeed, we should 
always regret having entered into such transactions. If no benefit is retained in such cases, we 
should all prefer to be in the position in which we started, with the money in our pockets, since we 
were better off then. But this is clearly not the case. An analogy can be drawn with the notion of 
loss. We do not say that there is no loss to be compensated in the absence of some diminution in 
the assets at the claimant’s disposal.51 Loss can take other forms; we can be left worse off in other 
ways. The same goes for benefit. We can be benefited, left better off, other than through an 
increase in to our stock of assets. This is why we are happy to pay, and, after the event, remain 
happy to have paid, for pure services.
The question whether ownership interests carry an exclusive entitlement to benefits derived 
from the asset cannot, therefore, be regarded as fully settled. The case law is equivocal and the 
academic literature offers conflicting views, with little explicit discussion, or indeed awareness, of
49 This is where his argument differs from Beatson’s and Muir’s.
50 Birks, supra, n. 35, pp. 83-86. See in particular the discussion of Edwards v. Lee's Administrator (1936) 96 
S.W. 2d 1028, where he states (ibid. pp. 84-85), “The use of the land was taken directly from Lee. Despite 
Lee’s having suffered no loss, he would clearly have had a claim in unjust enrichment for the reasonable 
rental, being the value of what Edwards had taken.” The absence of wrongdoing is important since the 
claimant is then not disentitled from raising a change of position defence.
51 Similarly, we rightly say that there may still be a loss to be compensated when a specific harm has 
subsequently been rectified or has abated. For example, where the claimant suffers physical injuries which 
heal before the trial, we do not treat this as a reversal of that loss or as a reason for rejecting a compensatory 
claim. The fact that an injury is no longer a continuing source o f loss does not mean that the losses it had 
previously caused have been extinguished. For the same reason, once a service is complete, it may no longer 
be a source of further benefit, but it does not follow that the benefit it did bring has been lost. Many of the 
points here are expanded upon in the following pages.
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the issue at stake. What we can say with confidence is that if  and where the law regards the 
claimant’s interest in an asset as encompassing not just an exclusive entitlement to determine how 
that asset will be employed but also an entitlement to any benefits derived from its use,52 the 
claimant should be entitled to recover any benefit the defendant has derived from use of the asset to 
which the claimant has not effectively consented. Such a claim is explicable on the simple basis 
that, so long as the defendant retains that benefit, he has something to which he is not, and to which 
the claimant is, entitled. As such, the claim is in many ways similar to the claim for specific 
recovery. In both instances the claimant is asserting that the defendant has something which is 
rightfully his. The difference between them lies in what it is that the claimant is asserting an 
interest in. In the specific recovery claim he is pointing to the asset itself, the physical thing in the 
defendant’s hands. Here, he is calling not for the return of this thing but of the benefits deriving 
from it. The defendant is better off, has been enriched by, his receipt o f and dealings with the asset, 
and the point of the claim is to take this benefit from the defendant and transfer it to the claimant.
5.4.4 The scope o f  an interest in benefits
Before we look at how an interest in the benefits derived from an asset may be given effect, 
there is one other point to which attention should be drawn. We have seen that, although ownership 
interests can be viewed as granting an open-ended set of use-privileges to the asset, some uses will 
fall outside the exclusive domain of the owner. Cases like Victoria Park Racing and Recreation 
Grounds Company Ltd. v. Taylor?s concern the limits of an owner’s exclusive interest. Similarly, if 
we do recognise that an owner has an exclusive interest in benefits derived from the use of his asset, 
it would not follow that all such benefits would be recoverable. Here too we would have to ask how 
far this interest extends, and so to what benefits the claimant is entitled.
As with the question o f the extent of an owner’s use privileges, we should not expect the 
scope of an interest in benefits to be capable o f clear definition. The broadest approach would 
allow for the recovery all benefits from others’ uses of an asset within the owner’s exclusive 
domain without his consent. A narrower and more straightforward alternative would be to 
recognise the owner as having an interest in the benefits derived from a defendant’s use of his asset
52 Or, rather, from such uses as fall within the claimant’s exclusive interest. There will usually be some uses 
of the asset, and hence some benefits deriving from the asset’s use, which the law does not reserve for the 
owner. The clearest example of this is the benefit to be derived from viewing the asset: see Victoria Park 
Racing and Recreation Grounds Company Ltd. v. Taylor (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479.
53 (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479.
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only to the extent that such use results in an increase in the assets at the defendant’s disposal, such 
as where it enables him to avoid incurring otherwise necessary expenditure.54
5.4.5 Recovery and quantification o f  benefits
The final question is how the recovery o f benefits is to be effectuated. We must begin by 
examining the notion of benefit more closely. Firstly, though our focus here is on cases where the 
defendant has received tangible property from the claimant, as we have just seen, it is clear that 
there can be benefit in circumstances other than the receipt o f physical assets and we may be 
benefited even where we end up with a diminution in our assets. This is evident whenever we 
choose to make a disposition of a physical asset without obtaining another such asset in return, thus 
diminishing our pool o f possessions. If we valued only such assets then we would never choose a 
course of action which would leave us with fewer of them. The fact that we do demonstrates that 
we also value other “things”, such as experiences, knowledge and relationships.55
Secondly, and more fundamentally, even in cases involving the receipt of physical assets, 
benefit is an abstract, intangible notion. The receipt o f the benefit is something distinct from the 
receipt of the thing. As manifested in the language of deriving a benefit from  an asset, the benefit is 
something consequential on, and so necessarily separable from, the asset’s physical receipt. The 
benefits we derive from assets come from what we are able to do with them. The receipt and use of 
a particular asset will be beneficial to an individual when it facilitates or enables the pursuit of ends 
and experiences he desires and values, and the benefit is the contribution this makes to his ability to 
achieve these objectives, to satisfy these wants. And, of course, it is not just the possession and use 
of tangible assets which can make such a contribution. A benefit is in essence an improvement in a 
person’s quality o f life, and we are benefited every time we do or receive or experience something 
which we value, which we regard as making us better off.
54 Essentially the same idea can be expressed by saying that a claimant will be liable for benefits derived from 
prohibited use of another’s assets where and to the extent that it results in an increase to his patrimony. This 
end result is akin to the position taken by Beatson, on whose view liability should depend on the defendant 
being left with some marketable residuum: see, supra, nn. 39-42 and accompanying text. On this approach, 
claims for the recovery of benefits begin to resemble the first type of non-specific claim we examined above, 
where the claimant can recover in respect of the increased wealth-acquiring potential the asset receives 
provides. The difference, however, is that such claims are dependent on the claimant being able to establish 
an interest in an asset held by the defendant. By contrast, this version of a claim to recover benefits, and 
Beatson’s preferred approach, are not so limited, requiring merely an increase in the assets at the defendant’s 
disposal. The latter, but not the former, would justify recovery, for instance, where the misapplied asset is 
used to discharge a liability of the defendant’s.
55 A common criticism made of theorists such as Beatson and Muir is that they fail to see that a defendant can 
be benefited in the absence of the receipt of or an improvement to assets (e.g., Birks, supra n. 36, pp. 449- 
451). As we have seen, such criticisms are founded on a misreading of their argument and so are misplaced: 
see supra, text to nn. 40-42.
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Two points follow from, and reflect, this. Firstly, the receipt of an asset is not inherently or 
necessarily beneficial. Whether it is depends on what the defendant can then do with it and the 
value he places on such uses. We all differ in our goals and interests, our means and our capacities, 
and such differences lead to differences in both the uses to which we can put a given asset and the 
value we attach to those uses. Accordingly, what is beneficial to one person may not be to another, 
and, amongst those for whom receipt of the asset would be beneficial, some will benefit more than 
others. This brings out the second point, that benefit is, in this sense, a personal or subjective 
notion. The benefit each of us derives from the receipt of an asset is as personal to us as our tastes, 
priorities and capabilities, for the very reason that these are the factors which determine what we 
value.56
Since benefit lies in the improvement to one’s quality o f life, the contribution made to one’s 
ability to pursue one’s objectives and satisfy one’s wants, it means that while the source of a benefit 
may be capable o f being physically held and given back, benefits themselves cannot. We can see 
this clearly even in the case of the receipt of physical assets. In such cases, and in contrast to those 
where the defendant is benefited by other means, continued possession of the asset enables the 
defendant to derive ongoing benefits through its continued use. Taking the asset away from him 
precludes his obtaining further benefits in the future, but it does nothing to remove those benefits he 
has already derived from his earlier use of it. Such benefits, once received, are unaffected by 
whether or not the defendant retains possession of the asset.57 For this reason it is misconceived to 
argue that only benefits derived from the receipt of assets are reversible.58 This confuses the benefit 
the defendant receives with its source, the asset. Benefits obtained from the receipt and use of 
physical assets are every bit as intangible, as abstract as those obtained from other sources. There is 
no greater difficulty or artificiality in reversing a benefit obtained from such other sources than 
there is in the reversal of the benefits derived from the receipt of assets. Either all such benefits are 
capable of reversal or none is.
It is worth stressing at this point that I do not think there is anything in this account of 
benefit which is out o f keeping with how the word is applied in the cases and texts, though it is
56 However, the benefit an individual derives from an asset may lie not in the value he places on its use and 
possession but in the fact that he can use it to obtain, by way of exchange, items of wealth which he does 
regard as valuable in their own right. To this extent, the (subjective) benefit the individual derives from the 
asset may be dependent upon others regarding that asset as beneficial, and hence being willing to enter into 
such an exchange with him.
57 For the argument that benefit is not co-extensive with, and so can endure even in the absence of, some 
continued increase in the assets at the claimant’s disposal, see supra, text to nn. 38-46.
58 For instance, Grantham and Rickett, supra, n. 38, p. 61, argue that there can be no recovery of benefits 
conferred by pure services on the basis that, without the defendant having in his hands some new or improved 
asset, his enrichment is not capable of restoration (reversal).
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usually not spelt out in quite such terms.59 Indeed, if, instead o f understanding benefit as an abstract 
notion, we were to treat the asset received by the defendant as the relevant benefit, successful 
restitutionary claims could only result in specific recovery, since the benefit, being the asset itself, 
could only be returned or given up by its delivery up to the claimant. That the courts allow, and the 
texts endorse, recovery of benefits to take the form of a non-specific, monetary award shows that 
they understand the benefit in such cases to be something distinct from the asset itself. Moreover, 
without such an understanding of benefit, it would be impossible to argue for benefit-based liability 
in the absence o f the defendant’s receipt of some physical asset, which could then be returned in 
specie, thus automatically ruling out such claims, inter alia, in cases of pure services and payment 
of another’s debts.
O f course this still leaves the question of how such benefits can be reversed. If they are 
intangible and so cannot be returned in specie, then what form could such a claim take? A useful 
parallel can be found in compensatory claims.
The abstract nature of benefit is mirrored in the notion of loss. Where a claimant seeks 
compensation for a loss, the loss may take a variety o f forms;60 assets of his may be damaged, he 
may suffer physical or psychological injury, his reputation may be harmed. These all result in the 
claimant being left worse off, in an impairment of his quality of life. An allegation of loss is, 
therefore, an allegation that the defendant has reduced, if only in some small and temporary way, 
the claimant’s quality of life. The aim of a compensatory award is to redress this, to ensure that the 
claimant is not left worse off by reason of the defendant’s conduct. This is done by awarding him a 
sum of money which increases his quality of life by an amount equal in measure to the diminution 
brought about by the defendant. Compensatory damages are not, therefore, designed to put right the 
specific harms and injuries which the defendant caused and which were the source of the claimant’s 
loss. Indeed often these cannot be reversed.61 Rather they seek to ensure that, when we combine 
these specific harms and the money awarded as damages, the claimant is in a position no worse than 
that which he would have occupied had these harms never occurred. It is for this reason that the
59 Indeed, if it were, it would avoid some of the unnecessary difficulties and confusion occasionally found in 
the cases and texts in the application of the notion of benefit. Thus, for example, one finds uncertainty 
whether, in cases where the claimant’s services result in an end-product received by the defendant, the 
relevant benefit is the service or its product (see, e.g., Virgo, supra, n. 29 at p. 71; c.f. B.P. Exploration Co. 
(Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt (No. 2) [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, at pp. 801-802, per Robert Goff J.). Of course, both may, 
depending on the facts, be a source of benefits, and the concept of benefit does not require us to choose 
between them. (Though, see infra, text to nn. 106-117, for discussion of whether the law provides recovery in 
respect of benefits conferred by one’s services.)
60 Or rather loss can be suffered in a number of ways. The terminology of loss is used at times to describe the 
(abstract) worsening of the defendant’s position and at others to describe the occurrences which lead to such a 
worsening. The same is true of “benefit”.
61 Some harms, whether to the person, assets or reputation, are irremediable. However, even where a specific 
harm can be repaired, until it is repaired, the claimant will have been deprived of the full use and benefit of 
the damaged item. Though repair stops this deprivation continuing, it in no way corrects or undoes the period 
of deprivation that has already elapsed. History cannot be rewritten.
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courts are correct to say that it is for the claimant alone to determine how he should spend his 
compensatory damages.62
When it comes to removing a benefit from a defendant, the court is in essence faced with 
the opposite task. Instead of having a reduction in the quality o f life which needs to be redressed, 
we have here an increase which needs to be offset. This can be done by requiring the defendant to 
give up something he values, and hence the loss o f which reduces his quality o f life, in equal 
measure to the benefit he received, such that, following and by virtue of the claim, the defendant 
can no longer be said to have been benefited by his receipt. The most obvious and most simple way 
of doing this is by requiring the defendant to pay the claimant a sum of money equal to the value he 
places on the benefits he has derived from the asset.63 Money is not the same as benefit. Rather it 
provides a ready and universal unit of measuring benefit, and, in its physical form, it is a convenient 
repository of value. The difficulty comes in attaching a money value to the particular benefits 
received by the defendant. This is because, as we have seen, what is beneficial, and the extent to 
which it is beneficial, will vary from person to person. What we need to identify therefore is what 
value, if any, the defendant places on his receipt of the asset.64
The cases we are considering involve receipt o f tangible property. Where the defendant 
retains that asset or a substitute asset acquired in exchange for it, a non-specific claim of the type 
described here will be brought either where principle requires the rejection of a specific recovery 
claim or where the claimant chooses to bring the non-specific claim in preference to a specific 
recovery claim. In each case the defendant will get to keep the relevant asset. Where specific 
recovery is unavailable, the law is saying that it is the defendant rather than the claimant who is 
now entitled to the asset. Where the claimant prefers not to seek specific recovery, he is effectively 
waiving his entitlement to the asset. In both cases, the defendant acquires, and the claimant loses, 
not just factual possession of the asset but also the entitlement to it. Therefore, what we are seeking 
to put a value on is the benefit he receives by acquiring this entitlement to the asset, with the 
exclusive use privileges and control powers this brings. This equates to asking the question what 
sum of money would the defendant have been willing to pay to acquire the asset that he received.
62 See further C. Webb, “Performance and Compensation: An Analysis of Contract Damages and Contractual 
Obligation” (2006) 26 O.J.L.S. 41, at pp. 61-62.
63 Where the defendant retains the asset and the court does not order specific recovery, the sum of money 
awarded must also take account of the benefits he will in the future derive from its use.
64 The need to take into account the defendant’s own sense of value is usually approached through the notion 
of “subjective devaluation”: see, e.g., Birks, supra, n. 36, pp. 109-114; Burrows, supra, n. 29, p. 18. On this 
basis, the prima facie measure of benefit is by reference to market price, but the defendant can argue that he 
placed a lower value on what he received. The account here differs in that, firstly, market price is not relevant 
even as a starting point and, secondly, since a defendant’s valuation will also on occasion exceed the market 
price, in principle we should not only be concerned with subjective devaluation. (Though the application of 
competing principles, notably that underlying the defence of change of position, will generally limit recovery 
in such cases to the market price: see chapter 6, text to n. 41).
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In substance, this is no different a task to, and presents the same difficulties as, the 
assessment o f compensatory damages where account is taken of the consumer surplus.65 The 
principal problem is one of proof. How do we know what value the defendant put on having title to 
the asset? The obvious source of the necessary information is the defendant himself, but, in the 
context of litigation, we may not feel his evidence to be fully reliable. However, only rarely will 
there be any evidence to support or contradict that of the defendant. The market value o f the asset, 
where there is one, offers no guidance, since an individual’s tastes and circumstances, and so his 
ascription of value, will often differ from those of the reasonable or statistically average man. If the 
asset was provided pursuant to a contract which has been discharged, the contract price will be only 
a little more helpful, merely indicating that he valued performance at at least that sum. Moreover, 
the claimant, even in contractual cases, is unlikely himself ever to have considered what was the 
maximum price he would have been willing to pay for the asset. Nonetheless, as shown by their 
handling of the consumer surplus issue,66 the courts are unlikely to yield in the face of such 
difficulties, relying where necessary on educated guesswork and common sense.
Where the defendant retains neither the asset he originally received nor any substitute asset 
acquired in exchange for it, the benefit he retains cannot be measured by the value he places on 
being entitled to such an asset since, ex hypothesis he neither has nor will acquire such an 
entitlement. Rather, we must seek to identify and place a value on the particular benefits he derived 
from his dealings with the asset and any substitute. This requires us to inquire in the first instance 
into how the defendant used the asset whilst it remained in his possession. These uses then need to 
be valued. Secondly, we must inquire into the circumstances in which the defendant parted with the 
asset, since they may have brought further benefit. Where the asset was destroyed or stolen, then 
there is no further benefit to the defendant. However, where the defendant voluntarily transferred it 
to another, such a disposition will usually bring a benefit to the defendant. This is most obviously 
the case where the defendant disposes of the asset as part o f an exchange. What he receives from 
his transferee in return will be provide a benefit.67 This will also be true though where the 
defendant makes a gift of the asset. By choosing to part with the asset gratuitously, the defendant 
demonstrates that he values the donee’s receipt of the asset, and the consequences of this, more than 
he does his own continued entitlement to it. Such benefits must also be valued.68
65 On which, see generally D. Harris, A. Ogus and J. Philips, “Contract Remedies and the Consumer Surplus” 
(1979) 95 L.Q.R. 581.
66 See, e.g., Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. v. Forsyth [1996] 1 A.C. 344, particularly the speech of 
Lord Mustill.
67 As we are here dealing with the case where the defendant retains no substitute asset, the exchange will be 
for some service or performance by the transferee or a third party.
68 As a final observation, it should be noted that one may benefit from another’s assets without ever coming 
into physical receipt of them. This is the case where the defendant is benefited by work done with the 
claimant’s tools. Another example may be where the claimant pays off a debt owed by the defendant. 
Provided the benefit derives from an application of the asset from which the claimant is exclusively entitled to
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5.5 Further claims
The claims we have examined thus far are all justified on the basis that the defendant has 
something to which the claimant is entitled. If the defendant holds something to which the claimant 
is, at least vis-a-vis the defendant, exclusively entitled, giving effect to the claimant’s interest 
requires that the relevant asset or benefit be given up to him. As such, the claimant’s recovery 
simply reflects and follows from his entitlement to the asset and/or the benefits derived from it. 
Given their justification, such claims are, therefore, dependent on the defendant’s continued 
retention of an asset or benefit to which can establish such an exclusive entitlement. Accordingly, if 
there is to be liability where the defendant no longer holds an asset or benefit to which the claimant 
is entitled, it must have some other basis, resting on some other principle or interest of the 
claimant’s.
Though the defendant may no longer hold the asset he received from the claimant, while it 
was in his possession he will usually have made use o f it. In so far as the claimant’s interest in the 
asset empowers him exclusively to determine how the asset will be applied, such use is inconsistent 
with the claimant’s interest. This, however, does not, in itself, justify the defendant’s liability. 
Since the defendant no longer holds the asset, no claim can be justified on the basis of preventing 
further misuse, and, in respect of the use the defendant has already made o f the asset, this is now a 
matter o f history and cannot be reversed or undone. What can be reversed or undone are the 
consequences o f the defendant’s use of the asset. We have already dealt with the recovery of 
benefits derived from use o f another’s asset. The other possibility is for the claimant to recover 
compensation for the loss he has suffered through being deprived of the asset.
For such a claim to be justified, however, we must find a reason for requiring this loss to be 
borne by the defendant rather than the claimant. In the absence of an undertaking of responsibility, 
the principal justification for shifting onto the defendant a loss which would otherwise fall on the 
claimant is that the defendant was a cause of the loss and was at fault in doing so.69 This will be the 
case either where the defendant was culpable in causing the initial misapplication or where, though 
innocent at that stage, he later became aware that the claimant’s consent to the transfer was 
defective and went on knowingly to deal with the asset inconsistently with the claimant’s interest.70
profit (and many claims would fail at this stage, as with Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds
Company Ltd. v. Taylor (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479), a claim may in principle be available on the basis of the
claimant’s interest in the asset, even where that asset is never received by the defendant.
69 See further chapter 6, n. 8 and accompanying text.
70 Accordingly, I agree with Jaffey that the liability of a recipient who disposed of the asset in the knowledge 
that he had received it without the claimant’s proper consent is better viewed as founded on the defendant’s
87
The resulting position largely mirrors the view of Aquinas that liability in respect of the 
receipt o f another’s asset can rest on one of two bases, namely, having what belongs to another and 
wrongfully taking what belongs to another.71 Furthermore, it shows that it is not correct to view the 
non-consensual receipt, as opposed to retention, of another’s asset as raising even a prima facie  
liability.72 For this reason, some of the work currently done by the defence of change of position is
better analysed as involving a denial of the basic cause of action.73
5.6 Other interests
We have treated as our core case the receipt o f assets to which the claimant holds legal 
beneficial title. When we move beyond this core case to situations where the claimant has some 
different interest in the asset received or where the defendant is enriched in some other way, the 
availability of claims and their scope will similarly turn on what interest the claimant can establish 
in that which the defendant received. In particular, in so far as the claimant’s interest mirrors the 
interest of a holder of legal beneficial title, the same claims should in principle be available.
5.7 Trusts
In the simplest instance of the trust, assets are held by the trustee, who holds legal title to 
them and has the usual array of control powers and use privileges associated with legal beneficial 
title. However, in contrast to a holder of legal beneficial title, in exercising these powers, the 
trustee must act solely in the interests of another, his beneficiary. The beneficiary has a correlative 
right that the trustee deal with the assets for the former’s exclusive benefit. Furthermore, where the 
beneficiary is of full age and sound mind, and his beneficial interest is absolute, he can call upon the 
trustee to transfer to him both possession of and legal title to the trust assets, bringing the trust to an
wrongdoing rather than the simple fact of non-consensual receipt: see Jaffey, supra, n. 25, pp. 234-235, 320- 
321.
71 Thomas Aquinas, Summae Theologicae (Bums Oates and Washboume, 1929), II-II, q. 62, a. 6. See too J. 
Gordley, Foundations o f Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press, 
2006), pp. 424,433-434.
72 See too the approach taken by Lord Templeman in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548, at 
pp. 559-560: “ ... in a claim for money had and received by a thief, the plaintiff victim must show that money 
belonging to him was paid by the thief to the defendant and that the defendant was unjustly enriched and 
remained unjustly enriched” [my emphasis].
73 See Jaffey, supra, n. 25, pp. 282-284. On change of position, see chapter 6, text to nn. 3-41.
end.74 The question then is how should the law respond where an asset held on trust is received by 
the defendant in the absence of the effective consent of one or both of the trustee and beneficiary?
We shall start with the case where neither the trustee nor the beneficiary consent to the 
defendant’s receipt of the asset. While the trust is up and running the trustee has an interest in the 
asset which entitles him to physical possession of it and to determine how it is to be employed. 
And, though the beneficiary’s Saunders v. Vautier right means that this interest is defeasible and, 
arguably, that, even prior to the beneficiary’s exercise of that right, the trustee has no such exclusive 
interest vis-a-vis the beneficiary, it is clear that the trustee’s interest in the asset is an exclusive one 
with respect to strangers to the trust.75 This interest justifies specific recovery o f the asset by the 
trustee from a third party recipient. Furthermore, just as a legal, beneficial owner can also claim 
specific recovery of assets required in exchange for the asset he originally held, so too should a 
trustee be entitled to recover assets acquired by the defendant in exchange for the original trust 
assets. Though the trustee was not entitled to benefit personally from such exchanges, he 
nonetheless was exclusively entitled (at least vis-a-vis the defendant) to determine how to exploit 
the trust assets’ potential for acquiring new items of wealth. Where the defendant has exchanged 
the original trust assets for a substitute, that potential is then located in the new asset. Specific 
recovery can therefore be justified on the basis that it puts the trustee back in the position of being 
able to determine how this potential is exploited. As this power is to be exercised for the benefit of 
the beneficiary, such recovered substitute assets should,, of course, be held on trust for the 
beneficiary. The same reasoning justifies the trustee bringing a non-specific claim, entitling him to 
recover the value of what could be acquired in exchange for the asset held by the defendant.
More difficult to justify is a non-specific claim by the trustee to recover the benefits derived 
by the defendant from his use of the asset. Though the trustee controls access to the asset and the 
use of it, it is the beneficiary who is entitled exclusively to benefit from this.76 As such, it is not the 
trustee who can establish an entitlement to the benefits received by the defendant. If we are to 
allow the trustee to sue in respect o f the defendant’s receipt of such benefits, it can only be on the 
basis that, just as the trustee has vested in him control powers and use privileges in respect of the 
asset, so too he holds the power to bring proceedings in respect of the benefits obtained by its 
unauthorised use. This power would though be held and exercisable solely for the benefit of the 
beneficiary, and the proceeds of such a claim would accordingly be held on trust for him.
The claims available to the beneficiary will likewise be determined by the nature o f his 
interest in the trust assets. On one view, a beneficiary’s only interest is in the trust fund, rather than
74 Saunders v. Vautier (1841) Cr. & Ph. 240.
75 See infra, n. 89 and accompanying text.
76 In the absence of a disposition which overreaches the beneficiary’s interest in the asset.
in the specific assets which are at various times held on trust by the trustee.77 Quite what an interest 
in a fund is, on this view, is hard to pin down,78 but what is clear is that it involves a denial of the 
beneficiary having specific and distinct interests in the various items which constitute the fund at a 
given point in time. The premiss of this argument is that there are features of trusts law which 
cannot be squared with the beneficiary having at all times an interest in the individual assets which 
form the subject matter of the trust. Penner, for instance, focuses in particular on the claims 
available to a beneficiary following a misapplication of trust assets. Subject to defences, the 
beneficiary can elect between asserting an interest in the misapplied asset and making a claim to 
any substitute assets acquired in exchange for it. Penner’s argument is that it is only by 
understanding the beneficiary’s interest as being in a fund o f shifting assets, rather than in the 
individual assets which make up the fund for the time being, that we can explain the beneficiary’s 
ability to assert an interest in the proceeds of both authorised and unauthorised dispositions of trust 
assets. But this is not true. As we have seen,79 an entitlement to substitute assets is best explained 
as a corollary, and manifestation, of an interest in the original asset’s potential as a means of 
acquiring new items of wealth through exchange. So, rather than being inconsistent with having an 
interest in the specific trust assets, a beneficiary’s right to the proceeds of dispositions of such assets 
is in fact best explained by him having such an interest.80 Indeed, if  the beneficiary were not to
77 See, e.g., J. Penner, “Duty and Liability in Respect of Funds”, ch. 12 of J. Lowry and L. Mistelis (eds), 
Commercial Law: Perspectives and Practice (Butterworths, 2006).
78 Though Penner asserts that a fund exists as a distinct proprietary interest {ibid. at p. 212), his analysis 
suggests that, until certain events, such as a breach of trust, occur which allow the beneficiary to claim an 
interest in specific assets, the beneficiary has no proprietary interest of any sort but simply personal rights 
against the trustee. Indeed, his statement {ibid.) that, “in terms of the fund beneficiary, the proprietary aspect 
comes out only, it is submitted, in the way in which the law deals with situations where things go awry” [his 
emphasis] comes close to acknowledging this.
79 Supra, text to nn. 11-16.
80 This is not to say that the interest of a beneficiary mirrors in all respects the interest of a holder of legal 
beneficial title. This is clearly not the case. Most importantly, a beneficiary’s interest is subject to, or limited 
by, the trustee’s power, in certain circumstances, to transfer to a third party possession of and legal title to the 
asset free of the beneficiary’s interest (on which see infra, text to n. 92). In addition to the claims available 
following a misapplication of trust assets, Penner gives other examples of aspects of trusts law which he sees 
as inconsistent with the beneficiary having an interest in individual trust assets. However, these likewise give 
us no reason for rejecting the analysis of a beneficiary’s rights put forward here. Firstly, the beneficiary can 
assign his entire interest under the trust without making separate assignments in respect of each asset. 
However, this need mean no more than that the courts have adopted a pragmatic and facilitative approach to 
such transactions. Secondly, we should not place too much significance on the fact that it is the trustee who 
holds the right to sue third party recipients of trust assets, since this is principally a matter of form rather than 
substance. This is made most clear by the ability of the beneficiary to bring such an action where the trustee 
is unable or unwilling, needing only to join the trustee in proceedings. This shows that the beneficiary is 
entitled unilaterally to decide whether to sue. Penner’s analysis is itself difficult to square with certain 
features of the trust, in particular the beneficiary’s Saunders v. Vautier right to require the trustee to transfer 
the trust assets to him absolutely and his related right to call on the trustee to transfer trust assets absolutely to 
a third party, as, e.g., in Vandervell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1967] 2 A.C. 291.
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have an interest of any sort in the individual trust assets, we would not expect him to have any claim 
other than against the trustee for breach of duty.81
A more radical analysis views a beneficiary as having no interest o f any kind in the trust 
assets. A sophisticated argument to this effect has recently been put forward by Smith.82 Smith has 
suggested that a beneficiary has a right only to proper performance of the trust by the trustee, and 
that his rights against third parties are limited only to preventing their interference with the trustee’s 
performance o f his duties. Accordingly, the beneficiary has no interest as such in the trust assets, 
their use and the benefits derived from them, and so claims against third party recipients cannot be 
justified on the basis of such an interest.83
Is it correct to understand a beneficiary’s rights in this way? Smith notes that the rights a 
beneficiary can assert against third party recipients of trust assets differ from and are less extensive 
than those they can assert against the trustee.84 However, this in itself does not tell us that, to the 
extent that claims may lie against recipients of trust assets, these do not derive from an interest in 
such assets. More in point is the observation that duties o f care to avoid damage to or destruction of 
trust assets are owed only to trustees and not to beneficiaries.85 This appears inconsistent with the 
beneficiary having an interest in the assets. By contrast, however, there are aspects of trust law 
which seem to be incompatible with Smith’s view. One is the rule in Saunders v. Vautier, which 
suggests that a beneficiary’s interest goes beyond a simple right to performance of the trust by the 
trustee.86 Another is that trusts, and a beneficiary’s rights under them, are not dependent on the 
identity of the trustee. So, the trustees of a trust will often change over time, with the beneficiary’s
81 Similarly, the trustee’s liability to restore the trust fund in specie appears inconsistent with the beneficiary 
having no interest in the specific trust assets.
82 L. Smith, “Unravelling Proprietary Restitution” (2004) 40 Can. Bus. L.J. 317, at pp. 317-322. Largely the 
same argument had earlier been made by Stone: see H. Stone, “The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que 
Trust” (1917) 27 Columbia L.R. 467.
83 In fact, it will make little practical difference whether we adopt Smith’s analysis or the view that 
beneficiaries do indeed have an interest in trust the assets. In particular, on Smith’s view, holders of 
misapplied trust assets will, subject to defences, be liable to give them up so as to prevent (further) 
interference with the trustee’s performance of his duties. The principal situation where it may make an 
important difference (and this depends on a particular understanding of the nature of the trustee’s duties) is 
where the defendant recipient no longer retains the asset, but has benefited from its use while it was in his 
possession. Here it may be argued that the defendant, since he no longer the holds the asset, is not in a 
position further to interfere with the trustee’s performance of his trust obligations, and so no claim could be 
justified on that basis. By contrast, if the beneficiary is understood to have an interest in trust assets and that 
interest extends to benefits derived from its use, then liability may be justified.
84 Smith, supra, n. 82, pp. 320-321. See too R. Nolan, “Equitable Property” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 232.
85 See, e.g., Leigh andSillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd.; The Aliakmon [1986] A.C. 785, at p. 812, 
and see too M.C.C. Proceeds Inc. v. Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [1998] 4 All E.R. 675. The 
significance of this rule is reduced, and possibly eliminated, however, once one notes that the beneficiary can 
compel the trustee to bring claims arising from a breach of the duty of care owed to him, with the proceeds of 
such claims then held on trust for the beneficiary.
86 So, for instance, Matthews (P. Matthews, “The Comparative Importance of the Rule in Saunders v. 
Vautier” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 266, at p. 273) writes that Saunders v. Vautier “illustrates and exemplifies the 
idea of beneficial (or ‘equitable’) ownership or property.”
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rights remaining unaffected. Indeed, a trust will not fail for want o f a trustee, with the court 
appointing one if necessary. This again suggests that there is something more to the beneficiary’s 
interest under a trust than a simple right against his trustee, that it subsists independently and 
irrespective of who happens for the time being to be trustee and indeed notwithstanding the 
temporary absence o f a trustee. Similarly, it is clear that in the event of a trustee’s insolvency, the 
trust assets are not made available to meet the claims o f the trustee’s creditors. This is hard to 
square with the beneficiary having merely a right to the trustee performing his trust obligations 
since, though denying creditors access to such access allows performance of the trustee’s trust 
obligations, most other creditors can similarly argue that, without priority, the performance of the 
(non-trust) obligations they are owed would be interfered with were their claims not granted 
priority. Smith draws an analogy with the way that contract rights give rise to claims against third 
party to prevent their interference with performance o f the contract,87 but the preceding examples 
show that the rights of a beneficiary are accorded greater protection and are more enduring than 
contractual rights. What we need to explain is why this is.
The most plausible explanation for all these aspects of a beneficiary’s rights is the now 
orthodox view that the beneficiary has an interest in the trust assets. This explains why the identity 
of the trustee has no impact on the subsistence or content o f the beneficiary’s rights and why a 
beneficiary’s claim is accorded priority over the claims o f other creditors in the event of the 
trustee’s insolvency. The key question is what is the exact nature o f this interest.
I believe there are two ways to conceive of a beneficiary’s interest prior to the exercise of 
his Saunders v. Vautier right.88 The first is to say that he has, at that time, no interest in the physical 
possession and determining the use of the asset, but that the Saunders v. Vautier right gives him, 
and indeed amounts to, a power unilaterally to acquire such an interest. The second is to say that he 
has such an interest even before he exercises that right, since the trustee is entitled to possess and to 
determine the use of the asset only so long as the beneficiary allows.89 On either basis the 
beneficiary should be entitled to recovery of the asset, any fruits or substitutes from a third party in 
possession of them. On the first view, even though the asset is now in the defendant’s hands, the 
beneficiary, having not disposed o f his power to acquire an interest in possessing and using the
87 Smith, supra, n. 82, p. 321.
88 As will be seen, for present purposes it does not matter which of these conceptions of the beneficiary’s 
rights one adopts. However, authorities such as Re Brockbank [1949] Ch. 206 suggest both why this 
distinction may matter and that the courts have favoured the first conception. For a general examination of 
the nature and purpose of the Saunders v. Vautier principle, see Matthews, supra, n. 86.
89 On this basis one could argue that there is an analogy between the respective rights of the trustee and 
beneficiary to the trust assets and the position under the common law where the defendant takes adverse 
possession of land to which the claimant holds paper title. The adverse possessor acquires a legal title to the 
land which is “good against” (that is, he acquires an interest in the land which is exclusive in respect of) all 
but those, such as the claimant (until the expiration of the limitation period), with a better title: see Asher v.
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asset, may exercise that power and call for the trustee to transfer legal title to him, which entitles 
him to recover possession from the defendant. On the second, the beneficiary already has such an 
interest and can simply assert it against the defendant. On either basis, since the beneficiary either 
has or can acquire such an interest in the asset, he also has available to him the non-specific claims 
which we have seen are available to the holder of such legal beneficial title. As we have noted,90 it 
is not entirely clear whether legal beneficial title includes an exclusive interest in the benefits others 
derive from use of the asset. If it does a beneficiary should also be able to claim against those who 
no longer retain trust assets but who benefited from their use.91
The second situation to examine is where the trustee consents to the asset passing to the 
defendant but the beneficiary does not. In such a case the trustee clearly has no claim in respect of 
any interest of his own in the asset, since he has given his consent to its receipt by the defendant. If 
any claim is to lie it must be in respect of the beneficiary’s interest. Importantly his interest will 
usually be limited by or subject to the trustee’s power to transfer possession of and title to the trust 
assets free of the beneficiary’s interest.92 If the trustee transfers a trust asset to the defendant in 
proper exercise of this power, the beneficiary’s interest in the asset is extinguished, regardless of 
whether the beneficiary knew of or consented to this disposition, and therefore no claim will lie 
against the defendant. However, the trustee’s power to dispose of the asset free of the beneficiary’s 
interest will not be unlimited, and the position differs where the disposition in favour of the 
defendant exceeds this power of the trustee. In such a case, the beneficiary’s interest will not be 
defeated simply by the trustee transferring the asset to the defendant.93 Therefore, the beneficiary 
may rely on this subsisting interest to found a claim.
We have seen that one possible interpretation o f a beneficiary’s Saunders v. Vautier right is 
that, even prior to its exercise, it gives him an interest in the possession and use of the trust assets 
since he can . call for their transfer to him at any time. On this view the beneficiary would be 
entitled to specific recoveiy from the defendant as a means of effectuating this interest. However, a 
specific recovery claim can be justified even if we do not regard the beneficiary as having any such 
subsisting interest. As we saw, should we not view the beneficiary as having a present interest in 
possessing and using the asset, his Saunders v. Vautier right means that he has a power to acquire 
such an interest. The key question then is against whom is this power effective. In particular, it 
does not follow from the fact that it can be exercised against the trustee that it is also exercisable
Whitlock (1865) 1 L.R. 1 Q.B. 1. A similar principle applies in relation to chattels: Armory v. Delamirie 
(1722) 1 Stra. 505.
90 Supra, text to nn. 25-54.
91 Indeed, if the law does recognize exclusive interests in benefits derived from assets, it seems clear that, 
even before exercising, and indeed even in the absence of a Saunders v. Vautier right, it is the beneficiary 
rather than the trustee who has such an interest. Accordingly, on this view, we would not need to rely on 
Saunders v. Vautier to account for the possibility of such a claim.
92 See D. Fox, “Overreaching”, ch. 4 of P. Birks and A. Pretto (eds), Breach o f Trust (Hart Publishing, 2002).
93
against third party recipients o f trust assets. It is, however, clear that the courts now regard that 
power as exigible also against such strangers to the trust. It is for this reason that a beneficiary is 
regarded as having his own, equitable, title to the trust assets.94 That being so, the beneficiary has 
an interest in the trust assets which he can assert against the defendant recipient and, through an 
exercise o f his Saunders v. Vautier right, require the defendant to transfer the asset to him. As 
before, this also entitles the beneficiary to bring the non-specific claims set out above.
The final situation to examine is where the beneficiary consents to the defendant’s receipt 
but the trustee does not. Since it is the trustee who will, in the usual case, have possession o f the 
asset, such cases will be rare. We can, however, say that the beneficiary, having his own distinct 
interest in the asset, is free to dispose of this as he chooses, the trustee’s consent being irrelevant. In 
such a case the trustee retains his own interest, though it remains defeasible by an exercise of the 
Saunders v. Vautier right, now held by the defendant. This interest of the trustee, so long as it 
subsists, supports the various claims described above. Additionally, the beneficiary can call on the 
trustee to transfer the asset absolutely to the defendant, that is, the trustee transfers possession of, 
and legal title to, the asset to the defendant, extinguishing the beneficiary’s interest in it and leaving 
the defendant as holder o f legal, beneficial title.95 That being so, there should be no claim by the 
trustee where the beneficiary consented to the defendant receiving the asset beneficially and, prior 
to such receipt, the beneficiary could have required the trustee to transfer the asset to the defendant 
absolutely.
Not all trusts are alike and, where the rights o f the parties differ from those in the simple 
case we have just been examining, so too may the claims they can bring. For instance, not every 
beneficiary will have a Saunders v. Vautier right to call on the trustee to transfer the trust assets to 
him absolutely. In the absence of this, the beneficiary will not be able to establish an interest in the 
trust assets sufficient to justify a specific recovery claim. Where there is no single beneficiary with 
such a right, the beneficiaries as a group, if all sui juris, together can require the transfer of the trust 
assets to them.96 On this basis, they, as a group, can bring the same claims as an absolutely entitled 
single beneficiary. A beneficiary with no Saunders v. Vautier right may still be able to establish an 
interest in benefits received by the defendant, for instance where the beneficiary has a beneficial life 
interest in the assets.97 On other occasions, though, the beneficiary will have no interest in the trust 
assets sufficient to found a claim of any kind.98 Again though, the beneficiaries as a whole, whether 
or not all sui juris, will be exclusively entitled to the benefits derived from the trust assets.
9iIbid., p. 105.
94 See A. Scott, “The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust” (1917) 27 Columbia L.R. 269.
95 Vandervell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1967] 2 A.C. 291.
96 Re Smith [1928] Ch. 915.
97 C.f Baker v. Archer-Shee [1927] A.C. 844.
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Accordingly they can claim in respect of any benefits received by the defendant to which they did 
not consent and which were not the result o f an overreaching disposition by the trustee.
5.8 Intellectual property
The institution o f property is commonly understood to embrace not simply entitlements to 
tangible, physical things but also entitlements to certain abstract, incorporeal notions and entities. 
Intellectual property is one example of this, through which are granted exclusive entitlements to 
particular ideas, information and motifs. As before, the claims available to the holder of such a 
right should be determined by the nature and scope of his interest, and, to the extent that his interest 
mirrors the interest of a holder of legal, beneficial title to tangible assets, the same claims should in 
principle be available to him.
It is clear that intellectual property rights give an exclusive entitlement to determine who 
may utilise and take advantage of the information or ideas over which the right extends. This in 
itself justifies injunctive relief to prevent such use by others without the claimant’s consent. The 
claimant’s interest may also extend to an exclusive entitlement to any physical assets acquired or 
created through application of the idea or information. This would then justify the delivery up of 
such assets to the claimant." If his interest comprises not just the power to determine who may use 
the information or ideas but also an exclusive entitlement to any benefit derived from them then, 
subject to the application of competing principles, the claimant should have a claim for the recovery 
of any benefit obtained by others where they have made such use without the claimant’s effective 
consent.
As the law stands, the claims available following infringements of intellectual property 
rights vary depending on the nature of the idea, information or other abstract entity in which the 
claimant has an interest. In some instances recovery o f all profits derived from prohibited use is 
unavailable where the defendant acted innocently.100 The absence of such of a claim strongly 
suggests that such entitlements do not presently extend to an exclusive entitlement to the benefits 
generated from use of the idea. In other cases, however, recovery o f such benefits seems to be
98 This will, for instance, be the position of a beneficiary of a discretionary trust. See Gartside v. Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [1968] A.C. 553.
99 C.f Patents Act 1977, s 61(l)(b), Trade Marks Act 1994, ss 15 and 16; A. Burrows, Remedies for Torts and 
Breach o f Contract (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2004), pp. 583-586. This is not dissimilar to the way an 
interest in a tangible asset commonly extends to other assets generated from or acquired in exchange for that 
asset: see supra, text to nn. 9-16.
100 This is clearest in relation to patents: see the Patents Act 1977, s 62(1). The question is less certain in 
respect of trade mark infringements: see Edelman, supra, n. 30, pp. 236-241.
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available even in the absence o f wrongdoing.101 This is consistent with the claimant having an 
exclusive interest in such benefits, and indeed it would be difficult to justify such claims on any 
other basis.102
Aside from recovery o f profits, a claimant may be entitled to a monetary award measured 
by reference either to the profits he has lost through the defendant’s actions or, where no such 
profits would have been made, to the sum the claimant could reasonably have charged the defendant 
for his use. As with the analogous awards made in cases of interference with tangible assets, the 
latter type of award has been argued to be an example o f restitutionary liability.103 As we have seen 
though,104 the validity of this argument is far from clear. Indeed one may say that, in the absence of 
some explanation of the basis in principle of such liability, it is idle to debate whether such claims 
are restitutionary. Certainly limiting recovery to a reasonable sum appears inconsistent with the 
claimant having an exclusive interest in all benefits derived from the idea or information.105
5.9 Services
It is not only through the receipt and use o f our assets that we can confer benefits on others. 
We can also pass benefits through our actions, by providing services which are of value to them. 
The question is whether a claimant who does not consent to the defendant benefiting from his 
actions has a claim in respect of such benefits.
Though the issue of restitution for services has generated its fair share o f debate, academic 
attention has almost exclusively focussed on identifying the circumstances in which services may 
be regarded as enriching.106 The implication is that the identification of a benefit received by the 
defendant is the only obstacle to recovery in such cases. This in turn rests on the widespread,
101 This was clearly the case in relation to copyright infringements under the Copyright Act 1956, s 17(2). 
Things are less clear now by virtue of s 97(1) of the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988, though 
Wienerworld Ltd. v. Vision Video Ltd. [1998] F.S.R. 832 suggests that the position remains the same.
102 The significance of such claims lying in cases of innocent infringement is of course that they cannot be 
explained as applications of the principle that no man should profit from his wrongdoing. Whether such 
claims do in fact demonstrate acceptance that the claimant has an exclusive interest in benefits derived from 
the idea or information is questionable, however, when one looks at the reasons given for such awards. For 
instance, it is often said that, because the claimant could have obtained an injunction to prevent the 
defendant’s use of the idea or information, profits generated from such use should be recoverable. However, 
as we have seen {supra, text to nn. 24-25), this does not follow. There is no illogic in the law granting the 
claimant an interest in exclusively determining the use of, and hence who may benefit from, an asset without 
also recognising an interest in such benefits.
103 See, e.g., Edelman, supra, n. 30, pp. 224-231.
104 Supra, text to nn. 29-34.
105 As is the fact that such claims are often unavailable where the defendant acted innocently; see, e.g., Patents 
Act 1977, s 62(1); Copyright Act 1988, s 97(1).
106 Hence textbook discussion centres on “pure” services {supra, text to nn. 39-42); see, e.g., Birks, supra n. 
36, pp. 449-451; Burrows, supra, n. 29, pp. 17-18; Virgo, supra, n. 29, pp. 70-72.
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though generally tacit, assumption that a restitutionary claim will prima facie  lie wherever the 
defendant receives a benefit from the claimant without the latter’s effective consent. As we have 
seen though,107 such an assumption is incorrect. It is not every involuntarily conferral of a benefit 
which is capable of founding a claim, and if a claimant wishes to recover a benefit received by the 
defendant he must do more than simply show that the benefit came from him and that he did not 
consent to this. The key question is whether the law recognises individuals as having an exclusive 
interest in (at least some of) the benefits they create through their actions. To the extent that such 
an interest is recognised, this justifies the claimant’s recovery o f benefits derived by a defendant 
from the claimant’s actions without his effective consent.
Is there such an interest? It is clear that the law does recognise our interest in, and so 
protects, our capacity for action, our freedom to choose how and when we act.108 And in allowing 
us to choose how we act, the law allows us to choose who we shall benefit through our actions. 
But, as we saw in relation to benefits derived from the use of assets,109 it does not follow that the 
law recognises any interest in those benefits once created. Much the same point is made by Penner 
in his rejection of restitutionary liability in cases of pure services.110
Penner’s argument has two steps. The first is to demonstrate that the receipt o f assets and 
the receipt of services are conceptually distinct, and so we should reject the orthodox equation of 
benefits derived from receiving assets and those derived from another’s actions. The second is to 
show that this conceptual distinction is indeed reflected in the law’s response to the involuntary 
conferral of benefits through services. Penner’s first step involves distinguishing our interest in 
property, defined as our interest in things external to ourselves, from our interest in exercising our 
capacity for action, a capacity which is inherently and necessarily ours. Hence, we have property 
in, title to, assets, whereas we do not have, and do not speak o f having, property in or title to our 
actions. But, while we can rightly distinguish our interest in assets from our interest in our capacity 
for action, this does not in itself prove that there should be no claim in respect o f benefits conferred 
by our actions, a claim analogous to that which is, or may be, available in respect o f benefits 
derived from our assets. Put simply, the fact that we can distinguish benefits derived from assets 
and those derived from actions does not tell us that we should. So, even if we accept Penner’s
107 Chapter 3, text to nn. 25-44.
108 This is done principally though the criminal law and the torts of battery and false imprisonment.
109 Supra, text to nn. 24-25.
110 J. Penner, “Basic Obligations”, ch. 5 of P. Birks (ed.), The Classification o f Obligations (Clarendon Press, 
1997), at pp. 102-119. Though Penner confines his attention to pure services, his argument arguably suggests 
that we should also deny recovery in respect of benefits derived from the receipt of assets (in contrast to 
claims dependent on and to give effect to the claimant’s interest in assets in the defendant’s hands). 
Throughout, the principal distinction he draws is between the receipt of and one’s entitlement to assets and 
receipt of and claims to benefits derived from services, not between benefits derived from  assets and those 
from services. For instance, Penner stresses the role of title in identifying rights to assets, noting that no such
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definition o f property, it does not follow that we cannot or should not have an interest in the 
benefits created by our actions.111 To deny recovery of such benefits on the basis that our capacity 
for action is not a proprietary interest, without more, is assertion and not reason, depending as it 
does on an implicit assumption, itself requiring justification, that it is only through the concept of 
property that the law gives entitlements to benefits. In the absence of such reasoned support, resort 
to the language o f property tells us nothing. As such, Penner’s argument does not so much give us 
a reason to reject recovery in respect of pure services as refute one argument frequently made in 
support of such claims, namely that there must be symmetry in the law’s response to the receipt of 
benefits from assets and from actions.
What does appear to be true though is that English law does not presently recognise 
individuals as having an interest in the benefits deriving from or created by their actions. If there 
were such an interest we should expect benefits involuntarily conferred on others by our actions to 
be recoverable. The cases, however, do not support this, appearing to require that, before a claim 
will lie, some additional factor, such as the defendant having encouraged the claimant to act as he 
did or the defendant allowing the claimant so to act, in the knowledge that he expected payment, 
must be present.112 Even then the sum of money awarded does not appear to be assessed on the 
basis that this is the value of the benefit received by the defendant.113
There is one qualification. Though a number o f commentators have challenged the view 
that there is and should be recovery in respect of pure services, that is services which create or leave 
no new or improved asset in the defendant’s hands, there is close to a consensus that a claim will lie 
where the claimant’s actions do leave such a residuum.
Why should this make a difference? As we have seen, the receipt of assets justifies claims 
for the recovery o f such assets and, possibly, for recovery of benefits derived from them where and 
on the basis that the claimant has an exclusive interest in those assets. But in the cases we are 
examining now there is no receipt of assets to which the claimant had any pre-existing entitlement, 
nor are there assets in the defendant’s possession which derive from an asset of the claimant’s and
notion is employed in relation to services. But the same point can be made in relation to benefits, whether 
they derive from assets or other sources.
111 Indeed, on Penner’s definition, there would be nothing to stop us classing such an interest as an interest in 
property, since the benefits created by our actions, in contrast to the actions themselves, are external to and 
separable from us.
112 Analyses of the cases along such lines are found in Beatson, supra, n. 39, pp. 31-39, Muir, supra, n 43 and 
in P. Watts, “Restitution -  A Property Principle and a Services Principle” [1995] R.L.R. 49, at pp. 70-80; c.f 
the famous quote of Pollock C.B. in Taylor v. Laird (1856) 25 L J. Ex. 329, at p. 332: “One cleans another’s 
shoes; what can the other do but put them on?”. The question of what principle, what interest of the claimant, 
can adequately explain recovery in such cases is, however, far from clear; c.f. Penner, supra, n. 110, pp. 116- 
119.
113 That such awards are not quantified by reference to the benefit received by the defendant, and hence that 
such claims do not reflect an interest in the claimant in such benefits, is reinforced by the fact that a claim 
may lie even where the claimant’s actions do not benefit the defendant; see, e.g., Planche v. Colburn (1831) 8 
Bing. 14.
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so could justify a claim on that basis. The only connection between the claimant and the new or 
improved asset in the defendant’s hands is that the asset or the improvement to it is a product of the 
claimant’s labour or actions. But, in the absence o f some interest in the claimant to the products of 
his actions, this cannot justify such a claim. Because of this, we can justify the denial of recovery in 
cases of pure services, while at the same time allowing claims where the service gives rise to some 
new or improved asset, only if  we say that a claimant, while having no interest in the benefits 
created by his actions, nonetheless does have an interest in assets which his actions create or, 
possibly, improve or maintain. Is such a position defensible?
Where a service results in the creation of some new asset, not only may the service itself be 
beneficial to the recipient, but the resulting asset will also usually provide, through its use, a source 
of further, future benefits. And, as with all assets, if valuable and scarce, it can also be used to 
acquire new items o f wealth through exchange. As such, services which leave a marketable 
residuum create a capacity to derive ongoing benefits and to acquire other items of wealth. The 
asset, and with it the power to exercise this capacity and to determine who should benefit from it, 
requires allocation. By contrast, pure services create or contribute to no asset and hence no such 
capacity, and so do not raise the same questions of allocation.
There are reasons for resolving these questions of allocation in favour of the claimant. 
Firstly, one can make what Harris has called a creator-incentive argument.114 Those who, through 
their labour, create new assets, in so far as these can be put to valued use, thereby create a source of 
wealth from which any number of people may benefit. To the extent that this is socially desirable, 
as it usually will be, there is a public interest in encouraging such conduct. This can be done by 
granting the creator an entitlement to determine the disposition o f the asset and the benefits it 
brings. A second argument builds on the fact that, through protecting our interest in exercising our 
capacity for action, the law allows us to determine who will benefit from our actions, even if it does 
not then give us an interest in such benefits once received so as to found a claim for their recovery. 
It would be consistent with this to allow recovery where the service results in some new or 
improved asset, since in such cases, in contrast to cases of pure services, the claimant’s actions put 
the defendant in a position to derive ongoing benefits.
Each argument provides both a ground for distinguishing cases of pure services from those 
where the service leaves some marketable residuum and support for the recognition of an exclusive 
entitlement to a newly created asset in the claimant. Such an entitlement in turn justifies the same 
claims as are available where the defendant receives an asset to which the claimant had such an 
entitlement prior to receipt.115
114 J. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 293-299.
115 The position is less straightforward where the claimant’s actions improve an existing asset of the 
defendant’s, rather than create an entirely new asset. To the extent that the same principles apply (and here,
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Is this distinction between pure services and those resulting in some end-product reflected 
in the law? Certainly there are examples of the law granting entitlements to those who have 
through their industry and/or ideas created new assets. This can be seen in the law of intellectual 
property and in the rules of specificatio. However, where the claimant’s actions merely result in an 
improvement of an existing asset, the position is less clear. Despite the occasional suggestion that a 
claim will lie in such cases116 there are a number of such situations where no claim is available. For 
instance, much o f the law of tracing is inconsistent with the proposition that a claimant is entitled to 
recovery where his actions improve or enhance the value o f the defendant’s asset. As the law 
stands, it is only contributions in the form of an exchange of assets, and not through the provision of 
labour or the application of one’s skills, which can give rise to an interest in the resulting product.117
5.10 Overview
In summary, the claims available following the defendant’s receipt of assets or benefits 
provided by the claimant will depend, in the first instance, on what interest the claimant has in the 
asset and/or benefits presently held by the defendant. If the claimant can make out an exclusive 
entitlement to an asset in the defendant’s hands, this should entitle him to its specific recovery or to 
a monetary award measured by the increase to the defendant’s wealth-acquiring potential the asset 
provides. Such an exclusive entitlement can most easily be established by the claimant
for instance, the creator-incentive argument may have less weight), they would in the usual case justify 
recovery only to the extent of the increased wealth-acquiring potential that the claimant’s contribution 
brought about.
116 See, e.g., Greenwood v. Bennett [1973] Q.B. 195, at p. 202, per Lord Denning M.R. There, Bennett’s car 
was stolen and eventually came into the hands of Harper, who, mistakenly believing the car to be his, repaired 
and improved it. The car was subsequently seized by the police and the court was required to determine to 
whom it should be returned. It was held that Bennett was entitled to the car but that he must reimburse 
Harper for the money he had spent on it. This is an example of what the texts, somewhat misleadingly, call a 
“passive claim”, in that it places a condition on owner’s recovery of the car, rather than “actively” entitling 
the mistaken improver to sue for payment. While Lord Denning M.R. was of the view that an active claim 
would lie in such cases, this was not endorsed by the other members of the court and was expressly rejected 
by Caims L.J. (ibid. at p. 203). The distinction between active and passive claims (or, more accurately, 
between claims brought by the improver and defences or conditions applicable to claims brought against him) 
is also reflected in s 6(1) of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977. Though this distinction has been 
criticized as illogical (see, e.g., Burrows, supra, n. 29, p. 164; Virgo, supra, n. 29, p. 80), it can be defended 
and suggests that one whose actions improve another’s asset acquires no interest in, and has no claim in 
respect of, that asset or the benefits derived from it: see Jaffey, supra, n. 25, p. 92.
117 See, e.g., F.C. Jones and Sons v. Jones [1997] Ch. 159, where there was no suggestion that Mrs Jones had 
any claim to money which derived, in part, from her investment decisions. C.f. Smith, supra, n. 12, pp. 239- 
242, 367-368; T. Akkouh and S. Worthington, “Re Diplock (1948)”, ch. 11 of C. Mitchell and P. Mitchell 
(eds), Landmark Cases in the Law o f Restitution (Hart Publishing, 2006), at pp. 304-315. Indeed, even where 
the claimant contributes to the defendant’s asset through his own assets, rather than his actions, it is unclear 
that a claim lies: see Borden (U.K.) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. [1981] Ch. 25; c.f. Akkouh and 
Worthington, ibid.', Smith, supra, n. 12, p. 242.
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demonstrating that he had such an entitlement to the asset immediately prior to its receipt by the 
defendant and that he did not properly consent to its transfer to the defendant. It may also be 
possible to establish such an entitlement in other ways however, notably if  the asset in the 
defendant’s hands is a product of or substitute for an asset to which the claimant was exclusively 
entitled, and, possibly, if the asset was created or improved by the claimant’s actions.
The claimant should have a claim to the monetary value of a benefit received by the 
defendant where he has an exclusive entitlement to benefits deriving from the source from which 
the defendant was benefited. It is unclear whether and when such entitlements are recognised in the 
law, though arguably an exclusive entitlement to assets carries with it a similar entitlement to the 
benefits it brings.
Without identifying such an entitlement, the simple facts that the defendant received an 
asset from, or has been enriched by, the claimant without his consent provide no justification for 
any claim by him.
We have now seen what claims are justified by virtue of the claimant’s interest in his assets. 
However, the protection o f such interests will often be opposed, and so qualified, by the application 




We have now seen what claims are supported by a claimant’s interest in his assets when, 
without his consent, such assets come into the defendant’s hands. O f course, such claims will fail if 
one or more of the facts on which they are founded is absent. For instance, no claim will lie where 
the claimant’s consent to the transfer was in no way defective. This is for the simple reason that, in 
such cases, the principle that we should protect and give effect to the claimant’s interest in 
exclusively determining the disposition of his assets is not called into play on the facts and so 
provides no basis for recovery. More importantly, however, such claims will also fail where all the 
elements of the claim as set out in the previous chapter are present and yet the application of other 
principles nonetheless require us to deny or to restrict recovery. Where this is so, though the 
claimant can rightly say that the claim is necessary to protect his interests, there are other 
considerations which have a stronger, or at least as strong a, claim for recognition in the law and 
which militate against recovery.1 What follows is an examination o f some of these principles.2
6.1 Change of position and the limits of strict liability
The preceding analysis of the interests which underlie claims in respect o f misapplied assets 
shows why liability in such cases is presumptively strict. In the first place, the entitlement the 
claimant is asserting is neither premised nor dependent upon any wrongdoing or fault on the 
defendant’s part. Rather, he is simply alleging that by law he has been allocated an interest, 
exclusive of the defendant, in some thing in the defendant’s hands. The defendant is required to do 
no more than give up something to which he had no prior entitlement and to which no entitlement
1 It has been said, surprisingly frequently, that defences must logically amount to a denial of some element of 
the cause of action; see, e.g., P. Birks, Restitution -  The Future (The Federation Press, 1992), pp. 125-126; R. 
Nolan, “Change of Position”, ch. 6 of P. Birks (ed.), Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press, 1995), at p. 
136; R. Grantham and C. Rickett, Enrichment and Restitution in New Zealand (Hart Publishing, 2000), p. 
334, c.f., ibid., p. 314. This is plainly untrue, unless we always include “absence of defences” in the formula 
for a cause of action, in which case the statement becomes tautologous. Indeed, for this reason, the logical 
consequence of this view of defences is that reference to “defences” is superfluous. If we are meaningfully to 
talk of defences, they must be distinct from elements of the cause of action and one basis for dividing the two 
is that presented in the text. In any case, it is clear that our reasons for rejecting a claim may be unconnected 
to, and so involve no denial of the applicability of, the principle or interest on which the claimant is relying. 
Clear examples of this elsewhere in the law of torts include limitation and contributory negligence.
2 This is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of such principles. Rather it will focus on some of those most 
common and most closely connected to cases of misapplied assets.
102
was properly granted by the person exclusively entitled to do so. Secondly, and crucially, in the 
simple case with which we began the previous chapter, this does no injustice to the defendant, since 
the claim will leave him no worse off than if had never received the asset. If he is required to hand 
back the asset, he simply ends up in the same position as that which he would have occupied had 
the asset not been misapplied.3 In short, he gains nothing but loses nothing.4
However, the position is no longer so straightforward where allowing a claim on one or 
more of the bases set out in the previous chapter would leave the defendant worse off than if he had 
not received the asset. The most common situation where this would result is where the defendant 
has made a disposition of his assets on the assumption that he is entitled to the asset received from 
the claimant, and he would not have made such a disposition had he known that he had no such 
entitlement. The question then is whether we should allow recovery (in full) where this would 
cause such a loss to the defendant.
The position of English law here is equivocal. Where it is held that the defect in the 
claimant’s consent prevents his title passing to the defendant, a claim will not fail simply because 
this would leave the defendant worse off than if he had not received the asset. The furthest the law 
goes is, on occasion, to provide a defence where the defendant has, in good faith and without notice 
of the defect in the claimant’s consent, given something o f value in return for his receipt o f the 
asset.5 By contrast, where title is held to pass despite the claimant’s defective consent, claims will 
not succeed against the defendant, provided he has not committed any wrong, to the extent that this 
would put him in a worse position than that which he would have occupied had he not received the 
asset. This is by virtue o f the defence known as change o f position.6
3 Some refinement is needed when we move to the non-specific claims outlined in the previous chapter. 
Necessarily, in such cases, the defendant is required to give up something (a sum of money) different from 
that which he received from the claimant. In relation to claims for the recovery of benefits, there can be no 
danger of the claimant being left worse off as a result of the claim since recovery extends, and is justified, 
only to the extent that the defendant would otherwise be better off as by virtue of the receipt. In relation to 
non-specific claims assessed by reference to the wealth-acquiring potential the asset provides, the situation is 
not so straightforward, and there may be a risk that, even in the simple case, full recovery might leave the 
defendant worse off: see infra, text to nn. 37-41.
4 It is important to note, however, that it is not because the defendant is not left worse off by the claim that the 
claim is, in the first instance, justified. Rather, this fact helps us to see why the defendant’s innocence does 
not provide a reason for rejecting such a claim.
5 Though this will sometimes have the effect that no loss will be bome by the defendant, it is unclear whether 
this is the rationale of the defence. Certainly it does not do the job very well. Not only is the defence 
unavailable in many instances in which full recovery would leave the defendant worse off, but, where the 
defence does apply, it provides a complete bar to any claim and so goes beyond the mere prevention of such 
losses to the defendant. See further infra, text to nn. 31-36.
6 In fact, the position of English law may well be more complex than this brief outline suggests. For instance, 
at least on one view, where title does not pass, the claimant may nonetheless choose not to rely on, and so 
effectively denounce, his title and claim instead in unjust enrichment, in which case the change of position 
defence can be raised: see P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2005), pp. 66-68. 
Moreover, where the claimant asserts title to a substitute asset in the defendant’s hands, it has also been 
argued that change of position applies: see P. Birks, “Change of Position and Surviving Enrichment”, ch. 2 of 
W. Swadling (ed.), The Limits o f Restitutionary Claims: A Comparative Analysis (British Institute of
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This divergence of approach is usually explained on the basis that change of position is a 
defence unique to unjust enrichment claims and that, where the claimant is relying on his pre­
existing and subsisting title to the misapplied asset, the claim is not in unjust enrichment. But as we 
have seen already,7 such explanations are inadequate since, whether or not title passes, the claimant 
is asserting the same interest and the law is giving effect to the same principle. As before, if this 
difference in treatment is to be justified, we must look beyond the plain fact that there is such 
different treatment and ask whether it can be supported on the basis that such cases raise different 
questions, and so call for different applications, of principle.
6.2 The basis of the defence
We can begin by asking why we should be concerned by the possibility o f a claim causing a 
loss to the defendant. If we allow the claimant in such a case to assert his interest in full, so as to 
recover the asset in specie or to claim a sum of money equal to the asset’s wealth-acquiring 
potential, the law would effectively be shifting a loss from the claimant onto the defendant. That is, 
in the absence o f legal intervention, the defendant would remain in possession of, and free to deal 
with, the asset and it would be the claimant left disadvantaged. O f course, the claimant has an 
interest deserving of protection, but the question is whether that interest is sufficient to justify 
imposing this loss on the defendant.
If we look elsewhere, we can see that the law is generally reluctant to allow claims where 
this would leave the defendant worse off in the absence of fault or an undertaking of responsibility 
in respect of the relevant loss on the defendant’s part. For instance, there is a tendency in the law of 
torts that liability for losses caused by one’s actions should be dependent on fault.8 That the law
International and Comparative Law, 1997), at pp. 42-46; c.f. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 
548.
7 Chapter 4, text to nn. 20-30.
8 This is not to deny the significant role strict liability plays in the law of torts, nor that genuine fault is 
sometimes absent in some torts which are supposedly fault-based. A number of observations, however, can 
be made to defend the proposition in the text. Firstly, I think it is fair to say that, whether or not as a matter of 
statistical frequency fault-based claims are more common than strict liability claims, most view fault-based 
liability as the central case of tort, with strict liability the exception and calling for special justification. This 
is reflected in the focus in the texts and tort courses on the tort of negligence. It is also evident in the way the 
courts have allowed negligence to occupy ground hitherto regarded as the exclusive province of another tort 
while at the same time preventing other torts taking ground from the tort of negligence: see, respectively, 
Spring v. Guardian Assurance Pic [1995] 2 A.C. 296 and Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] A.C. 655. 
Similarly there is a trend for torts traditionally considered to be examples of strict liability to develop in ways 
which mitigate the strictness of liability: see, e.g., Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather Pic 
[1994] 2 A.C. 264 (c.f. Transco Pic v. Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 A.C. 1, at p. \5,per 
Lord Hoffmann); Defamation Act 1996, ss 1-4. Secondly, in so far as the law of torts is concerned with 
prescribing what is acceptable conduct and upholding such standards (for instance, through declaratoiy and 
injunctive relief), there can be no complaints about strict liability, since in such cases the defendant is not
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recognises and protects a claimant’s interest in the avoidance o f certain losses is plain from the fact 
that law provides claims for the recovery of such losses. However, a requirement of fault limits the 
law’s protection of such interests. This, therefore, provides an instance of the law rejecting 
assertions of the claimant’s interest where this would leave an innocent defendant worse off. 
Moreover, in such cases, it may be thought that the argument for shifting the loss onto the defendant 
is stronger since it is he who, albeit innocently, caused the claimant to suffer the loss. Here, by 
contrast, where the defendant receives the claimant’s asset with no knowledge that the claimant’s 
consent to the transfer was defective, the defendant cannot even be said to have caused this loss to 
the claimant. As such, we appear to have greater reason to refuse to impose liability on, and so to 
shift the loss onto, the defendant.
One way to express this concern is to say that there is a principle that the law should not 
inflict a loss on an innocent claimant in the absence of some relevant undertaking of responsibility.9 
However, it may be possible to find a more revealing rationale by reference to the interests we 
examined in the previous chapter. In such cases, we may be able to say that the claimant’s interest 
in exclusively determining the disposition of his assets comes into conflict with the same interest of 
the defendant in relation to his own assets.
Certainly, this seems to be the case where the claimant seeks or the court orders non­
specific recovery, since here the effect of such a claim is to require the defendant to hand over 
assets - a sum of money - to which the claimant was not, and the defendant was, previously entitled. 
As such, the defendant can argue that this would infringe his own interest in exclusively 
determining the disposition of his assets.10 Clearly the same argument is not available where the
being required to bear a loss but simply to refrain from certain conduct. It can be argued that much of the 
strict liability in tort can be explained on that basis: see T. Weir, Tort Law (Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 85. 
Other instances of strict liability may be explicable so as likewise not to conflict with the proposition in the 
text. For instance, there is the argument, referred to supra, chapter 5, n. 31 and accompanying text, that 
conversion became a tort of strict liability to make up for the lack of a common law vindicatio, a position 
which would be reinforced were we to adopt the suggestion that innocent converters should be able to raise 
the defence of change of position.
9 The defence of change of position is often explained as protecting the defendant’s interest in the security of 
his receipts: see, e.g., Birks, “Change of Position and Surviving Enrichment”, supra, n. 6, pp. 39-41; M. 
Jewell, “Change of Position”, ch. 10 of P. Birks and F. Rose (eds), Lessons o f the Swaps Litigation (Mansfield 
Press, 1999), at p. 273. This recognises that those who receive assets on the basis that they are theirs to use as 
they wish are necessarily concerned to ensure such assets are indeed at their free disposal. Since our 
decisions as to how to apply individual assets of ours is affected by the total sum of assets available to us, we 
may be prejudiced if required to give up assets or enrichments which we believed to be free from such claims 
and on the basis of which belief we disposed of other assets. Nonetheless, such reliance is only one way, 
though perhaps the most common, in which a defendant may be left worse off by such a claim. Attempts to 
squeeze all such instances within the notion of reliance are artificial: see, e.g., Birks, ibid., pp. 50-51. It is 
better to acknowledge that cases of reliance expenditure are one application of a broader principle and 
interest. This also allows us to see the parallels between such cases and other areas of the law, such as the 
tendency against strict liability for losses in the law of torts, where no question of the security of receipts 
arises.
10 Of course, a defendant can raise this argument against all non-specific claims, not just claims following the 
receipt of misapplied assets, for instance where the claimant seeks damages for a tort of breach of contract.
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claimant seeks specific recovery of an asset on the basis of his exclusive entitlement to it, since, if 
his assertion is correct, it is he and not the defendant who is entitled to it. In such cases, the 
defendant may, however, be able to argue that to allow the claimant to recover the misapplied asset 
would defeat the basis of an earlier disposition of the defendant’s own assets. That it, where the 
defendant made a disposition of his assets in reliance on his (perceived) entitlement to the asset 
received from the claimant, at least in so far as he would not have made such a disposition had he 
known he was not so entitled, he can say that his consent to that disposition was conditional upon 
his having such an entitlement. So, if the claim is allowed it will render an earlier application of the 
defendant’s assets a misapplication. As such, it can be said that such cases also raise a conflict 
between the claimant’s interest in the disposition of his assets and the defendant’s interest in the 
disposition of his own assets.11
We are, therefore, faced with a conflict o f principle, a clash between opposing interests of 
the parties. How should this be resolved? Where two principles or interests conflict, the starting 
point should be to see if either has primacy over or greater weight than the other. If so, we should 
give effect to the stronger or more important principle. However, this presents a problem here since 
neither principle, neither party’s interest, is obviously stronger than the other. Indeed, if we take the 
view argued for above, both parties are asserting the same interest and so there can be no suggestion 
that one is deserving o f greater protection.
In the event o f such a deadlock there are two ways the law can go. The first is simply not to 
intervene, providing no redress to the claimant (to the extent that the parties’ interests clash). The 
argument would run as follows. Where a claimant seeks legal redress, he must provide a reason 
supporting the relief claimed. This will usually require him to show not just that he has some 
interest deserving o f legal protection and which is being threatened but also that it is appropriate for 
the law to protect this interest through the use of its coercive power as against the defendant. So, 
for instance, when looking at the recovery of losses, it is not enough for the claimant to show that
However, this argument will be outweighed by the need to protect the claimant’s interests is so far as the 
defendant will not be left worse off by the claim or where, though it would leave him worse off, he has 
undertaken responsibility for that loss or his culpability in bringing it about justifies its imposition upon him.
11 Since the scope of a defence will be determined by its rationale, that is, the principle which underlies it, the 
correct identification of the principle has practical importance. For instance, if the change of position defence 
exists to ensure that the defendant is not left worse off than he would have been had he not received the asset, 
it is difficult to justify the availability of the defence where the relevant diminution in the defendant’s assets 
occurs prior to receipt of the claimant’s assets, so called anticipatory change of position: see T. Akkouh and 
C. Webb, “Mistake, Misprediction and Change of Position” [2002] R.L.R. 107, at pp. 110-111. However, if 
we regard the defence as protecting the defendant’s own interest in determining the disposition of his assets, 
we can accommodate anticipatory change of position, for, where the defendant makes a disposition of his 
assets in anticipation of the receipt from the claimant, should the claim succeed, the basis of that earlier 
disposition would fail. The only difference between such cases and those where the defendant makes the 
relevant disposition following receipt is that the basis of the disposition is a future occurrence (the receipt of 
an asset which would be at one’s free disposal) rather than an existing state of affairs (the possession of such 
an asset).
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he has suffered a type o f loss in respect o f which the law offers protection, he must also provide a 
reason why it is the defendant who should bear it. He cannot do this if  his claim would infringe an 
interest of the defendant’s as deserving o f protection as that which the claimant is asserting.12 In 
such cases, we can therefore say that the claimant cannot provide sufficient justification for the 
law’s intervention on his behalf. Applied in this context, the result would then be equivalent to that 
produced by change of position; a claim will not succeed against an innocent defendant to the extent 
that it would leave him worse off than he would have been had he not received the asset.
There is a second possibility. Since we have here conflicting and equally weighted interests 
and principles, an alternative is to reflect this in the law’s response. In such cases, full protection of 
the claimant’s interest would be incompatible with and at the expense of full protection o f the 
defendant’s interests. As it is impossible to give effect to both parties’ interests, and as we have no 
basis for prioritising one over the other, the law should favour neither, choosing instead to provide 
partial protection to both. Expressed slightly differently, the impossibility o f giving full effect to 
both parties’ interests means that someone will necessarily be disadvantaged. There is an inevitable 
loss which must fall somewhere and it is the job o f the law to determine where is will fall. Since we 
have no reason for imposing the loss on one party rather than the other, it is fair to split it between 
the two of them. The result would be tantamount to a partial change o f position defence.13
The usual backdrop for discussion of the possibility o f splitting the loss between the parties 
has been the suggestion that the extent to which the defendant has a defence of change of position 
should be dependent on how his fault in respect of his receipt and retention o f the asset compares 
with that of the claimant in its initial misapplication. The relevance to the application of the 
defence of the fault of either party will be discussed shortly. However, the criticism made of loss 
splitting in that context is the difficulty and uncertainty it would bring. Here though, such criticisms 
carry little weight since we are looking at a simple equal division o f the loss. Indeed, it may be 
thought surprising that English law has been more ready to split losses between two blameworthy 
parties on the basis of their comparative fault, so giving rise to such uncertainties, than between 
innocent parties where the simpler option of equal division would often be appropriate.14
12 Again, provided the defendant is not at fault in relation to, and has not assumed responsibility for the 
consequences of, the infringement of the claimant’s interest, and provided the claimant cannot call on any 
additional principle in support of his claim. This is accordingly the position taken in much of the law of torts. 
Where the defendant causes a loss to the claimant, there will be recovery where the defendant was at fault but 
no, rather than partial, recovery where he acted blamelessly.
13 How this could be done will be examined later: see infra, text to nn. 23-30.
14 Examples of the former are the contributory negligence defence and the rules on contribution and 
reimbursement between wrongdoers. There are occasional examples of the law splitting losses between 
innocent parties, for example the rule of general average contribution in relation to the loss of cargo at sea. 
Elsewhere, the law has refrained from such an approach where it might be considered appropriate. For 
instance, unlike in other jurisdictions, English law’s response to the frustration of contracts is not (primarily) 
concerned with ensuring a fair distribution of losses: see E. McKendrick, “Frustration, Restitution, and Loss 
Apportionment”, ch. 6 of A. Burrows, Essays on the Law o f Restitution (Oxford University Press, 1991).
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One further point. We have noted that in some instances the law does not provide a change 
of position defence to claims following the misapplication o f assets. Thus is the case where the 
defect in the claimant’s consent is held to preclude title passing to the defendant. The standard 
justifications for this are twofold. Firstly, it is said that change of position is a defence unique to 
unjust enrichment claims and that, where a claimant relies on his subsisting title, the claim is not in 
unjust enrichment.15 Secondly, the defence should not be extended to claims founded on the 
claimant’s subsisting title since this would unduly weaken the legal protection given to, and so the 
status of, property rights.16
This is unpersuasive. As we have seen,17 whether or not title passes, where the law 
provides for claims following the misapplication of assets, it is recognising the same principle, the 
same interest in the claimant. In both cases, the claimant was exclusively entitled to the asset prior 
to its receipt by the defendant and his consent to its receipt and retention by the defendant was 
either absent or impaired. Holding that title does not pass and holding that it does but imposing 
some separate liability on the recipient are two solutions to the same problem, two ways o f 
effectuating the same principle, rather than different responses to different questions. As such, we 
cannot defend the current position simply by asserting that one case concerns unjust enrichment, 
and so is governed by one set of rules, while the other does not, and so other rules and 
considerations apply. Rather, the key question is whether we can support this difference in 
treatment on the basis that, though the same principles fall to be applied in each case, the factual 
differences between them justify different responses.
The factual difference between the two classes of case lies in the nature of the defect in the 
claimant’s consent. I have argued already that, at least in relation to mistakes and ignorance, we 
cannot distinguish cases on the basis of the significance and seriousness of the defect.18 However, 
even if we did accept that defects in consent can be greater or lesser, can this support the present 
legal position whereby there is no change of position defence to claims where the defect in the 
claimant’s consent was most serious?19 I do not think it can. The defendant will be left in a worse 
position than that he would have occupied had he not received the asset if  the claimant can recover 
in full. No matter how defective the claimant’s consent was, it is difficult to see how this can
Note too the cool reception to Devlin L J .’s suggestion of loss-splitting in cases where, as a result of fraud as 
to the purchaser’s identity, an unpaid vendor parts with goods which are subsequently sold on to a third party: 
Ingram v. Little [1961] 1 Q.B. 31, at pp. 73-74.
15 See, e.g., Grantham and Rickett, supra, n. 1, p. 361.
16 See, e.g., P. Birks, “Misnomer”, ch. 1 of W. Cornish, R. Nolan, J. O’Sullivan and G. Virgo (eds), 
Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Hart Publishing, 1998), at p. 24; D. Fox, “Legal Title as a Ground of 
Restitutionary Liability” [2000] R.L.R. 465, at pp. 488-489; G. Virgo, Principles o f the Law o f Restitution 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2006), pp. 708-710.
17 Chapter 4, text to nn. 20-30.
18 Chapter 4, text to nn. 35-38.
19 Though see chapter 4, text to n. 40, for the argument that the defects in consent which preclude title passing 
often do not appear to be any more serious than those which do not preclude the passing of title.
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justify shifting the loss onto the defendant. O f course, a claimant whose asset, for instance, was 
taken from him without his knowledge may be particularly deserving, but this cannot support 
requiring instead that the loss be borne by another party who bears no responsibility for the 
misapplication, who is no less innocent and who may be just as deserving.20
As an aside, we may note that those who maintain that it would unduly weaken property 
rights if change o f position were allowed as a defence to claims based on subsisting title are 
remarkably accepting o f the weakening of property rights entailed by the law’s willingness to say 
that title does pass even where the claimant’s consent to the transfer is defective. In such cases, the 
claimant loses his title to the asset despite not having properly consented to its transfer. It may also 
be pointed out to those concerned about the weakening o f property rights which acceptance o f the 
defence would entail that, as things stand, even where title does not pass, the claimant will not 
usually be entitled to recovery of the very asset he lost, and so the protection of his property rights 
is, at best, partial and indirect.
6.3 Fault
This also provides one explanation of why a defendant who is at fault in relation to his 
receipt, retention or dealings with the claimant’s asset has no defence.21 Even if he can argue that 
the claim will leave him worse off and contravene his interest in the disposition of his assets,22 his 
culpability provides a reason for placing the loss on him rather than on the claimant. The 
defendant’s fault tips the scales, which would otherwise be evenly balanced, in favour o f the 
claimant. But this also suggests that the claimant’s own fault or responsibility in relation to the 
misapplication o f his assets should likewise be relevant. Just as the defendant’s fault tips the scales 
in the claimant’s favour, the claimant’s fault should tip the scales in favour of the defendant. The
20 Moreover, especially if the change of position defence is explained along the lines presented in the text 
{supra, text to nn. 10-11), if we take the view that the seriousness of the defect in the claimant’s consent is 
relevant to the availability of the defence, then we should make a similar inquiry with respect to the 
circumstances of the defendant’s potential change of position. The defence will often be founded on the fact 
that, were the claim to succeed in full, the defendant’s consent to some earlier disposition will be negated. If 
so, we should also ask how serious this defect is; the greater it is, the more deserving he is of protection. We 
would end up with the availability of the defence determined by a comparison of the extent to which each 
party’s consent was defective. This would raise difficulties similar to those which have, for the most part, led 
courts and commentators to deny that the parties’ comparative fault should be relevant to the application of 
the defence {infra, text to nn. 23-30).
21 Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548, at p. 580. A question remains, which I shall not 
attempt to resolve here, as to what degree of fault suffices in this context, though it is clear that innocent 
“wrongdoers” should not have the defence denied to them on this basis.
22 And he may not be able to argue that his interests are infringed where he made the relevant disposition of 
his assets in the knowledge that he was not entitled to asset he received from the claimant. In such a case he 
will, usually, not be able to say that his consent to that disposition would be rendered defective by the 
claimant’s recovery.
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parties’ interests are no longer equally matched. The claimant’s culpability provides a reason for 
requiring the claimant, rather than the defendant, to bear the loss.
Some have strongly rejected the suggestion that the claimant’s fault should be relevant to 
the claims he can bring and to the application of the change o f position defence.23 The principal 
argument employed is that, since the claimant’s fault is no bar to establishing a restitutionary 
claim,24 it would be inconsistent for his fault then to be relevant in the application of the change of 
position defence.25 But this does not follow. The fact that the claimant’s negligence in misapplying 
his assets does not preclude recovery where this would not prejudice the defendant does not entail 
that his culpability should likewise be disregarded where recovery would leave the defendant worse 
off. These are different issues and raise different questions o f principle.26 As we have seen, in the 
latter case, unlike the former, we cannot give effect to both parties’ interests in full. Someone must 
be disadvantaged, and fault provides a sensible basis for determining who this should be.
Aside from this, the argument against taking into account any fault on the claimant’s part is 
that this would introduce too much uncertainty and complexity into the law.27 This may be the case 
were we to adopt the approach taken, for instance, in New Zealand, where the parties’ respective 
comparative levels o f fault are used as the basis for splitting the loss between them.28 However, we 
can accept the relevance o f the claimant’s fault to the availability o f the defence without also 
accepting that the quantum or terms of recovery should be tailored to reflect the extent to which 
each party was responsible for the losses involved. The simplest solution would be that the defence 
is unavailable, and so the defendant bears the loss, where he is more at fault, while the claimant 
bears the loss where his fault is greater. Where the parties are equally blameworthy or blameless 
we face the same choice as outlined above, between leaving the claimant to bear the loss and 
splitting it equally between the parties.29 Such an approach should be manageable. It is true that 
the levels of fault o f the two parties are not readily commensurable, since the claimant’s fault will
23 See, e.g., Dextra Bank and Trust Co. Ltd. v. Bank o f Jamaica [2002] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 193, at para. 45; 
c.f. ibid. at para. 42; R. Grantham and C. Rickett, supra, n. 1, pp. 357-360; Birks, “Change of Position and 
Surviving Enrichment”, supra, n. 3, p. 41; J. Dawson, “Restitution without Enrichment” (1981) 61 Boston 
University L.R. 563, at pp. 571-573. Others, however, have been more receptive to the idea: see Nolan, supra, 
n. 1, pp. 156-158; A. Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (Butterworths, 1st edn 1993), pp. 429-431; c.f. A. 
Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (Butterworths, 2nd edn 2002), pp. 523-524.
24 Kelly v. Solari (1841) 9 M. & W. 54.
25 See, e.g., Dextra Bank and Trust Co. Ltd. v. Bank o f Jamaica [2002] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 193, at para. 45; 
Grantham and Rickett, supra, n. 1, p. 358. I endorsed this view too readily in Akkouh and Webb, supra, n.
11,p. 111.
26 See Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (2nd edn), supra, n. 23, p. 524.
27 See, e.g., Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra, n. 6, p. 219; Grantham and Rickett, supra, n. 1, pp. 359-360.
28 See National Bank o f New Zealand Ltd. v. Waitaki International Processing (N.I.) Ltd. [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 
211; Judicature Act 1908, s. 94B.
29 Beatson and Bishop have called this a relative fault approach, in contrast to one based on comparative fault 
(see J. Beatson and W. Bishop, “Mistaken Payments in the Law of Restitution” (1986) 36 University of 
Toronto L.J. 149, at pp. 154-155), though it should be noted that this terminology is not used consistently 
elsewhere.
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relate to what he could have done to prevent the misapplication while the defendant’s will usually 
lie in what he knew or should have known about the asset’s provenance. But similar problems have 
not inhibited such developments elsewhere,30 and, if  need be, we can simplify matters further by 
treating the fault of neither party as greater, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.
6.4 A broader principle?
It has been suggested that there is a further, broader principle which is relevant to such 
cases and which may provide a defence even where the defendant would not be left worse off by the 
claim. Barker, for instance, has argued for the continued co-existence and distinctiveness o f the 
defences of change of position and bona fide purchase on the basis that, while the former is 
concerned with protecting the defendant from unjust losses, the latter has the wider, instrumentalist 
focus of the facilitation of trade.31 Trade is inhibited and the market suffers if the acquisition of 
assets involves risks to purchasers. This will be the case if  there is the possibility that the purchaser 
may come under an unexpected liability by virtue of his receipt or possession of the asset or that he 
takes it subject to another person’s interest of which he had no warning. Since people want to avoid 
this happening, such risks provide a disincentive to the acquisition o f property.
We can accept that the law should be concerned with the facilitation of trade. What is less 
clear is whether this requires a broader defence than that outlined already.32 The risks identified 
above inhibit trade because they carry with them potential losses to the purchaser, either through his 
having to meet a liability or in his not being free to deal with the asset as he wishes. But the 
avoidance of such losses is the function of, and is achieved by, the defence we have already 
outlined under the heading of change of position. So long as this defence does its job properly, 
innocent purchasers will not be left worse off by virtue of their receipts.33 As such, the risks that 
would otherwise arise in the acquisition of assets are removed, as are the barriers to trade to which
30 For instance under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
31 K. Barker, “After Change of Position: Good Faith Exchange in the Law of Restitution”, ch. 7 of P. Birks 
(ed.), Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press, 1995), at pp. 195-198. See too K. Barker, “Bona Fide 
Purchase as a Defence to Unjust Enrichment Claims: A Concise Restatement” [1999] R.L.R. 75, at pp. 76-78, 
86-87; Birks, “Change of Position and Surviving Enrichment” supra, n. 6, pp. 56-57.
32 It is also unclear to what extent such instrumentalist concerns should be allowed to trump the protection of 
individuals’ rights and interests. As will be seen though, this question does not call for resolution here.
33 The one qualification to this is that an innocent defendant could suffer such a loss if we were to adopt the 
solution of loss-splitting where the parties are equally blameless: see supra, text to nn. 13-14. Were we to 
adopt that as a general solution in cases where the parties are equally blameless, the facilitation of trade may, 
accordingly, provide a reason for creating an exception, and placing the entirety of the loss on the claimant, 
where the asset was received as part of an exchange.
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they would lead.34 Providing effective protection of the interests of those entering the market will 
also ensure the effective protection of the market.
Is there any reason to think that change of position cannot offer adequate protection to 
individual recipients and so, by extension, the market? That the law is just in principle is little 
comfort if it does not work justice in practice. What is important is that the defence, when applied 
by the courts, does catch all those defendants who would be left worse off by full recovery. Much 
turns on the location and weight of the burden of proof. It makes sense to put the onus on the 
defendant, since he is better positioned to adduce evidence o f the circumstances which would cause 
him loss were the claim allowed in full. Provided courts remain mindful of the fact that many 
people gear their expenditure around the total sum of assets they believe to be at their disposal, such 
that increased income will often be followed by increased expenditure, and recognise that it will 
usually be difficult for a defendant to prove that a particular disposition was made in reliance on his 
belief that he was entitled to the asset received from the claimant,35 the defence should be able to 
fulfil its purpose.36 For these reasons, we should doubt whether protection of the market and the 
facilitation of trade supports a broader or an additional defence.
6.5 Application
It only remains to examine how the application o f the principle outlined above affects the 
claims set out in the previous chapter.
34 The possibility that adequate protection of individual recipients will entail adequate protection of the 
market is acknowledged by Barker: see Barker, “After Change of Position”, supra, n. 31, p. 198. Moreover, 
the qualms he has as to the capacity of change of position to meet these concerns can be dealt with if the 
defence is developed and understood along the lines argued for here.
35 That the courts are sensitive to such considerations is clear from the cases: see, e.g., Philip Collins Ltd. v. 
Davis [2000] 3 All E.R. 808 and Scottish Equitable Pic v. Derby [2001] 3 All E.R. 818.
36 Even if it is thought that the change of position defence offers inadequate protection to recipients due to the 
difficulty defendants face in proving that the claim would leave them worse off, it is hard to see what 
approach would be preferable. One option is to restrict the types of defect of consent which will ground a 
claim. But this just leads to haphazard and unprincipled results. Though greater protection is given to certain 
recipients (those whose receipt follows a defect of consent not within the class of defects which ground a 
claim), others are provided none (unless we were to maintain the change of position defence for these 
recipients, in which case one may ask why, if the change of position defence is sufficiently workable and 
reliable for them, it is not for the others).
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6.5.1 Specific recovery
We have seen that, where the claimant is exclusively entitled to an asset in the defendant’s 
hands, his interest supports a claim for that asset’s recovery. However, in light of the preceding 
analysis, specific recovery should not be available as against an innocent defendant where this 
would leave him in a worse position that which he would have occupied had he not received the 
asset. This does not mean that on such facts a specific recovery claim must fail. The claimant 
should still be entitled to succeed on such a claim provided he ensures that the defendant is not 
thereby left worse off. The clearest way of doing this is for him to pay the defendant a sum of 
money to offset or make good any such loss. In effect, the claimant is then entitled to specific 
recovery on terms, namely, that he compensates the defendant for the loss caused to him by 
receiving and then having to give up the asset.37
To calculate this loss we need to ask what dispositions the defendant made of his own 
assets and what valuable opportunities he passed by in reliance on his belief that he was entitled to 
the asset received, as well as any other losses causally connected to the receipt. However, we need 
also to take account o f any benefits the defendant obtained by virtue o f his receipt. Monetary 
values then need to be attached to all of these. The amount by which the claimant would be left 
worse off if  required to hand over the asset, and so the sum payable by the claimant, is that arrived 
at if we offset the value of the benefits received from the losses suffered.
So, if  the defendant received £1,000 and, believing he was entitled to this money, spent 
money of his own, say £500, on a holiday which he would not have taken had he known he was not 
so entitled, the relevant loss in the first instance is the £500 he spent on the holiday. However, in 
return for that money he received the benefit of the holiday, and, unless we offset the value of this 
benefit from the money spent, the result would be that the claimant would get the benefit of the 
holiday for free; that is, the claimant would be entitled to specific recovery only if he reimbursed 
the defendant for the money spent on the holiday. The question then is how to put a value on the 
benefit received by the defendant. This is in essence the same task, and involves the same inquiries, 
as those examined in the previous chapter in the context of claims for the recovery o f benefits.38 
One particular point must be borne in mind however. It may be thought that the value of the 
holiday to the defendant, at least in the usual case, must be at least the sum he paid for it, since his 
decision to exchange the money for the holiday demonstrates that he places a higher value on the 
former than the latter. However, the value in money terms which one attaches to an item will vary 
depending on one’s total wealth. The more we have, the more we are prepared to pay for a given
37 See too Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra, n. 6, p. 210; Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (2nd edn), supra, n. 
23, p. 528.
38 Chapter 5, text to nn. 55-66.
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item. When the defendant chose to spend £500 on the holiday, he did so on the assumption that his 
total wealth included the £1,000 received from the claimant. But this assumption turned out to be 
incorrect. This is why it matters that he would not have spent £500 on the holiday had he known he 
was not entitled to the £1,000 received from the claimant. It shows that, without, that £1,000 added 
to his total wealth, he would not have placed the same value on the holiday. In these circumstances 
the holiday is worth less to him than the £500 he spent on it. So, if  the claimant was to recover the 
full £1,000 from the defendant, the defendant would be left worse off since, given the total wealth 
in fact at his disposal, the benefit he obtained from the holiday is less than that of the £1,000 he 
must hand over. So what is the correct figure?
The question we must try to answer is, given the total wealth in fact at the defendant’s 
disposal, what price would he have been willing to pay for the holiday. This gives us the value he 
places on the holiday in these circumstances. So, if  we find that the defendant would have been 
prepared to spend £300 for the holiday, his net loss is £200 (the £500 he spent on the holiday offset 
by the £300 benefit from the holiday). No injustice is done to the defendant if  the claimant recovers 
the asset in return for paying him £300 as this does not leave him worse off. He gets the holiday for 
the price which, in the circumstances, he would have agreed to pay for it.39
If  it is objected that this approach, depending as it does on such hypotheticals, involves too 
much uncertainty and allows too much room for error, the answer, once again,40 is that similar 
concerns have not deterred the courts elsewhere and, more importantly, an approach which, though 
difficult, strives for a just result is surely preferable to one which makes no such attempt.
6.5.2 Non-specific claims
When we come to the non-specific claims, we are faced with the same basic question, to 
determine the amount by which the defendant would be left worse off in the event of full recovery. 
Here though, once we arrive at the correct figure, we need simply deduct it from the sum payable by 
the defendant.
The first type o f non-specific claim we examined looks to the wealth-acquiring potential the 
asset provides. Here, when calculating the appropriate deduction, in addition to the factors already 
discussed we must also take into account, on the one hand, that the defendant will get to keep, and 
indeed become entitled to, the asset and, on the other, that, as a result o f the claim, he is being 
required to pay for it. Where there is a market in such assets these two factors will cancel each 
other out. This is because, even if  the defendant values the asset at less than the market rate, he can
39 It should be clear that it does not matter that such a holiday would not have been available at that price.
40 See chapter 5, text to nn. 23, 65-66.
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then sell the asset, and thereby recover a sum equal to that which he must pay to the claimant.41 
The difficulty comes if, for any reason, the defendant should be unable to sell the asset. In such a 
case, he will have no choice but to retain it and so we must ask what value he places on the asset. 
This figure should then be the maximum sum recoverable from him; anything more would leave 
him with something he values less than the money he paid to the claimant and hence worse off. To 
the extent that we are unsure whether and for how much the asset can be sold, we must, as when 
faced with uncertainties in quantification in other claims, fall back on educated guesswork and 
probabilistic reasoning.
In relation to the second type o f non-specific claim, for the recovery o f benefits derived 
from the claimant’s asset, much of the work of the defence is pre-empted by the requirements of the 
cause of action. Since the claim is dependent on the defendant being, and remaining, benefited and 
extends only so far as the removal o f that benefit, this will usually preclude any chance of the claim 
leaving the defendant in a worse position than had he not received the asset. One situation in which 
the defence may be needed is if  the defendant does not have the funds to meet the liability without 
selling other assets of his. If he is required to sell such items for a price lower than the value he 
attaches to them, the claim would leave him worse off. Another is where the defendant places a 
higher value on the asset and the benefits he has derived from it than the market. In such cases, he 
should nonetheless be able to limit recovery to the market value on the basis that he could otherwise 
have obtained the same benefits from the market, and so compelling him to give up the full value he 
places on the asset and its benefits would be to require him to pay over the odds for something he 
could have acquired at a lower price elsewhere.
6.6 Contractual performance
No claim will lie in respect of assets transferred in fulfilment of a valid contractual 
obligation. This is so even where the claimant’s consent to the contract, and hence to the transfer of 
assets under it, is defective, since many such defects do not prevent the contractual obligation 
arising.42 This is sometimes explained on the basis that the law o f unjust enrichment is subsidiary 
to the law of contract.43 However, the more revealing explanation is to say that, where the law 
recognises an obligation on the claimant to transfer an asset to the defendant, it necessarily admits a
41 Of course, if the defendant has to incur costs in selling the asset, these should be deducted from the sum 
recoverable by the claimant.
42 See, e.g., Smith v. Hughes (1871) L.R. 6 Q.B. 597; Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd. [1932] A.C. 161.
43 See, e.g., R. Grantham and C. Rickett, “On the Subsidiarity of Unjust Enrichment” (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 273; 
S. Hedley, “Unjust Enrichment: A Middle Course?” (2002) 2 O.U.C.LJ. 181, at p. 190.
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limitation to the claimant’s interest in exclusively determining the disposition of his assets.44 In 
other words, where the law imposes or recognises an obligation on the claimant to transfer an asset, 
regardless of to whom that obligation is owed, it is necessarily, to that extent, denying or overriding 
his freedom exclusively to determine the disposition of his assets. The obligation means that he has 
no choice but to make the transfer.
It should not matter whether that contractual obligation is owed to the defendant or to a 
third party. Though in the latter case, before the transfer, the defendant may not have any claim- 
right against the claimant that the asset be transferred to him,45 to allow the claimant to recover once 
the transfer has been made would contradict the obligation owed by the claimant. And though that 
obligation is owed to and exists to protect the interests of the third party, not the defendant, rather 
than requiring that the third party be joined to proceedings, it is simpler to allow the defendant to 
raise that contract as a defence.46
6.6.1 Voidable contracts
This argument stands only in so far as the obligation to transfer the asset remains valid. 
Two situations require examination here. Firstly, we have voidable contracts. On occasion, the law 
allows a party whose consent to a contract is defective to have that contract set aside. Where he 
does so, the parties’ mutual undertakings are no longer legally binding. This has two aspects. 
Firstly, in so far as the contract is still unperformed, the parties are released from the obligation to 
render such performance. Secondly, where the parties have already taken steps in performance of 
the contract, such actions are no longer to be considered as required by law, as the fulfilment o f a 
legal obligation. This, therefore, removes the obstacle the contract would otherwise provide to the 
recovery of assets the claimant transferred to the defendant. Indeed the avoidance of the contract 
itself provides the basis for such a claim, since the claimant’s consent to the transfer was given,
44 Accordingly there will be no claim wherever an asset is transferred in fulfilment of a valid legal obligation, 
whatever the source of that obligation: see D. Friedmann, “Valid, Voidable, Qualified, and Non-existing 
Obligations: An Alternative Perspective on the Law of Restitution”, ch. 10 of P. Birks (ed.), Laundering and 
Tracing (Clarendon Press, 1995), at pp. 247-248. The principle justifying such a limitation on the claimant’s 
freedom to choose who will receive and benefit from his assets will be whichever principle underlies the 
obligation to transfer the asset, since any such obligation entails such a limitation. It is, of course, always 
open to one to argue that a given principle is not sufficiently strong to justify so limiting the claimant’s 
interest in the disposition of his assets, which amounts to an argument that there should be no such obligation 
to transfer.
45 Though such a claim is now more likely by virtue of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
46 This is the soundest explanation for the result in Pan Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Creditcorp Ltd., The 
Trident Beauty [1994] 1 W.L.R. 161. Note the analogous situation in the law of torts where a claim against 
the defendant would contradict a contractual obligation owed by the claimant to a third party: see Norwich 
City Council v. Harvey [1989] 1 W.L.R. 828.
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inter alia, on the basis that he was under an obligation to make such a transfer. Once that obligation 
is removed, so is the claimant’s consent to the asset’s receipt and retention by the defendant.47 
Accordingly, a voidable contract, once avoided, far from providing a barrier to claims in respect of 
assets transferred under it, in fact supports such claims.
6.6.2 Termination fo r  breach o f  contract
The second situation to be examined is where a contract is terminated following breach. 
Some breaches of contract entitle the innocent party to terminate the contract. The conventional 
understanding of termination is that it frees both parties from having to perform those obligations 
which have not yet fallen due, while those obligations, both primary and secondary, which have 
already accrued remain on foot. Both parts of this statement require qualification however. Firstly, 
though the party whose breach led to the contract being terminated is no longer required to perform 
those obligations which have not yet fallen due, he may be liable to compensate the other party for 
the losses caused by their non-performance.48 Secondly, and more importantly for present 
purposes, each party may have a claim in respect o f assets transferred in performance of the 
contract.49
When viewed from the perspective of principle, the law is puzzling. Unless we take the 
view that termination, like rescission of a voidable contract, extinguishes all contractual obligations, 
both those as yet unperformed and those already performed, it is difficult to see on what basis either 
party can recover assets transferred in the performance of the contract, even where nothing is 
received in return. Without this, the recipient should be able to respond to any such claim simply 
by saying that the transfer was made in performance, and was required for the fulfilment, of a valid
47 This is important as it means that it is both parties, and not just the party whose defective consent rendered 
the contract voidable in the first place, who can claim in respect of assets transferred under the contract. 
Despite this, I do not think it is entirely satisfactory to state that the avoidance of the obligation is itself the 
basis for such claims (c .f  Friedmann, supra, n. 44, p. 263). The avoidance of the obligation matters because 
it removes the basis of the transferor’s consent to the transfer, and it is this lack of consent which supports the 
claim. Moreover, such formulations wrongly suggest recovery necessarily follows the avoidance of an 
obligation in performance of which an asset is transferred.
48 See Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A.C. 827, at pp. 848-850, per Lord Diplock; 
G. Treitel, The Law o f Contract (Sweet and Maxwell, 11th edn 2003), pp. 851-855.
49 Such a claim will certainly lie where the asset transferred is money and there has been a total failure of 
consideration, that is, the recipient has not performed any of the contractual obligations in respect of which 
the money was paid: see Giles v. Edwards (1797) 7 Term Rep. 181; Dies v. British and International Mining 
and Finance Corpn Ltd. [1939] 1 K.B. 724; Stocznia Gdanska S.A. v. Latvian Shipping Co. [1998] 1 W.L.R. 
574. Beyond this the position is less clear. There is some suggestion now that the failure of consideration 
need not be total: see Goss v. Chilcott [1996] A.C. 788. It is widely argued that analogous claims should lie 
in respect of assets other than money (see, e.g., P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law o f Restitution (Clarendon 
Press, rev. edn 1989), pp. 226-234, 238-242; Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (2nd edn), supra, n. 23, pp. 343- 
347, 354-359; Virgo, supra, n. 16, pp. 332, 337-339), though the authorities provide scant support.
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contractual obligation, notwithstanding that he may himself have been in breach. And yet the 
authorities and texts stress that this is not how termination works and that the effects of termination 
for breach differ from those of rescission of a voidable contract.50 This is clear from the possibility 
o f claiming compensatory damages for breach following termination. One solution would be to 
refine our understanding of termination such that we view the right to terminate as giving a 
contracting party a choice not simply between continuing with performance as before and 
prospective termination, but also enables him effectively to rescind the contract ab initio, so 
entitling him to recover assets transferred in the course of performance. However, while this would 
provide a principled basis for such claims, such a view is incompatible with the explanations of 
termination found in the cases and texts. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the fact that the law 
allows one party to recover pre-payments while at the same time allowing the other to claim 
compensatory damages for breach.51
Perhaps the account of termination which most accords with principle is to view the 
consequences o f termination, like the availability of the right to terminate itself, as stemming from 
and to be determined by the contract itself. That is to say, the question whether a contract can be 
terminated and, if  so, what claims are then to be available to each party are to be resolved by 
reference to the terms o f the contract, both express and implied. So, where the parties have 
expressly provided for recovery in such cases, the courts will give effect to their agreement. Where 
there is no such express provision, the question is whether terms may be implied. This in turn raises 
the question of the basis of the implication of such terms, an issue which is far from clear. What we 
can say, though, is that, since it is now well established that a claim to recover payments lies where 
the contract has been terminated and there has been a total failure o f consideration, when parties, at 
least in commercial settings, provide in their contract for the right to terminate, they do so in the 
knowledge, and so on the basis, that such claims are available (at least in the absence o f an express 
term to the contrary). Though this is not quite how termination is analysed in the cases, it is largely 
consistent with how the courts approach questions of termination and its consequences.52 
Moreover, it provides a principled justification for the law in this area.
50 See, e.g., Johnson v. Agnew [1980] A.C. 367, at pp. 392-393,per  Lord Wilberforce; Hurst v. Bryk [2002] 1 
A.C. 185, at pp. 193-194,per Lord Millett; Treitel, supra, n. 48, pp. 370, 852-853.
51 Dies v. British and International Mining and Finance Corpn Ltd. [1939] 1 K.B. 724; Rover International 
Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd. (No. 3) [1989] 1 W.L.R. 912. Such an understanding of termination would 
also be inconsistent with the rule that a party cannot, by termination, escape from an arbitration clause in the 
contract (see Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. [1942] A.C. 356) and with the decision in Hurst v. Bryk [2002] 1 A.C. 
185.
52 For instance, there is now growing acceptance that what constitutes a total failure of consideration is a 
matter of contractual interpretation (see, e.g., Stocznia Gdanska S.A. v. Latvian Shipping Co. [1998] 1 W.L.R. 
574, at p. 588, per Lord Goff; Virgo, supra, n. 16, pp. 315-318), which allows us to explain the seemingly 
irreconcilable authorities on this point: see, e.g., Giles v. Edwards (1797) 7 Term Rep. 181; Rowland v. 
Divall [1923] 2 K.B. 500; Fibrosa Spolka Ackyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. [1943] A.C. 32. 
The distinction between part-payments, which can be recovered, and deposits, which usually cannot, also
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However, if we take this view, it means that claims to recover assets transferred under 
terminated contracts are not in fact instances of the claims we have been examining up to now. 
Thus far we have been looking at claims founded on the claimant’s interest in exclusively 
determining the disposition of his assets. Here, however, the claims lie not because the claimant did 
not consent to the transfer53 but because this is what the parties provided for in their contract. They 
are claims deriving from the contract, giving effect to the claimant’s interest in having the contract 
performed and justified by whichever principle we view as underlying the recognition of all 
contractual obligations.54
6.7 Responses to the failure of contracts
Once a purported or apparent contractual obligation falls away, the obstacle it would 
otherwise provide to recovery in respect of assets transferred in fulfilment o f that obligation is 
removed. So, as a general rule, a party who has transferred an asset to another in performance of a 
contract which was void from the outset or has been rescinded ab initio should have available to 
him the claims set out in the previous chapter. Where two parties have exchanged assets in such 
circumstances, this would entitle each to claim, subject to the limitation that neither party should 
thereby be left worse off than if he had not entered into the exchange.55
turns on the construction of the contract: see Treitel, supra, n. 47, pp. 1007-1012. A broadly similar account 
of the availability and basis of claims following termination is contained in J. Beatson, “Discharge for Breach: 
Instalments, Deposits, and Other Payments due Before Completion”, ch. 3 of The Use and Abuse o f Unjust 
Enrichment (Clarendon Press, 1991).
53 His consent may be defective, but, as we have seen, the existence of a valid contractual obligation to make 
such a transfer precludes him claiming on that basis.
541 should make clear that I am not arguing that, because such cases concern contracts, any resulting claims 
should be classed as “contractual” {c.f. S. Hedley, “Implied Contract” [2004] C.L.J. 435, at p. 451). Such an 
argument, though recognising a contextual truth, is in itself analytically uninteresting as it says nothing as to 
the justificatory basis of such claims. The analysis presented here seeks to provide such a principled 
justification by viewing such claims as arising where and because this is what the contract provides, such that 
they are supported by the same principle as support the recognition of contractual obligation more generally. 
The identity of this principle is, of course, a matter of controversy. The orthodox view is that contractual 
obligations are voluntarily undertaken and arise in order to give effect to the intentions of the parties, with the 
existence and scope of such obligations determined by those intentions. On this basis, claims for the recovery 
of assets transferred in performance of a terminated contract would arise where, and on the basis that, this is 
what the parties intended. The same approach should also be taken to other types of claim which may lie after 
termination, such as for payment for work done: c.f, Planche v. Colburn (1831) 8 Bing. 14; Sumpter v. 
Hedges [1898] 1 Q.B. 673. I should stress, however, that I am not contending that the approach put forward 
in the text justifies all the case law on termination. I am merely saying that we can justify claims for the 
recovery of assets where this is what the contract provides. Where we cannot so interpret the contract, a 
principled explanation, if one is to be found, must be sought elsewhere.
55 As such, it is arguable that the current law on rescission is both too narrow and too wide. Too narrow in 
that it pays insufficient attention to losses which should limit recovery. Too wide as it treats the benefits 
derived from the other party’s actions in the same way as it does receipt of assets and the benefits thereof,
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However, we should not assume that, once any contract is removed or negated, recovery of 
assets transferred under it follows as a matter of course. As before, the availability of such claims 
may be limited by the application of competing principles and in the context o f failed contracts this 
is particularly likely.
Firstly, the principle which dictates the invalidity of the contract will often also be relevant 
in determining what claims, if any, should be available following its failure. So, for instance, where 
the law holds a contract void on the basis that its performance would involve or lead to conduct 
which we prohibit or want to discourage, similar reasoning may support the law denying assistance 
to those involved and instead leave any losses resulting from the contract’s invalidity to lie where 
they fall.56 At other times, the relevant principle will not require the contract’s complete 
subversion. This is the case with contracts with minors and the mentally incapable, where the law’s 
concern is that those incapable of protecting themselves are not exploited. As such, and once we 
bear in mind that it would not be desirable to disable such parties from entry into all commercial 
transactions, there will often be good reason for the law to adjust the terms of such contracts to 
ensure their fairness, rather than requiring that they be unwound completely.57
In other cases, however, a contract fails simply because o f a defect in consent of one or 
both of the parties to it. Where this is so, the same respect for the parties’ autonomy and freedom of 
choice as underlies the contract’s invalidity would also appear to support the recovery o f assets 
transferred in its performance. It may, however, be that, even in these cases, there exists an 
additional principle which provides an independent basis for claims following failure and limits the 
availability of the claims we have been examining thus far.
The starting point is that, where an apparent or assumed contract turns out not to be valid, 
there is the risk that those who have acted on the assumption of its validity will be prejudiced. 
Some protection is provided by allowing recovery of assets transferred on the basis of that false 
assumption. But often this will be of little or no assistance. For instance, such claims offer no 
protection where a party has incurred expenditure or otherwise depleted his resources in 
performance or in preparing for performance. Though such expenditure is capable of providing a 
change of position defence where the other party has transferred to him assets in performance and 
now seeks recovery, the protection this offers is dependent on there having been such a transfer and 
is insufficient where the expenditure incurred exceeds the value of the asset received. Alternatively, 
one party may have done work, which, when carried out, both parties understood was to be paid for. 
This work may or may not have been of benefit to the other party. Accordingly, even if  we allow
requiring the giving up of both, notwithstanding that, as we saw in the previous chapter (text to nn. 24-52), it 
is at least strongly arguable that we have no exclusive interest in the benefits of our actions.
56 See, e.g., Berg v. Sadler and Moore [1937] 2 K.B. 158; Awwad v. Geraghty & Co. [2000] 1 All E.R. 608.
57 See, e.g., Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 3(2). An analogous approach can be seen in cases such as Earl o f 
Aylesford v. Morris (1873) 8 Ch. App. 484 and The Port Caledonia and The Anna [1903] P. 184.
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parties to recover in respect of assets transferred in performance and make such claims subject to 
the defence of change o f position, the failure of a contract will often lead to an unequal distribution 
of losses and gains between the parties.
Now this in itself does not justify any additional claim. The law does not seek to redress all 
inequalities. It needs a reason for shifting a loss or a gain from one party to another. As we have 
seen already,58 fault is one such reason, so where one o f the parties is to blame for the other’s 
defective consent, this justifies the former bearing the losses involved in the contract’s failure. 
Beyond this it has been suggested that loss and gains should be readjusted so that they are borne 
equally in certain cases where the contract fails through the fault of neither party. One argument is 
that where parties choose to enter into a contractual relationship, they become, and choose to 
become, mutually reliant, and share a common interest in the success o f their arrangement. As 
such, if it becomes impossible to carry this arrangement through, it is consistent with the basis of 
their relationship that the parties are treated as equals and that the losses and gains of their failed 
endeavour are split between them.59 It may even be argued that entering into such a relationship 
puts each party under an obligation to look after the interests of the other, and that this may provide 
an alternative basis for requiring each party to bear their fair share o f the losses involved in the 
contract failing.60 Although I doubt whether it is in fact appropriate to view contracting parties as 
joined in some common venture, the mutual reliance inherent in such situations may justify splitting 
losses between the parties. Each party incurs the costs of performing and preparing to perform in 
reliance on the performance o f the other, and does so with the knowledge and encouragement o f the 
other. Therefore, where performance is not forthcoming, the loss each party suffers is a loss 
suffered as a result of placing reliance on, and with the encouragement of, the other. Save where 
the parties have allocated the risks of non-performance, and unless caused by the fault of the other, 
a contracting party bears some responsibility for the loss suffered by the other in the event of his 
performance not being forthcoming. This may accordingly justify the splitting of losses, that is, 
reimbursement for costs incurred and payment for work done, where a contract fails, for example, 
due to frustration or common mistake, innocent misrepresentation, or lack o f formality. Where this 
is so, the recovery of assets transferred is performance should be possible to the extent that it does 
not infringe this principle.
58 Supra, text to nn. 8-9.
59 See J. Dietrich, Restitution: A New Perspective (Federation Press, 1998), pp. 151-156, 167-176. See too C. 
Fried, Contract as Promise (Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 69-73.
60 A similar argument is put forward in J. Penner, “Basic Obligations”, ch. 5 of P. Birks (ed.), The 
Classification o f Obligations (Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 117-119.
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6.8 Loss to the claimant
In the simplest case, a misapplication of assets will lead to the defendant holding something 
previously held by the claimant, and the resulting claim will require the defendant to hand back 
what the claimant lost. The claimant accordingly ends up back where he started and no better or 
worse off than he would have been had there been no misapplication. However, sometimes 
recovery on the bases set out in the previous chapter would give the claimant not just something 
different but something more than he lost. This may be the result in a variety o f situations. For 
instance, the original asset held by the claimant may have been exchanged by the defendant for an 
asset of greater value, and the claimant would have made no such exchange had he retained he 
asset. Alternatively, in so far as claims may lie for the recovery of benefits others derive from use 
of the one’s asset, it may be that the defendant’s use of the asset did not prevent the claimant from 
using, and so benefiting from, his asset. Or the claimant may have received benefits as a result of 
the initial loss o f the asset, such as an insurance payout.61 Can we justify claims where and to the 
extent that this would leave the claimant better off than he would have been without the 
misapplication? Put another way, should recovery be limited to the extent o f the claimant’s loss?
Opinions are split. Those who maintain that recovery should not exceed the claimant’s loss 
have largely supported this limitation by reference to the notion of corrective justice, arguing that, 
in the absence of wrongdoing, corrective justice only justifies recovery to the extent that the 
claimant’s loss and the defendant’s gain correlate.62 My own view is that invocations of corrective 
justice, now becoming increasingly common, are unnecessary and unhelpful, so I shall first say a 
little about the use o f corrective justice more generally before coming back to the specific question 
of the claimant’s loss.
6.9 Corrective justice
In his account o f justice, Aristotle noted that the range of issues to which justice pertains 
can be divided into two, so that justice has two basic aspects or forms.63 The first is distributive
61 I do not mean to suggest all such cases fall to be treated in the same way. In particular, one may wish to 
argue that the claimant’s recovery should be capped by his initial loss, but that it should not be further 
reduced if his loss is subsequently made good in whole or in part.
62 See, e.g., M. Mclnnes, ‘“At the Claimant’s Expense’: Quantifying Restitutionary Relief’ [1998] C.L.J. 472, 
at pp. 474-475; L. Smith, “Restitution: The Heart of Corrective Justice” (2001) 71 Texas L.R. 2115, at pp. 
2146-2148; C. Mitchell in “The New Birksian Approach to Unjust Enrichment” [2004] R.L.R. 260, at pp. 
266-267; Virgo, supra, n. 16, pp. 112-115..
63 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (J. Thompson (trans.), H. Tredennick (rev.), Penguin, 1976), 1130b30- 
1132b20.
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justice and concerns the allocation of resources, privileges, responsibilities between the members of 
a community. Justice here requires that each person has a share which is in proportion to his merit 
in reference to the criterion of distribution being applied. Secondly, there is corrective justice. This 
concerns questions relating to or arising from interactions or dealings between members o f the 
community.64 To explain the workings of corrective justice, Aristotle adopted the language of gain 
and loss. Interactions between individuals involve or give rise to injustice where they result in one 
party gaining and the other suffering a corresponding loss. Corrective justice requires the parties’ 
equality to be restored by the gain being given up to the other party, thereby making good his loss.
It has been remarked that this analysis of corrective justice appears to mirror the 
straightforward case of a misapplication of assets.65 There one’s gain is another’s loss and the law 
responds by requiring the gain to be returned. It would also suggest that corrective justice only 
requires gains to be given up where there is such a corresponding loss. However, it is clear that 
Aristotle used the language of gain and loss very differently from the way these terms are 
conventionally used in law. We must first examine what Aristotle meant by such terminology 
before we can use it in support of arguments as to the proper content o f the law.
That “loss” and “gain” in Aristotle’s account of corrective justice is neither the same as nor 
co-extensive with factual losses and gains is clear from his discussion of assaults.
Even where one party has received and the other given a blow, or one has killed and the other been 
killed, the active and passive aspects of the affair exhibit an unequal division; but the judge tries to equalize 
them with the help of the penalty, by reducing the gain. The term “gain” is used generally in such cases, even 
though it is not the appropriate word for some offences, e.g., in the case of assault; ... at any rate when the 
damage has been estimated the effects are called loss and gain respectively.66
Were this not so, Aristotle’s account would fail to explain most instances o f private law 
liability. But then if the losses and gains entailed by an unjust interaction are not factual losses and 
gains, what are they? There are, I think, two possible answers. One is that the language of loss and 
gain is simply designed to reflect the two sides of the interaction, what Aristotle called the “active
64 It is clear that Aristotle intended “dealings” to be understood broadly so as to encompass not just voluntary 
transactions but also, for instance, assaults and defamation. Even so, it seems that his account does not cover 
the whole range of human interactions to which justice pertains. It focuses on the correction or rectification 
of unjust interactions, but there is a necessarily prior question of what interactions are lawful or just. As such, 
Aristotle’s conception of corrective justice accounts for secondary rights and obligations but not primary 
rights and obligations (on which distinction see C. Webb, “Performance and Compensation: An Analysis of 
Contractual Obligation and Contract Damages” (2006) 26 O.J.L.S. 41, at pp. 42-45). It has been suggested 
that it was to make up for this deficiency that Aquinas chose instead to use the term commutative justice. See 
generally, J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 177-179.
65 Smith, supra, n. 62, p. 2119.
66 Aristotle, supra, n. 63, at 1132a.
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and passive aspects” of the dealings between the parties67. Here, gain and loss amount to the 
commission and the suffering o f an injustice, or simply “doing” and “being done to”. This explains 
both why there is a gain and loss in all unjust dealings and why the gain and loss in each case 
necessarily correlate. The principal difficulty with this interpretation is that losses and gains, so 
understood, seem incapable of being reversed or undone. We can give up factual gains and 
compensate factual losses, but we cannot undo actions, “doings”.
The second interpretation is that put forward by Weinrib.68 His suggestion is that we 
should understand Aristotle’s reference to gains and losses as normative gains and losses. Whereas 
factual gains and losses concern how the position or condition o f the parties has changed as a result 
o f their interaction, normative gains and losses are identified by asking whether, by reason of what 
happened between them, there is justification for requiring something to be taken from one party 
and given to the other. A party has a normative gain when justice so requires him to give something 
up and a normative loss where justice requires something to be given to him.69 Translating this into 
legal terms, wherever there is liability,70 there is a normative gain to the defendant and a normative 
loss to the claimant. These necessarily correlate since what justice requires the defendant to give 
up, and so what constitutes his gain while he still holds it, is what the claimant is required to be 
given, and the absence o f which is his loss. Moreover, on this interpretation we have no difficulty 
seeing how gains can be given up and losses made good.71 I think, however, that Weinrib’s 
approach takes us some way from what Aristotle had in mind when employing the terminology of 
losses and gains. In Aristotle’s account, the parties’ loss and gain provide the basis of, or indeed 
represent, the injustice in the parties’ dealings. By contrast, following Weinrib, we must first ask 
what justice requires of the parties, then, only having determined this, we can say that a party 
required to give something up has a gain and one to whom justice requires something be given is 
suffering a loss. So understood, the notions of loss and gain no longer drive nor even contribute to 
the explanation o f the nature of the injustice.
For present purposes, however, it is unnecessary to seek a resolution to these problems. 
This is because, however we interpret the references to gain and loss in Aristotle’s account, it is
67 Ibid.
68 E. Weinrib, The Idea o f Private Law (Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 115-120.
69 In Weinrib’s terms (ibid. at p. 116), “ . . . a  person enjoys a normative gain when there is justification for the 
law’s diminishing his or her holdings, and ... a person endures a normative a normative loss when there is 
justification for the law’s augmenting his or her holdings.” Weinrib goes on to argue that such justification is 
to be found in the notion of Kantian right (ibid. at pp. 120-129).
70 Or at least wherever one party is liable to transfer some asset to another.
71 Indeed the defining feature of a normative gain is that it is something which must be given up and of a 
normative loss that it must be made good.
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plain that these do not refer to factual gains and losses.72 Accordingly, we cannot find support for 
the view that recovery in respect of misapplied assets should be limited to the extent of the 
claimant’s losses in Aristotle’s reference to the correlativity o f loss and gain in instances of 
corrective injustice.73 Indeed, Aristotle’s account of corrective justice tells us very little about its 
content, about when interactions between parties are just or unjust. Rather, as Weinrib notes74, 
Aristotle’s account o f justice is formal, providing a structure, a framework for the application of 
justice arguments in resolving problems of social ordering. So, Aristotle tells us that one aspect of 
justice concerns relations and dealings between individuals, but does not tell us what justice 
requires here. For an answer to this question we must look elsewhere.75
6.10 Establishing the irrelevance of loss
Accordingly, to say that recovery in respect of misapplied assets is an example of the law 
effecting corrective justice may be true, but tells us very little about the proper form and scope of 
such claims.76 We are simply back where we started, asking what principle supports such claims, 
what principles may limit the availability of such claims and what the application of such principles 
requires on a given set o f facts.
The question then is whether principle requires us to limit liability to the extent of the 
claimant’s loss. Lionel Smith, working from the framework o f corrective as elaborated by Weinrib, 
has argued that liability in unjust enrichment should be so limited to recovery of the claimant’s 
initial loss.77 Smith’s reasoning is that the law of unjust enrichment is about defective transfers, and 
that it is the flaw in the transfer that provides the normative basis for recovery.78 More simply, the
72 This, of course, does not mean that factual losses and gains may not be relevant to the establishment of an 
Aristotelian or normative loss or gain. This is clearly the case in law and morality. C.f. M. Mclnnes, “Unjust 
Enrichment: A Reply to Professor Weinrib” [2001] R.L.R. 29, at pp. 45-47.
73 Similarly, it is inaccurate to say that corrective justice is concerned with reinstating parties to their re­
transactional positions (c.f, K. Barker, “Understanding the Unjust Enrichment Principle in Private Law: A 
Study of the Concept and its Reasons”, ch. 5 of J. Neyers, M. Mclnnes and S. Pitel (eds), Understanding 
Unjust Enrichment (Hart Publishing, 2004), at p. 97), unless it is meant simply that pre-transactional justice is 
restored.
74 Weinrib, supra, n. 68, pp. 66-75.
75 For instance, it is here that Weinrib turns to Kant, though I am doubtful as to how much assistance the 
notion of Kantian right provides in fleshing out the requirements of corrective justice or the content of private 
law.
76 All it tells us is that the justification for liability is to be found in the relationship of and what occurred 
between the parties.
77 Smith, supra, n. 62, pp. 2146-2148. Smith, however, goes on to argue that subsequent reductions of the 
claimant’s loss should not likewise reduce recovery, that is, there should be no defence of passing on: ibid., 
pp. 2152-2155
78 Adopting Weinrib’s terminology, Smith writes (ibid., p. 2147), “[t]he transfer, not just the loss or the gain, 
is crucial to the foundation of this strict liability. It unites the parties and, because of the flaw, turns a material
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claim arises from and seeks to reverse a defective transfer, and so it follows that the claimant is 
entitled to what was transferred from him to the defendant and nothing more.
I agree with this up to a point. Smith is correct to stress that it is not enough to look at the 
gain made by the defendant; we must also ask where it came from. Central to the justification of 
claims following transfers to which the claimant’s consent was defective is the fact that, in addition 
to the claimant not having consented to the defendant’s receipt o f the assets, those assets came from 
him. But I do not think that it follows from this that recovery exceeding the claimant’s initial loss 
cannot be justified, and justified by the same principle. If we ask why a defective transfer generates 
liability, the answer we come to is that, as a result of it, the defendant now holds something to 
which the claimant is exclusively entitled. Before the transfer the claimant had in his possession an 
asset to which he was exclusively entitled and he has not effectively consented to this entitlement 
being transferred to the defendant. The elements of the defective transfer, namely the claimant’s 
lack of consent and the fact that the asset came to the defendant from him, matter because they 
establish the claimant’s entitlement to the asset the defendant received and so provide the basis of a 
claim against the defendant.
But this is just one way, though the simplest and most common way, for the claimant to 
establish an exclusive entitlement to an asset in the defendant’s hands. We have seen already that a 
claimant may be able to establish an exclusive interest in, and so claim in respect of, an asset in the 
defendant’s hands despite the claimant having had neither possession o f nor any such interest in that 
asset prior to its receipt by the defendant, as is the case with fruits and substitute assets.79 Of 
course, we need always to be able to connect the claimant and the asset or benefit he is claiming, we 
need to be able to justify why this person should be able to recover this asset. But this can be done 
other than by establishing a prior entitlement to and possession o f the asset followed by a defective 
transfer. Gains, transfers, even non-consensual transfers, are not legally significant in and of 
themselves. They become significant where and in so far as they enable a claimant to establish an 
entitlement to something in the defendant’s hands. Claims of entitlement to assets held by the 
defendant need not depend on, nor indeed arise from, a loss to the claimant or some diminution in
loss into a normative loss and a material gain into a normative gain. It follows that the measure of the transfer 
is the measure of the claim.”
79 See chapter 5, text to nn. 9-16.
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his stock of assets.80 As such, there is no basis for limiting claims to the extent of any loss suffered 
by the claimant.81
6.11 Passing on
The preceding analysis has focussed largely on the question o f the claimant’s initial loss, 
but the position is the same where the claimant’s loss is subsequently reduced, for instance by the 
receipt o f assets from a third party which would not have been transferred to him had the initial 
misapplication not occurred. Accordingly, there is no justification for a general defence of passing 
on.
In line with the analysis thus far, the third party, however, may have a claim to recover 
assets so transferred to the claimant if his consent to that transfer is defective. This will be the case, 
for instance, if  the transfer was conditional on the claimant having suffered a loss and the claimant 
has made good that loss as a result o f a successful claim against the defendant.
80 This is reinforced by the fact that not all defective transfers generate liability, particularly if, as Smith does, 
we include within this transfers of wealth or abstract value. See chapter 3, text to nn. 25-44 and chapter 5, 
text to nn 24-54, 106-117. My view, however, is that the language of transfers is inapposite where claims are 
made in respect of the receipt of benefits or abstract value, since the defendant receives something the 
claimant did not previously hold. In which case, in so far as such claims are available, these provide a further 
example of liability which is not arise out of, and so does not seek to reverse, a transfer.
81 Moreover, because of the justification of such claims, it is inappropriate to speak of the claimant receiving a 
“windfall” in such cases; c.f. Air Canada v. British Columbia (1989) 59 D.L.R. (4th) 161, at p. 193-194, per 
La Forest J; Mclnnes, supra, n. 62, p. 474.
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Chapter 7
Indirect receipt and insolvency
We began our examination of the claims available following a defective transfer or 
misapplication o f the claimant’s assets with a central case. One feature of this was that the 
defendant received the asset directly from the claimant. However, the misapplied asset may be 
received by the defendant only after having passed through the hands of a third party. The question 
to be considered here is whether such cases of indirect receipt fall to be treated any differently from 
the cases of direct receipt on which we have focussed thus far.
This issue has divided the commentators. However, there is increasing support for the view 
that claims against indirect recipients rest on a different set o f principles and so are materially 
distinct from instances of direct receipt.1 Moreover, the case law, though not unequivocal, seems to 
back this up. Since the only factual distinction between the two classes o f case lies in the route the 
asset took to reach the defendant, their differing treatment can only be justified on the basis that this 
can be identified as a material difference. Accordingly, we must ask whether the fact that the asset 
passed through the hands o f a third party before reaching the defendant raises different questions of 
principle from the cases examined thus far.
First, though, it is useful to take a closer look at the notion of indirect receipt. Direct 
receipt can be understood to cover those cases where the defendant receives an asset previously 
held by the claimant, and without it first having passed through the hands o f a third party.2 Indirect 
receipt, by contrast, covers all instances of, and claims pertaining to, the receipt of assets where 
there is no such direct connection between claimant and defendant. This covers a lot of ground and, 
importantly, the indirect link between claimant and defendant can be established in different ways. 
Since different issues are raised in each case, it is useful to divide cases of indirect receipt into two 
basic categories. The simpler case arises where the defendant receives from a third party an asset 
which was either previously held by the claimant or is the fruit or substitute o f an asset that had
1 Indeed it has recently been argued, in S. Hedley, “Unjust Enrichment: A Middle Course?” (2002) 2 
O.U.C.L.J 181, that, amongst unjust enrichment theorists, it is now a majority view that cases of indirect 
receipt are to be treated differently from those of direct receipt.
2 Accordingly, the notion of direct receipt employed here extends beyond those cases where the asset passes 
from the claimant’s physical possession immediately into the defendant’s hands to cases where the receipt is 
not immediate, provided no third party handles the asset in the intervening period. This accommodates cases 
such as Holiday v. Sigil (1826) 2 C. & P. 176, where the claimant dropped a bank note which was 
subsequently picked up by the defendant. It should be stressed though that this definition of direct receipt is 
intended only as a starting point for discussion, and I do not intend to argue against those who have applied 
such terms differently. As will become clear, I think very little turns on the directness or indirectness of the 
defendant’s receipt.
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been held by the claimant.3 In the less straightforward example of indirect receipt, the defendant 
receives from a third party an asset which, although not previously held by the claimant nor is a 
fruit or substitute of such an asset, he would not have received had the misapplication of the 
claimant’s asset not occurred.4 In the former case, the claimant and defendant are connected 
through a series of transactional links, that is, by following the asset initially misapplied and its 
substitutes. By contrast, in the latter case, the links are solely causal, in that the defendant would 
not have received the relevant asset but for the misapplication o f the claimant’s assets. For 
convenience then we will call the former category transactional indirect receipt and the latter 
causal indirect receipt. This distinction will prove important as the two categories reflect different 
bases upon which a claim may be founded, and so involve different considerations.
How then might one argue that the indirectness o f receipt marks a material difference from 
the cases we have examined till now, and so justifies their different treatment? A variety of 
responses have been offered.
7.1 Enrichment at the claimant’s expense
Much of the discussion o f indirect receipt has as its starting point that liability in respect of 
misapplied assets is a matter o f the law of unjust enrichment. The question then becomes whether 
the enrichment o f a defendant whose receipt is indirect can be said to be “at the claimant’s 
expense”.5 It is not surprising that this has failed to produce any consensus. Even if it were correct 
to view liability in such cases as founded on the defendant’s unjust enrichment,6 we cannot hope to 
provide a defensible answer to this question without an account of the interests and principles such 
claims seek to advance. Without this we are simply left with a verbal formulation capable of 
numerous, mutually incompatible interpretations and no basis upon which to choose between them. 
Simply demonstrating that the words “at the claimant’s expense” are apt to extend to a given receipt 
by a given defendant gets us no nearer to determining whether that defendant’s liability is justified. 
Moreover, looking down to the cases for answers will tell what the courts have said and done but 
not whether they were right to do so. Similarly unhelpful are attempts to flesh out the “at the
3 In the conventional terminology, the claimant can follow his asset into, or trace its value into an asset in, the 
defendant’s hands.
4 E.g., the claimant, labouring under a mistake, pays £1,000 to X, which leads X to make a gift of his car to 
the defendant, a gift he would not have made had he not received the money from the claimant.
5 See, e.g., A. Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (Butterworths, 2nd edn 2002), pp. 31-34; P. Birks, ‘“At the 
Expense of the Claimant’: Direct and Indirect Enrichment in English Law”, ch. 18 of D. Johnston and R. 
Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002).
6 On which see chapter 3, text to nn. 6-24.
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expense o f ’ requirement through a notion of privity.7 Without explanation o f what exactly privity 
entails and, more importantly, why it does so, this leaves us without any justification for the denial 
of liability in such cases. Here, as before, the language o f unjust enrichment offers no assistance in 
determining the scope or identifying the basis o f liability in cases o f misapplied assets.
7.2 Title
A more promising starting point is to note that there is agreement on all sides that a claim 
will lie against an indirect recipient where the claimant is able to establish a title, whether legal or 
equitable, to an asset in the defendant’s hands.8 However, as we have seen,9 the law often holds 
that the claimant’s title to a misapplied asset passes despite the defect in his consent. Accordingly, 
in many cases the initial recipient obtains not just possession o f but also title to the asset from the 
claimant. Therefore, the claimant’s title is lost well before the asset reaches subsequent (indirect) 
recipients. Because of this, as the law stands, it will only be occasionally that the claimant will be 
entitled to recover on the basis o f his subsisting title to the asset.10
However, it is clear that the passing of title does not, in itself, preclude a claim against a 
recipient. This is clear from cases o f direct receipt, where a transfer can be found to have been 
defective, and so form the basis of a claim, despite title having passed. It is here, however, that it 
has been argued that difficulties arise in holding indirect recipients liable. Where there has been a 
misapplication of the claimant’s asset, the defective transfer from the claimant to the initial 
recipient justifies the latter’s liability. However, where that initial defective transfer did not prevent 
title passing, each subsequent transfer of the asset appears to be a valid exercise of a title holder’s 
power to dispose of his asset. Therefore, in the usual case, not only will an indirect recipient not
7 See, e.g., G. Virgo, Principles o f the Law o f Restitution (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2006), pp. 105- 
107; A. Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (Butterworths, 1st edn 1993), pp. 45-54; c.f. Burrows, supra, n. 5, p. 
31.
8 See, e.g., Burrows, supra, n. 5, pp. 34-35; Virgo, supra, n. 7, pp. 107, 636. There is, however, no such 
consensus as to how such a title may be established, the basis of the claims that are available in such 
instances, or indeed what may be recovered. It is clear, however, that a claimant may be able to establish title 
to an asset in the defendant’s hands even though that asset had not previously been in the claimant’s 
possession, such as where a claim is made in respect of substitute assets.
9 Chapter 4, text to nn. 11-12.
10 There is an argument that, at least in some cases, though the claimant’s title passes to the initial recipient, a 
new, equitable, title will arise in response to his defective consent: see, e.g., R. Chambers, Resulting Trusts 
(Clarendon Press, 1997); P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2005), pp. 180-198. This has 
been keenly disputed (see, e.g., W. Swadling, “A New Role for Resulting Trusts?” (1996) 16 L.S. 110; 
reprinted as Appendix 2 of P. Birks and F. Rose (eds), Restitution and Equity: Volume 1 -  Resulting Trusts 
and Equitable Compensation (Mansfield Press, 2000)) and support in the case law is patchy: contrast, e.g., 
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. [1981] Ch. 105 with Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] A.C. 669. However, if accepted, the argument 
would entail that claims would lie more frequently against indirect recipients.
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hold anything to which the claimant has title but he also will not have acquired the asset through a 
defective transfer.11 In short, neither of the supposed bases o f liability for the receipt of misapplied 
assets seem to apply to many indirect recipients, and therefore, so the argument goes, their liability 
cannot be justified.
In response to this, it has been contended that liability is not dependent on some nexus of 
transfer between claimant and defendant but simply on the fact that, as a matter of causation, the 
defendant has received a benefit from the defendant which the claimant did not intend him to 
have.12 As such, though indirect receipt may make the establishment of such a causal connection 
more difficult, indirect recipients in principle fall to be treated in the same way as direct recipients.
My view is that, while neither approach is entirely misconceived - indeed there are 
important truths in each - each leads us, ultimately, in the wrong direction and fails adequately to 
explain when and why recipients, both direct and indirect, may be liable. To understand this, it is 
necessary to return once more to the basis of claims following the misapplication of assets.
7.3 The basis of liability
Where an asset to which the claimant is exclusively entitled is, without his consent, 
transferred to another party, the claimant’s interest in the asset, which, inter alia, entitles him and 
him alone to determine who shall receive, use and benefit from the asset, justifies the recipient’s 
liability to him. And though the law does not provide a uniform response to such cases, sometimes 
holding that the claimant’s title does not pass, sometimes holding that it does but with the recipient 
then subject to a liability to give up its value, it is this interest, and its supporting principle, which 
explains the claims that lie against direct recipients.13 When we come to subsequent recipients, to 
ensure that we treat like cases alike, we must ask whether the indirectness of receipt is a material 
difference so as to justify different treatment. Once we understand the principle underlying claims 
against direct recipients, the answer can only be that it is not. The claimant no more consents to the 
indirect recipient’s possession of the asset than he does to the direct recipient’s.14 In both cases, the
11 See, e.g., L. Smith, “Restitution: The Heart of Corrective Justice” (2001) 79 Texas L.R. 2115, at pp. 2155- 
2174; A. Tettenbom, “Lawful Receipt -  A Justifying Factor?” [1997] R.L.R. 1.
12 See, e.g., Birks, supra, n. 5; S. Evans, “Rethinking Tracing and the Law of Restitution” (1999) 115 L.Q.R. 
469.
13 For the full version of this argument, see chapter 4, text to nn. 20-30.
14 For similar reasons I disagree with Watts’ suggestion that the denial of recovery against indirect recipients 
in those cases where title does not pass may be justified on the basis that, in such cases, the defect in the 
claimant’s consent is more minor than in those cases where title is retained; see P. Watts, “Property and 
‘Unjust Enrichment’: Cognate Conservators” [1998] N.Z. Law Review 151, at p. 154. Even if it is true that 
such defects can be greater or lesser and that this is reflected in the distinctions the law draws (on which see 
chapter 4, text to nn. 35-38), it is hard to see how this can justify a distinction between direct and indirect
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claimant can say that, at the outset, he was exclusively entitled to the asset and at no point 
consented to a disposition of the asset or his interest in it in favour o f the defendant recipient.15
That one’s entitlement to one’s assets is capable of justifying claims against both direct and 
indirect recipients should not be viewed as controversial. After all, as noted at the outset, all agree 
that a claim lies where the claimant has title to an asset in the defendant’s hands, irrespective of 
whether the defendant received the asset directly from the claimant or otherwise. The position 
taken here runs counter to orthodoxy only in that, as we have seen, the rules on the passing of title 
mean that the claimant is often unable to establish title to any asset held by the defendant.
Acknowledging that, as the law stands, title can rarely be asserted against indirect recipients 
should not distract us. What we are asking is whether a claim is justified on a given set of facts, 
whether we should view the claimant as having a continuing interest in the asset, in short, what the 
law should be. It is plain that we cannot answer these questions by taking as a given (some part of) 
what the law zs.16 In any case, that the law’s protection o f a claimant’s interest in his assets does not 
stand and fall with the subsistence of his title to it is plain from the cases on direct receipt. There, 
the claimant is entitled to recover even where title passes and, as we saw earlier,17 these claims are 
explicable only by reference to the claimant’s interest in the asset. So, not only should we not 
assume the correctness o f the present rules on the passing o f title where a claimant’s consent to a 
transfer is defective, we can also see that the law does now, on occasion, protect a claimant’s 
interest in his assets where, as part o f its response, title is held to pass. Therefore, both as a matter 
of principle, and as a matter of law, the present rules on the passing of title give us no reason to 
reject the liability of indirect recipients.
At root, the argument for liability in such cases, and indeed for their parallel treatment with 
cases of direct receipt, is a simple one. Through the institution of property, the law grants 
individuals exclusive interests in certain assets. These interests, which we have referred to as 
ownership interests, entitle the holder to determine who may use and benefit from the asset, and, in 
the absence of the owner’s consent, nobody else has any right to hold, use or enjoy it. Now, there is 
a decision to be made as to what, in law, is to amount to proper consent, what mistakes and false 
assumptions, what degree of compulsion will negate a choice to make a disposition of the asset. 
But, wherever that line is drawn, there can only be two potential outcomes. Either the owner has 
made an effective disposition of his asset, in which case, even if his consent was imperfect in some
recipients. It is arbitrary to make a defendant’s liability turn on the route the asset took to reach him. Indeed, 
one could argue that the case against the indirect recipient will often be stronger since, in many cases, while 
the claimant’s consent to the initial transfer is defective, rather than wholly absent, when it comes to 
subsequent transfers to later (indirect) recipients, his consent will be wholly absent.
15 Or to any such disposition in favour of some other earlier recipient, through whom the defendant could then 
claim an entitlement.
16 See more generally, chapter 3, text to nn. 1-4.
17 Chapter 4, text to nn. 20-30.
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way, no liability whatsoever should arise, or the disposition was rendered ineffective by the 
claimant’s defective consent, in which case neither the immediate recipient nor those who receive 
subsequently should be regarded as entitled to retain or benefit from the asset. This then justifies its 
recovery by the claimant.
This then allows us to deal with the arguments that have been employed for and against 
claims in these cases. Firstly, the distinction between title-based claims and those founded on 
defective transfers is an unsafe foundation for discussion o f the appropriate response to the 
misapplication of assets. Though a fair representation of the law as its stands, it is misleading in so 
far as it suggests that we have here two materially distinct classes o f case, rather than alternative 
and competing responses to one common set of facts. Secondly, claims against indirect recipients, 
and the justification for such claims, are founded on the claimant’s lack o f consent to the indirect 
recipient receiving and retaining the asset. For this reason it is irrelevant that the transfer through 
which the defendant received the asset was not, as between transferor and transferee, defective. 
This is again clear from those cases where title does not pass as a result of the initial misapplication. 
If  A’s asset is stolen by B, who then transfers it to C, it is simply irrelevant that B ’s consent to the 
transfer to C was in no way defective. A’s consent is all that matters, since it is his consent alone 
which is necessary for a valid disposition of the asset. Thirdly, the basis o f the defendant’s liability 
is that he holds either the original asset held by the claimant or a substitute thereof. In the terms set 
out above, this provides a justification for claims in cases o f transactional indirect receipt. It does 
not, however, support liability where the defendant does not hold any such asset, and so does not 
justify claims against causal indirect recipients. If there is to be liability in such cases, it must have 
some other basis. It is to this which we now turn.
7.4 Causation
Causal indirect receipt differs from transactional indirect receipt in that the defendant holds 
neither the asset initially misapplied nor any fruit or substitute o f that asset. Instead, the claimant 
and defendant are connected only by the fact that the receipt of some other asset or benefit by the 
defendant was caused by the misapplication, in the sense that the asset or benefit would not have 
been received had the misapplication not occurred. Should such facts generate liability?
The suggestion has been that it is arbitrary to make recovery dependent on a chain of 
transfers and exchanges since this would provide a claim only in some of the instances where the 
defendant is enriched as a result of a misapplication o f the claimant’s assets. The causation 
approach is put forward to redress this. There are two underlying assumptions here. The first is 
that there should be liability wherever another benefits from a claimant’s asset, or indeed simply
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from the claimant, without his effective consent. The second is that the law’s focus on transactional 
links, and the claims dependent on establishing such links, are concerned only with the 
identification and recovery of such benefits. Both assumptions are questionable.
The connection between claimant and defendant determines what liability, if any, arises as 
between them. The liability o f transactional indirect recipients is built on the fact that an owner’s 
interest extends beyond the original asset to other assets acquired in exchange for it. Transactional 
links, that is, transfers and substitutions, are significant because they enable claimants to identify 
assets in the defendant’s hands as assets in which they have an exclusive interest. This in turn puts 
such a claimant in a position to bring either of the first two types o f claim examined in chapter 5. 
However, since these claims are dependant on the defendant holding an asset to which the claimant 
is exclusively entitled, in the absence of such transactional links, such claims must fail. As such, 
there is nothing arbitrary in the law’s focus on transactional links.
However, in chapter 5 we also examined the possibility o f a claim not dependent on, and so 
arising independently of, the claimant establishing an exclusive interest in an asset in the 
defendant’s hands. In so far as an owner has not just a right to control who uses and so benefits 
from his asset but also an interest in the benefits so derived, we can justify a defendant’s liability 
even where no relevant asset is retained, provided the defendant was and remains benefited by an 
asset to which the claimant was, at the time, exclusively entitled. This may then enable us to justify 
the liability o f an indirect recipient who does not retain and indeed may never have received an 
asset in which the claimant has an exclusive interest. Once again, the key question concerns the 
nature and extent of the claimant’s interest in his assets.
The law here provides little guidance. As we saw in chapter 5, even in the more 
straightforward two party cases, it is unclear whether the law recognises an owner as being 
exclusively entitled to benefits derived from his asset.18 Such case law as there is is equivocal. 
Turning to indirect receipt, the emphasis in the case law that on the claimant being able to trace into 
an asset received by the defendant suggests that mere causal connections are insufficient to found 
liability.19 This, in turn, suggests that there is no such interest in benefits derived from one’s asset, 
since the receipt of benefits, as opposed to the receipt o f one’s assets, does not depend on such 
transactional links, or at least that such an interest does not extend to the benefits received by this
18 Chapter 5, text to nn. 24-52.
19 See, e.g.,Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] Ch. 265; Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548. 
Conversely, it could be argued that the fact the courts have in such cases been rather indulgent in their 
application of the tracing rules suggests an enthusiasm to break free from the need for such transactional 
links. Indeed, Birks went so far as to suggest that Lipkin Gorman could be viewed as authority supporting a 
causation approach: see Birks, supra, n. 5, p. 519.
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class o f indirect recipient.20 However, there are occasional instances where indirect recipients have 
been held liable in the absence of transactional links.
The leading modem example, although it has received little attention in discussions of 
indirect receipt, is Banque Financiere de la Cite v. Parc (Battersea) Ltd.21 The case arose from a 
loan made by the claimant to P. The loan was made on the condition that it be repaid ahead of any 
loans P had taken from companies within the group o f which it was a part. This included the 
defendant. The money loaned by the claimant was then used by P to reduce its indebtedness to 
another of its creditors, R, which held a charge over land owned by P. Since the defendant held a 
second charge over that land, the reduction o f the debt owed to R was also (potentially) beneficial to 
the defendant since it now stood to recover more in the event of P failing to repay the loan and the 
defendant then having to enforce its security over the land. P then became insolvent. The 
defendant, by virtue of its charge, would ordinarily be entitled to recover the money it was owed 
from the proceeds of the sale of the land and in priority to the claimant. However, the claimant 
argued that it should be subrogated to the rights previously held by R, so as to entitle it to be repaid 
ahead of the defendant. The House of Lords agreed.
The case was argued and decided through the framework o f unjust enrichment. Given that 
the claimant only loaned P the money on the basis that it would be repaid before, inter alia, the 
defendant, the defendant would be unjustly enriched were it entitled to enforce its charge and secure 
repayment in priority to the claimant, on the basis that, to the extent that the defendant stood now to 
recover more from enforcing its charge, this was a benefit derived from the claimant’s payment to P 
(since this then caused P to pay off the debt due to R, which strengthened the security provided by 
the defendant’s charge) and this was a benefit which P did not intend the defendant to take. 
Stripped of unjust enrichment terminology, allowing the defendant to enforce its security interest 
without qualification would mean that it would benefit from an application of the claimant’s assets, 
to which, in the circumstances, it did not consent.
The case is significant because the claimant succeeded despite the absence of a 
transactional link between itself and the defendant. There was no suggestion that the increased 
payout the defendant would otherwise have received would have been the traceable product of the 
money the claimant initially paid over. There was, however, a causal connection. By virtue o f the 
claimant’s payment to P, the defendant stood to receive more when P’s assets were distributed 
among its creditors. The only relevant difference between this case and a standard instance of 
causal indirect receipt is that the claim was brought before, and so to prevent, the defendant’s 
receipt of the benefit. Given that this receipt would not have amounted to a wrong committed by 
the defendant against the claimant, it seems that the claim can be supported only on the basis that
20 See further, infra, text to nn. 22-24.
21 [1999] 1 A.C. 221.
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the claimant was entitled to the benefit which the defendant would have received, since it derived 
from an application of its own assets.
Approaching the question from the perspective of principle, the scope and nature of any 
claims in such instances fall to be determined, just as they do in cases of direct receipt, by 
examining the nature and scope o f the owner’s interest in the benefits derived from his asset. 
Liability here is dependent on the defendant receiving a benefit to which the claimant is exclusively 
entitled, and we must ask in each case whether the claimant has an exclusive interest in benefits o f  
the kind received by the defendant.22 Significant in this respect is that, in most cases of causal 
indirect receipt, the benefit derived by the defendant comes not from use he has himself made of 
that asset but from the fact that another’s receipt of that asset prompted a transfer of some separate 
asset to the defendant. As such, though such benefits are causally connected to the claimant’s asset 
and its misapplication, it is only in a loose sense that the benefit comes from  that asset.23 Now this, 
in itself, does not amount to a reason to reject claims in such cases. However, it may be thought 
that, if, as seems likely, we are to limit an owner’s interest in and recovery o f benefits derived, in 
some sense, from his asset, it is probable that those benefits which are only remotely connected to 
the asset and its use will be among those excluded.24
7.5 Defences
Accordingly, the same principles support claims against indirect recipients as against direct 
recipients. And, as with direct recipients, such claims will be limited by the application of other, 
competing principles.
The principles which we examined in chapter 6 also apply in cases o f indirect receipt. This 
means then that such claims should be limited where and to the extent that full recovery would 
leave the defendant worse off than had the misapplication not occurred. In conventional 
terminology, such claims should be subject to the defence of change o f position. Furthermore, as 
we saw in the previous chapter, there is no basis for the view that there is a distinct and broader 
principle of promoting the facilitation of trade and security of transactions, such as would justify a
22 See chapter 5, text to nn. 53-54.
23 This also shows that benefits may -  and indeed often will - come, in the sense of causally derive, “from” 
more than one party, and indeed from the application of more than one asset. This in itself gives us reason to 
question whether it is plausible to say that ownership of an asset gives one an exclusive interest in the benefits 
derived (causally) from it, since this would often lead to a number of claimants being able to claim such an 
interest.
24 An analogy may be drawn with the notion of relational losses, that is, losses suffered as a consequence of a 
loss suffered by another party, for which compensation traditionally has not been awarded through the law of 
torts: see J. Fleming, The Law o f Torts (Law Book Company, 9th edn 1998), pp. 196-200.
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distinct and broader defence to such claims. This is particularly significant in respect of cases of 
indirect receipt, since it means there is no justification for a defence of bona fide  purchase as an 
alternative or in addition to that of change o f position.25
Claims should also be denied where recovery would be inconsistent with a legal obligation 
owed by the claimant, the most common example being where the claimant was under a contractual 
obligation to transfer the asset to the direct recipient in the first instance.26 In most cases of indirect 
receipt, the obligation will be owed to someone other than the defendant, but, as we have seen,27 
there is sense in the defendant nonetheless being able to raise the existence of this obligation as a 
defence to claims against him.
7.6 Summary
One justification for imposing legal liability on a person is that he has something to which 
the claimant is, at least as between the two of them, exclusively entitled. And if the defendant does 
have something, an asset or an enrichment, to which the claimant is exclusively entitled, it should 
not matter how he came to have it. The route the asset or benefit took to reach the defendant simply 
has no bearing bn the justification for the claim. Therefore, indirect receipt should not be viewed as 
raising any different considerations or questions of principle from cases of direct receipt.
The preceding analysis also shows that there are distinct bases for claims against indirect 
recipients. Liability may derive from the defendant holding an asset to which the claimant is 
exclusively entitled or it may derive from the defendant being benefited as a result of some use or 
application of an asset to which the claimant is exclusively entitled. Because of this, the opposition 
that is sometimes raised between basing (indirect) recipient liability on transactional links and 
basing it on causation is a false one.28 Though the approaches differ, they are not mutually 
exclusive. This is because they answer different questions. So long as we recognise that ownership
25 See chapter 6, text to nn. 31-36.
26 This also shows that the key question is not whether the claimant was under an obligation to benefit or to 
transfer the asset to the defendant, but whether he was under an obligation which is inconsistent with a claim.
27 See chapter 6, text to nn. 45-46.
28 See, e.g., Evans, supra, n. 12. For this reason, while I agree with Evans that, in so far as the law is 
concerned with the receipt of benefits, it should be looking for causal rather than transactional connections, 
his argument, ibid., p. 504, that looking for transactional links is “arbitrary and anomalous” and “has no 
normative support” is misplaced. It might also be pointed out that the suggestion that the tracing rules require 
normative support appears at odds with the modem orthodoxy, to which Evans appears to commit, that 
tracing is simply a process which is neutral as to rights. Neither the process of locating benefits nor that of 
locating things and their substitutes has any normative aspect and so neither requires justification (though the 
way we resolve uncertainties encountered in undertaking these processes when deciding cases does). It does 
not, however, follow from this that the identification of a benefit or a thing held by a defendant may not be 
central to the justification of his liability.
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interests entail both an interest in the relevant asset, its fruits and substitutes and an interest in 
benefits deriving from such assets, we will have reason to be concerned with both the location of 
assets and the location o f benefits.
7.7 Insolvency
This brings us to the final issue, namely the effect o f a recipient’s insolvency on the claims 
we have been examining thus far. This question is usually addressed by asking whether the 
claimant has priority in insolvency, which in turn is conventionally regarded as turning on whether 
the claimant has a proprietary right in an asset held by the defendant or merely a personal claim. 
The focus of discussion has then been on the circumstances in which a claimant may be able to 
establish such a proprietary right.
I shall take a different route. The starting point is to see that the issue raised by the 
defendant’s insolvency is one o f indirect receipt. Where a defendant is insolvent, there is 
necessarily competition between his creditors as to the extent to which their claims will be met from 
the defendant’s limited resources. The defendant having insufficient assets to meet all his 
liabilities, there is a shortfall to be borne by some or all of his creditors. The key issue is how this 
loss is to be distributed between them. In relation to claims following the misapplication of assets, 
we have seen that liability, in the first instance, depends on and derives from the defendant’s 
retention of an asset to which the claimant can assert an exclusive entitlement. In such cases, the 
question is whether the relevant asset or its proceeds are to be made available to other creditors in 
full or partial satisfaction of their claims. To the extent that that they are, such creditors become 
(transactional) indirect recipients from the claimant. That is, they will receive, via the insolvent, 
and without the claimant’s consent, an asset to which, by virtue of it being the asset initially 
misapplied or a fruit or substitute o f it, the claimant can assert an exclusive entitlement.
As we have just seen, all other things being equal, cases o f indirect receipt falls to be 
treated in the same way as those of direct receipt. And, just as the claimant’s interest in an asset 
justifies the liability o f a defendant who receives it without the claimant’s consent, it likewise 
justifies the law acting at the outset to prevent it coming into another’s hands in similar 
circumstances. Accordingly, protection of the claimant’s interest in the asset requires that it should 
not be made available to satisfy the claims of other creditors, and hence that the claimant is able to 
recover in full. As such, we can only justify denying the claimant full recovery, and so making 
such assets available, at least in part, for the satisfaction of other creditors’ claims, if the 
circumstances of insolvency call for the application of competing principles, sufficiently strong as 
to outweigh the principle of protecting the claimant’s interest in those assets.
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7.8 Pari passu and the impact on other creditors
O f course, such priority means that the defendant’s other creditors are in a worse position 
than they would have been had the asset been made available for the satisfaction of their claims. 
But this tells us nothing, and certainly does not in itself reveal any injustice. After all, the same 
observation can be made wherever the law imposes liability.29 The reason this appears to work 
injustice here is that it means that those making claims in respect o f misapplied assets are given an 
advantage over other creditors of the defendant, which seems at odds with the basic principle of 
insolvency law of pari passu distribution, that all creditors should bear a proportionate share of the 
losses resulting from the defendant’s insolvency.
Those who have argued for priority to be accorded to claims in respect o f misapplied assets 
have, therefore, sought to show how such claimants may be distinguished from other creditors, so as 
to justify their exemption from the pari passu regime. These attempts have often fallen short. For 
instance, it has been argued that such claimants deserve priority on the basis that they have not 
chosen to take the risk of the defendant’s insolvency.30 However, even where true,31 this can be 
countered by showing that there are other creditors who likewise cannot be aid to have accepted this 
risk, but who nonetheless fall within the application of the pari passu principle.32 A second 
argument is that, without such priority, the defendant’s other creditors would receive a windfall.33 
This is closer to the mark, but to be convincing requires some explanation as to why the gain which 
would be made by the other creditors is better viewed as an undeserved windfall than a legitimate 
and fair reduction of the losses which they would otherwise suffer as a result of the defendant’s
insolvency.34 This requires us to return to the basis of such claims.
As between creditors who, for instance, are claiming to recover losses caused to them by a 
breach of duty by the defendant, the pari passu principle reflects the fact that none has any greater 
claim to the assets held by the defendant than the others.35 None can provide a reason why a
29 That is, any defendant, and anyone who claims through such a defendant, can say that, liability would leave
them worse off than they would have been in the absence of liability.
30 See, e.g., G. Jones, Note [1980] C.L.J. 275, at p. 276; D. Paciocco, “The Remedial Constructive Trust: A 
Principled Basis for Priorities over Creditors” (1989) 68 Can. Bar. Rev. 315.
31 The meaning and significance of the claimant accepting the risk of the defendant’s insolvency will be 
examined infra, text to nn. 44-48.
32 See W. Swadling, “Property and Unjust Enrichment”, ch. 11 of J. Harris (ed.), Property Problems: From 
Genes to Pension Funds (Kluwer Law International, 1997), at pp. 142-143.
33 See W. Goodhart and G. Jones, “The Infiltration of Equitable Doctrine into English Commercial Law” 
(1980) 43 M.L.R. 489, at p. 500.
34 C.f. Swadling, supra, n. 32, at p. 143.
35 The same is also true in respect of other claims which are similarly “asset-unspecific”, such as for the 
payment of contractually agreed sums and unpaid tax.
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particular asset should be made available to him, in satisfaction of his claim, in preference to other 
creditors. The position is, however, different when we come to claims in respect o f misapplied 
assets, for such claimants can offer a reason why their claim to a particular asset is stronger than 
those of other creditors. The claimant can say that the relevant asset is or derives from one to which 
he had a prior exclusive entitlement, and that he never properly consented to its disposition, whether 
to the defendant or to his creditors. Hence, just as the defendant’s liability is justified by the need to 
give effect to the claimant’s interest in the asset as between the two of them, so is the claimant’s 
priority in the event o f the defendant’s insolvency is necessary in order to prevent the other 
creditors receiving and benefiting from that asset without the claimant’s consent.
That claims which amount to an assertion of one’s ownership interest in an asset in the 
defendant’s hands fall outside the principle of pari passu distribution is indeed orthodox. This is 
clear from the law’s response in cases where title to the misapplied asset is held not to pass to the 
recipient. The argument put forward here differs solely in that it is not only in cases where, as the 
law stands, such title is retained that the law does and should give effect to the claimant’s interest in 
the asset, and that, subject to defences, priority should be accorded in all cases where the defendant 
retains misapplied assets.
Indeed, the same point can be made using this as an alternative starting point. Most, if not 
all, would agree that a claimant whose asset has been stolen or who has transferred it on the basis of 
a “fundamental” mistake, such as to the defendant recipient’s identity, and so who retains title to the 
asset, should have priority in the event of the defendant’s insolvency. The claimant’s asset should 
not be available to meet the defendant’s liabilities. The approach here would extend that priority to 
all misapplications, not just to those where, at present, the law holds that title has not passed. If we 
are to maintain this distinction or one similar, we must be able to explain why differences in the 
source or nature of the defect in the claimant’s consent should lead to differences in the law’s 
response in the event of insolvency. Why should the creditors o f a defendant who receives an asset 
as a result of the claimant’s mistake as to his liability to make that transfer have access to the asset 
to satisfy their claims, whereas those of a defendant whose receipt stems from a mistake of identity 
do not? We have seen already that the standard defences o f the law here are either unreal or beg the 
question.36 So, for instance, it is not enough simply to say that the claimant retains title in the one 
case but not the other, since this may well be how the law presently responds in such cases, but 
offers no attempt to explain why it is correct to do so. Similarly, it is plainly inaccurate to say that, 
in the former case, it is only the claimant’s intention to benefit the defendant which is vitiated, with 
his intent to pass title remaining uncompromised. This may be how the law presently treats such 
cases, but it in now way reflects the actual state of mind of the claimant when making the transfer.
36 See chapter 4, text to nn. 20-26.
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The most that can be said, and I am doubtful even o f this,37 is that the defect in the claimant’s 
consent is greater in the latter case than in the former. But this still leaves us in need of an 
explanation as to why the gravity o f the mistake should bear on the claims available to the claimant 
and, in particular, why, in the case of lesser impairments, the defendant’s creditors should be 
entitled to receive and benefit from the asset or its proceeds. After all, such “lesser” defects are 
nonetheless considered sufficient to justify the liability o f the defendant, and the claimant no more 
consented to its receipt by the defendant’s creditors than he did to its receipt by the defendant.
7.9 Contractual non-performance
Others who have argued for priority to be accorded more often to claims following a 
defective transfer or misapplication of assets have stopped short o f saying that there should, prima 
facie, be priority in all such cases. Chambers and Birks, for instance, have both argued that, 
through the resulting trust, proprietary claims, and so priority in insolvency, should be granted to a 
wider class of unjust enrichment clamant than at present. They have nonetheless suggested that 
there should be no such priority where the claimant’s consent to defendant’s receipt o f the asset did 
not fail until after it was received by the defendant,38 unless the asset was received on terms which 
throughout restricted the defendant’s use of it.39
Their basis for this limitation is not entirely clear. Where the claimant’s consent fails only 
after the asset comes into the defendant’s hands, there will necessarily be a period, prior to its 
failure, during which no claim lies in respect of the defendant’s receipt and retention of the asset, 
and it is instead at his free disposal. Chambers and Birks both presuppose that, once an asset is 
received by the defendant with no liability and no restrictions on its use, the claimant is thenceforth 
unable to assert any proprietary right in it such as would entitle him to priority in insolvency, even 
if the basis on which his consent was given then fails. It is, however, unclear whether this 
conclusion is based on the perception that such a revesting o f title is a conceptual impossibility or 
merely undesirable as a matter of principle.40
37 See chapter 4, text to nn. 35-38.
38 This will be the case where a condition of the claimant's consent to the transfer fails only after the transfer 
has been made.
39 Chambers, supra, n. 10, pp. 144-153; Birks, supra, n. 10, pp. 194-198.
40 Indeed, elsewhere Chambers appears to have accepted that, where an asset is transferred subject to a 
condition subsequent but with no restrictions on how the recipient may use it, the claimant may reclaim the 
asset and, presumably, be granted priority in the event of the recipient’s insolvency, where the condition then 
fails: see R. Chambers, “Conditional Gifts”, ch. 14 of N. Palmer and E. McKendrick (eds), Interests in Goods 
(L.L.P., 2nd edn, 1998), pp. 430-431, 458-460. Chambers may respond that, in such cases, the claimant 
retains some reversionary interest in the transferred asset, but, subject perhaps to the case where the claimant 
expressly reserves such an interest, this reversionary interest is nothing more than an expression of the
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Whatever the explanation, Chambers and Birks’ position is problematic. Firstly, there is an 
inconsistency in denying that the claimant can make out a title to the misapplied asset where 
consent fails only subsequent to its receipt by the defendant, while still allowing him a personal, i.e. 
non-prioritised claim, in such circumstances. As we have seen, any claim made in respect of the 
receipt and retention of misapplied assets is justified only on the basis of the claimant’s interest in 
the relevant asset. If we are to say that, once an asset is at the defendant’s free disposal, any claim 
to it is lost, then there is no scope for imposing liability on the defendant in any form.41
Moreover, remembering that, in insolvency, the competition is between the claimant and 
the defendant’s other creditors, Chambers and Birks’ position amounts to saying that that, where the 
claimant’s consent to the transfer fails subsequent to the defendant’s receipt o f the asset, the 
claimant’s defective consent is sufficient to justify the liability o f the defendant but not that of his 
creditors. However, given that the claimant no more consented to the creditors receiving and 
benefiting from the asset than he did to the defendant, it is hard to see how this difference in 
treatment can be justified. Even if  we view the defendant as having an unrestricted power to 
dispose of the asset in the period prior to the claimant’s consent failing, such that any disposition 
made by the defendant during this period cannot be challenged by the claimant, this would not 
justify making the asset available to the defendant’s other creditors in whose favour no such 
disposition has been made.
It is likely that underlying this restriction on priority is a desire not to upset the existing law 
whereby the claims of contracting parties who have paid money or transferred goods without 
receiving the performance due to them in return have no priority in the event of the defendant’s 
insolvency, unless they have contracted for such protection through the grant of security or 
reservation of title. Though such claimants have transferred assets on a condition - the defendant’s 
performance o f his contractual obligations - which fails, such as would appear to justify allowing 
them the same claims as generally available to those whose consent to a transfer of assets is 
defective, it is thought that this would be an illegitimate circumvention or contravention of the pari 
passu principle.42
conclusion that the claimant should be able to recover the asset in the event of the condition failing. As such 
it is a reflection of, rather than a justification for, such recovery and priority.
41 Presumably, Birks and Chambers see no inconsistency here because, as a result of adherence to 
conventional unjust enrichment theory, they fail to see the role property or ownership interests play in 
justifying such claims.
42 Birks originally took the position that a resulting trust, and so priority in insolvency, was the principled 
response to all cases of unjust enrichment, but that the policy of pari passu distribution in insolvency required 
an “arbitrary” limitation in respect of claimants who transferred assets under a contract which the defendant 
failed to perform; see P. Birks, “Restitution and Resulting Trusts”, in S. Goldstein (ed.), Equity and 
Contemporary Legal Developments (Hebrew University, 1992); reprinted as Appendix 1 of P. Birks and F. 
Rose (eds), Restitution and Equity: Volume 1 -  Resulting Trusts and Equitable Compensation (Mansfield 
Press, 2000). It was in part this admission of arbitrariness which led the House of Lords to reject this 
argument of Birks in Westdeutcshe Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council [1996]
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Now, there is no doubt that if such claimants could, provided the defendant retained the 
asset transferred or a fruit or substitute of it, recover such assets or their value in priority to other 
creditors where the defendant was insolvent, the change would be dramatic. Far more creditors 
would escape the application o f the pari passu principle, with many contractual creditors being 
accorded priority where at present they are not, which would result in fewer assets being made 
available to those creditors with no priority, and greater inequality amongst creditors generally.43 
However, if  we are to justify this exclusion of contractual transferors, we must be able to show why 
the principles which justify the priority given to other claims in respect of misapplied assets do not 
apply here, or why such cases uniquely raise competing principles whose application requires that 
priority not be granted.
7.10 Acceptance of risk
One common argument that has been deployed to explain the denial o f priority to 
contractual transferors is that they have voluntarily accepted the risk o f the defendant’s insolvency, 
and so should be left to bear their share of the losses resulting from it.44 I find this idea of 
acceptance o f risk a difficult one, however. If the claimant, in his contract with the defendant, has 
agreed that, in the event of insolvency, he is to have no priority over other creditors, such that the 
transfer is effectively made on terms that, should the defendant become insolvent, the asset will be 
made available to satisfy the claims of other creditors, I can well see that no such priority should be 
accorded. However, short of this, I am unsure as to what is meant by acceptance o f risk and why it 
should limit a claimant’s rights. Certainly the mere fact that the claimant was aware of the 
possibility of the defendant’s insolvency should not limit the claims available to him. An awareness 
that the basis o f one’s consent to a transfer may fail does not render that consent any less
A.C. 669, at p. 709, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. In fact, there is nothing arbitrary in one principle (or 
policy) limiting the application of another. Rather the arbitrariness in Birks’ argument is in saying that the 
policy underlying pari passu distribution trumps the full protection of the claimant’s interest in some cases 
where a recipient of misapplied assets is insolvent, but not in others.
43 It has been argued, see, e.g., A. Burrows, “Unravelling Proprietary Restitution: A Response to Professor 
Lionel Smith” (2005) 41 Can. Bus. L.J. 424, at p. 428 that if claimants who transferred assets under a contract 
which the defendant then failed to perform could bring proprietary claims, and so obtain priority in 
insolvency, this would eliminate the distinction between secured and unsecured creditors. This is plainly 
false. There would be many classes of creditor who would have no such priority, including all those claiming 
compensation for losses (whether for torts, breach of contract or other legal wrongs). Nor should it be 
thought that all contract claimants would then have the option to bring prioritised claims. Those who have not 
yet performed, or whose performance has not involved a transfer of assets to the defendant, would have no 
such claim; and those who have transferred assets would only have priority so long as the defendant retained 
that asset, a fruit or substitute.
44 See, e.g., Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] A.C. 669, at 
p. 684,per Lord Goff; Paciocco, supra, n. 30, pp. 340-345; E. Sherwin, “Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy”, 
[1989] U. Illinois L.R 291, at pp. 335-337; Burrows, supra, n. 43, p. 428.
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conditional,45 and so the fact that the claimant appreciated both that the defendant may breach his 
contract and that he may become insolvent in no way entails that he consented to the asset being 
made available to the defendant’s creditors.46
What appears to underlie the acceptance of risk argument is not only that most contracting 
parties who pay in advance or transfer goods on credit are aware o f the risk of the defendant’s 
breach and insolvency, but also that they will often have the possibility of taking precautions 
against such eventualities by bargaining for some form of security. From this it is thought to follow 
that those who do not take advantage of this opportunity should be left to bear their share o f the 
losses from the insolvency as determined by the pari passu principle. However, such reasoning is 
flawed, since it rests on an assumption that a claimant should, at least where possible, have to 
bargain for such protection. The key is to recognise that the contract is not, or at least need not be, 
the exclusive source of the rights and obligations between the two parties. Contract is just one 
source of legal rights and duties, and contracting parties do not lose their non-contractual rights 
simply by virtue of entering into a contract which makes no express provision for them.47 So, while 
it is true to say that, where a contracting party does not bargain for security, and so for the priority 
in insolvency it brings, no justification can be found in the contract for according such priority, 
there is still the possibility that priority may be justified on some other basis. And, as we have seen, 
a non-contractual justification for priority can be located in the principle of protecting an owner’s 
interest in exclusively determining the disposition of his assets.48 This interest and the rights 
flowing from it, though they may be modified or waived by contract, are not sourced in the contract,
45 For this reason, the popular view, endorsed in Dextra Bank & Trust Co. Ltd. v. Bank o f Jamaica [2002] 1 
All E.R. (Comm.) 193, that a claimant who transfers an asset subject to a condition subsequent without 
communicating that condition to the defendant recipient is a “risk taker”, and so should be denied recovery 
where that condition fails, is misconceived: see generally T. Akkouh and C. Webb, “Mistake, Misprediction 
and Change of Position” [2002] R.L.R. 107, at pp. 108-110.
46 Furthermore, as Rotherham notes (C. Rotherham, “Tracing and Justice in Bankruptcy”, ch. 6 of F. Rose 
(ed.), Restitution and Insolvency (Mansfield Press, 2000), at p. 127), the assumption of risk argument is 
incomplete, since at most it says that, given that such creditors ’ claims abate in insolvency, a creditor who 
fails to take the chance to bargain for security has accepted the risk of his claim abating as a result of the 
application of the pari passu principle. But it leaves unanswered the prior question of why we should treat 
such claims as subject to pari passu in the first place.
47 An analogy can be drawn with the law of torts, where contracting parties may, for instance, owe duties of 
care to one another despite the fact that they have not been bargained for: see Henderson v. Merrett 
Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 A.C. 145, at p. 193, per Lord Goff. Similarly, it is not suggested that a contracting 
party’s claim to recover an overpayment depends on the contract so providing. Of course, overpayments, 
unlike breach and insolvency, are usually not anticipated, but, as we have seen, the claimant’s awareness of 
such risks, in itself, provides no reason to limit his recovery when those risks materialise.
48 The point is, perhaps, made even clearer when it is recognised that the priority which would be accorded by 
the grant of security will usually be different to the priority conferred on the basis of the defective transfer, 
since the latter gives priority only in relation to the asset transferred, its fruits and substitutes, and so is 
dependent on their existence in the claimant's hands, and the claimant will usually be free to dispose of these 
as he sees fit, at least prior to breach. One far-reaching consequence of this analysis is that reservation of title 
clauses are strictly unnecessary, since a claimant would have by default a right to recover assets transferred 
under a contract in the event of the defendant's breach and insolvency.
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and hence whether or not the contract itself provides for such rights and the protection of such 
interests is by the by. Accordingly, if  the principles we have examined thus far do indeed apply in 
the case of contractual transfers, we can justify such claimants having priority in insolvency even 
where the contract does not so provide.
7.11 The significance of contractual obligation
I think, nonetheless, that a principled argument can be made to deny contractual transferors 
priority in insolvency. This is that the existence of the contractual obligation on the claimant to 
transfer the asset to the defendant precludes the claimant from bringing claims asserting his interest 
in exclusively determining its disposition, and so from taking advantage o f the priority that such a 
claim would provide. This argument has already been set down in chapter 6.49 In summary, the 
existence of the obligation to transfer the asset is incompatible with any claim to recover it, even 
where the claimant’s consent to the transfer is in some way defective, since the recognition of such 
an obligation necessarily involves a limitation on his freedom to dispose o f his assets to 
whomsoever he chooses. Given this, before a claim of the type we have been examining here may 
lie in respect o f contractual transfers, the obligation to make such a transfer must be set aside. 
Moreover, even where a contract is “terminated” for breach, this does not extinguish the obligation 
in fulfilment of which the asset was transferred.
As such, to the extent that, upon termination, the law justifiably allows recovery of the 
value of assets transferred in performing the contract, the better view may be that such claims are 
contractual, in the sense of deriving from the express or (genuinely) implied terms of the contract, 
rather than resting on the extra-contractual principles we are examining here. That being so, the 
availability and extent of such claims, including how they are affected by the defendant’s 
insolvency, are to be determined by the contract. An express term granting such priority is what we 
recognise as a reservation of title clause or an agreed Quistclose trust arrangement. In the absence 
of such a provision, the courts have reasonably been slow to regard such terms as arising by 
implication.50
49 Chapter 6, text to nn. 42-60.
50 The one area where the courts may be viewed as having done this is where Quistclose trusts have been 
recognised despite the parties not having spelt out that the claimant is to be accorded priority in the event of 
the defendant’s insolvency. The implication of such a term may be legitimated on the basis that, though the 
express terms may no provision for it, nor do they exclude it, and it is consistent with the parties’ intentions 
and the nature of their arrangement more generally for such a term to be inserted.
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7.12 Change of position and “off-balance sheet liabilities”
According priority to claims in respect of misapplied assets entails taking away from the 
defendant’s estate assets which would otherwise have been available for the satisfaction of the 
claims of other creditors, and so leaves them in a worse position than if no such priority was 
accorded. However, as we have seen, this in itself involves no injustice to such creditors and 
provides no reason for denying priority to misapplication claims. In the ordinary case, this will 
leave the defendant’s other creditors in the same position as they would have occupied had the asset 
not been misapplied.51 However, different considerations apply where one or more of the 
defendant’s creditors can say that the allowing the claimant to recover in full and in priority to other 
claims would leave his worse off than had there been no misapplication.
In chapter 6, in our examination of some of the principles which may justify the denial or 
restriction of claims in respect of misapplied assets, we identified one such principle as forming the 
basis of the defence o f change o f position. As we saw then, the defence functions so as to ensure 
that claims are denied to the extent to which they would leave innocent defendants worse off, and 
that this in turn may best be explained as necessary to protect the defendant’s own interest in 
exclusively determining the disposition of his assets. As insolvency most clearly demonstrates, it is 
not only the defendant who may be adversely affected by claims o f the type we are discussing. So, 
just as the principle operates to deny recovery where and to the extent that this would leave the 
defendant recipient worse off, so too it requires that such claims, and the priority they usually carry, 
be limited or qualified where one or more of the defendant’s creditors would otherwise be left in a 
worse position than that which they would have occupied had the asset not been misapplied.
This possibility arises because prioritised claims in respect of misapplied assets would 
constitute “off-balance sheet liabilities”52 and so are potentially deceptive to other creditors. A 
prospective creditor’s decision to advance credit to an individual will usually be affected by his 
perception of that individual’s creditworthiness. This will be based in part on the resources that the 
prospective debtor appears to have available to him. As such, where assets in the debtor’s 
possession and which appear to be at his free disposal turn out to be subject to unknown and 
undiscoverable claims, there is a risk that creditors may be misled. In relation to misapplied assets, 
the problem arises where a creditor provides credit to the defendant only on the basis of the 
defendant’s entitlement to the misapplied asset, such that he would not have advanced credit, at 
least on such terms, had he known or believed the defendant not to be so entitled. He can say that
51 See, e.g., Sherwin, supra, n. 44, at pp. 332-333; V. Finch and S. Worthington, “The Pari Passu Principle 
and Ranking Restitutionary Rights”, ch. 1 of F. Rose (ed.), Restitution and Insolvency (Mansfield Press, 
2000), at pp. 10-11, 16.
52 See, e.g., Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] A.C. 669, at 
p. 705, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
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to allow the claimant to recover that asset in priority to his and other claims would leave him worse 
off than he would have been had the asset not been misapplied, since, has there been no 
misapplication, he would not have been misled into believing the defendant was creditworthy and 
hence would not have advanced him credit, which in turn would mean that he would not have been 
exposed to the losses resulting from the defendant’s insolvency.
What is to be done in such cases? Simply denying the claimant priority may seem the 
obvious solution. However, this is imperfect for two reasons. The first is that it enables other 
creditors o f the defendant who did not advance credit in the belief that the misapplied asset was the 
defendant’s to have their claims satisfied, in part, from the claimant’s asset. Since such other 
creditors can identify no principle which would justify their being entitled so to benefit from the 
asset, this would amount to an unjustified infringement of the claimant’s interest in that asset. The 
optimal solution would be to protect those creditors who had relied on the defendant’s apparent 
entitlement to the misapplied asset without conferring any underserved advantage on those who had 
not. Secondly, even if  the claimant were relegated to the ranks of unsecured creditor, and his claim 
made subject to the pari passu principle, an injustice is arguably still done to those creditors who 
had relied on the defendant’s apparent ownership of the misapplied asset when giving credit. This 
is because ranking the claimant alongside such creditors allows him to recover a share of the 
insolvent’s estate which otherwise would have been available to them and other creditors. As such, 
and to this extent, reliant creditors can still say that such a claim would leave them worse off than 
they would have been had the asset not been misapplied.
The ideal solution would be to allow the claimant to recover in priority to the defendant’s 
other creditors, but without doing injustice to those creditors who relied on the defendant’s apparent 
ownership. One means of avoiding such injustice would be to allow a prioritised claim but also to 
require the claimant to make good the claims of such creditors, or at least the losses they would 
otherwise suffer as a result of the defendant’s insolvency. This would ensure that such creditors are 
not left worse off than they would have been had there been no misapplication while still preventing 
the other, non-reliant, creditors from receiving some part of the misapplied asset or its proceeds in 
satisfaction o f their claims. The problem with this approach comes where the losses to be to be 
made good to reliant creditors exceed the value of the asset which the claimant is seeking to 
recover. In such cases, the claimant will have little interest in seeking to recover the asset if such 
recovery is made conditional upon that his paying to those creditors a sum in excess o f its value. 
We then face a dilemma, since if we allow the claimant to recover without first compensating those 
creditors who did rely on the defendant’s apparent ownership of the asset, an injustice is done to 
them, yet if  we do not, all the other non-reliant creditors will have the benefit o f the asset being 
made available for the satisfaction of their claims. An alternative solution, which avoids this 
problem, may be to allow the claimant to recover in priority to other creditors provided he pays to
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reliant creditors a sum equal to the share they would have taken of the proceeds o f the sale of the 
asset had it been made available to creditors generally. This effectively perfects their expectations, 
since they gave credit on the basis that the asset was the defendant’s and so would be made 
available for the satisfaction o f their claims in the event of his insolvency.
The difficulty o f establishing whether a creditor has given credit on the basis of the 
defendant’s entitlement to a particular asset, and the relative complexity o f the possible solutions to 
this problem may encourage the view that we would be better served by taking the simpler and 
more certain approach o f denying priority in all such cases. I think, however, we should hesitate 
long before making such concessions. Firstly, while it may readily be conceded that the pursuit of 
justice is not the sole concern of the law, and that we must on occasion make concessions on the 
grounds of pragmatism, certainty and simplicity, we should nonetheless be slow to conclude that 
injustice should be tolerated on the grounds that this makes the law simpler or easier to apply. 
Secondly, if a simpler solution is to be favoured, it would be more just to give the claimant priority 
in all such cases, rather than impose a blanket denial. Though priority may work injustice to some 
creditors,53 the denial o f priority necessarily involves an injustice to the claimant, since it strips him 
of an asset to which he can claim to be exclusively entitled.
53 In this context, it is worth noting that it has been suggested that it is rare for creditors to base their decision 
to give credit on the debtor’s entitlement to particular assets in his possession, and are instead more likely to 
rely on the debtor’s general ability to generate income: see, e.g., Sherwin, supra, n. 44, pp. 323-324, 360.
Chapter 8
Rights and interests, property and obligation
The analysis of the claims available following a defective transfer or misapplication of 
assets that has been presented in the previous chapters has proceeded largely without reference to a 
distinction which is pivotal in most accounts of the law in this area; namely that between 
proprietary and personal rights. However, the conclusion that, subject to defences, a claimant 
whose assets have been misapplied should be entitled to their specific recovery, whether the 
defendant is a direct or an indirect recipient, and in priority to the claims of other creditors, may be 
thought to amount to, and indeed be more simply expressed by, saying that the claimant retains1 a 
title to or proprietary interest in such assets. So, for instance, the approach advanced here leads to 
many of the same results as would adoption of the view that recipients of misapplied assets are to 
hold them on trust for the claimant.2 What purpose, therefore, has been served by excluding such 
terminology from our account of the law here?
It would be unrealistic to imagine that the language of personal and proprietary rights could 
now be abandoned, and I do not propose this. However, without a clear and settled understanding 
of the location, basis and significance of a distinction between proprietary and personal rights, and I 
think it is plain that there is no such understanding at present, there are a number of dangers in its 
application. If we are to continue to employ these terms, we need to be aware o f these dangers and 
to develop a clearer sense o f the place of and the limited role played by these concepts in legal 
analysis. Without this, we risk being drawn us into identifying false oppositions and unities, thus 
derailing our attempts to develop the law in line with principle.
1 I acknowledge the argument that the language of retention is strictly appropriate only where the interest or 
title vested in the claimant is the same interest or title which he held at the outset: see, e.g., Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] A.C. 669, at p. 706, per Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson. For present purposes, however, I am not seeking to distinguish such cases of “genuine” retention 
and those where, though the claimant’s original title passes to the recipient, he acquires a new title in its place.
2 A view most famously advanced by Birks and Chambers: see P. Birks, “Restitution and Resulting Trusts” in 
S. Goldstein (ed.), Equity and Contemporary Legal Developments (Hebrew University, 1992), reprinted as 
Appendix 1 of P. Birks and F. Rose (eds), Restitution and Equity: Volume 1 -  Resulting Trusts and Equitable 
Compensation (Mansfield Press, 2000); R. Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Clarendon Press, 1997); P. Birks, 
Unjust Enrichment (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2005), pp. 185-198. As is plain from the previous chapters, 
there are also important differences in substance between the approach taken here and that of Birks and 
Chambers.
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8.1 The utility of the language of proprietary and personal rights
The description of certain claims and rights as personal or proprietary is unobjectionable so 
long as it is always borne in mind that the application of these labels follows from and is, at best, 
only a (rough) shorthand for a detailed set of conclusions as to the various claims available to the 
claimant such as set out previously. In other words, it is because the claimant can claim against 
indirect recipients and has priority in the event of the defendant’s insolvency that it becomes 
possible to speak o f him having a proprietary claim or interest in the relevant asset. However, as 
the preceding chapters have shown, it should also be clear that the form and scope of the claims 
available following a defective transfer or misapplication of assets can be expressed without resort 
to the distinction between personal and proprietary rights and without any reference to the location 
of title to the misapplied asset.
Following on from this, it is crucial to note that the language o f and distinction between 
personal and proprietary rights contribute nothing to the determination o f what claims should lie 
where assets have been misapplied. If, for instance, we are interested to know whether, in such 
cases, claims should have priority in the event o f the defendant’s insolvency, this requires us to 
inquire into the principles that apply in such cases, the reasons for supporting or denying such 
priority. This involves consideration of factors such as the interest or policy supporting a claim in 
the first instance and the interests of, and the impact o f such a claims on, the defendant and other 
affected parties, such as creditors o f the defendant. This is how we approached this question in 
chapter 7. The proprietary-personal distinction cannot help us resolve these considerations. Very 
simply, even if  is correct to say that rights and claims are to be divided into personal and 
proprietary,3 we need some logically prior basis for determining into which category a particular 
claim falls.
This is, superficially at least, different to the way most commentators approach such 
questions.4 Here, the standard approach is to view, for example, priority in insolvency as dependent 
on and a consequence o f the claimant having a proprietary interest in an asset held by the defendant. 
So, on this basis, to determine whether the claimant is to be accorded priority, we must first ask 
whether the claimant can establish such a proprietary interest, and the key question becomes how 
we are to identify proprietary rights. But, to explain and to justify the incidence of such interests, 
we must examine the principles supporting their recognition. And since, at least in such cases, the 
significance o f proprietary interests is the priority they bring, this takes us back to an inquiry into
3 On which see infra, text to nn. 24-72.
4 See, e.g., A. Burrows, “The English Law of Restitution: A Ten-Year Review”, ch. 2 of J. Neyers, M. 
Mclnnes and S. Pitel (eds), Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Hart Publishing, 2004), at p. 24; G. Virgo, 
The Principles o f the Law o f Restitution (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2006), p. 576; R. Grantham and C. 
Rickett, Enrichment and Restitution in New Zealand (Hart Publishing, 2000), pp. 403-404.
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the reasons for according priority to certain claims.5 As such, the reference to proprietary rights in 
such accounts is something of a red herring. We are told that priority depends on the existence of a 
proprietary right, but then the existence of a proprietary right depends on their being good reasons 
for giving the claimant priority in insolvency. The proprietary-personal terminology simply 
mediates, while contributing nothing to, the inquiry into the justification o f according certain claims 
priority in insolvency.
For this reason, I take a similar view of the terminology of personal and proprietary rights 
as I do of references to unjust enrichment.6 In each case, once we have come to the conclusion as to 
the existence and scope of a particular claim, we can attach the relevant label to it. But, in each 
case, in coming to that conclusion, these labels provide no assistance. The language of unjust 
enrichment tells us nothing about when and why the receipt o f a benefit should generate liability, 
and the language o f proprietary claims and interests tells us nothing about when and why a claim 
should have priority where the defendant is insolvent. And once we identify the factors which are 
relevant to answering these questions, it is doubtful what additional clarity or information is 
provided by the subsequent introduction o f such terminology.7
Indeed, the danger here is that the terminology we use to analyse such claims can not only 
obscure but also distract us from those factors which are relevant to their justification. By regarding 
questions such as the claimant’s position in the event o f the defendant’s insolvency as turning on 
whether his rights are proprietary or merely personal, we risk losing sight of the real reasons for 
according priority to certain claims. We have seen an example of this already in the use of “unjust 
enrichment”, where the framework and conceptual apparatus developed to analyse claims has 
become detached from the normative foundations for imposing liability in such cases, which has in 
turn resulted in an (occasionally) unprincipled body of law and a failure to treat like cases alike.8 
Similarly, we need to be careful in employing the language of personal and proprietary rights, since 
it is apt not only to hide the factors which are relevant to existence and scope of such claims but 
also to lead us into consideration of factors which are not.
5 Which is exactly the approach taken by those commentators who view priority as dependent on the 
claimant’s having a proprietary interest when confronting the question of when such interests are justified; 
see, e.g., Burrows, supra, n. 4, pp. 27-29; Virgo, supra, n. 4, pp. 598-599; Grantham and Rickett, supra, n. 4, 
pp. 414-419.
6 See Chapter 4, text to nn. 42-50.
7 In relation to the recognition of proprietary rights, the same point is revealed by looking at those cases in 
which certain types of proprietary rights were first recognised. So, for example, when the court in Tulk v. 
Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph. 774 decided that a restrictive covenant would bind a purchaser of the covenantor’s land 
who had notice of the covenant, it did not do so by first asking whether such a covenant created a proprietary 
interest. Rather the language of proprietary rights was applied to restrictive covenants because they were 
capable of binding purchasers.
8 See chapter 4, text to nn. 42-50.
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8.2 The incidents of proprietary rights
Employing the terminology of proprietary and personal rights carries particular risks given 
the way the concept o f a proprietary right is typically understood and applied. The conventional 
view of proprietary rights regards them as possessing a number o f features or incidents. On this 
basis, to say that someone has a proprietary right in an asset involves a number of different claims; 
for instance, that he has an interest enforceable against third parties, that his claim has priority in the 
event of a defendant recipient’s insolvency, that his interest is transmissible, that it provides the 
possibility of specific recovery of the asset.9 On the most extreme version o f this view, not only are 
such incidents necessary features o f proprietary rights but their availability also depends on a right’s 
proprietary status. On this basis, these incidents come as a package. Each is an inherent and 
exclusive feature o f a right being proprietary, with the result that one necessarily implies the others. 
Even where this extreme account of the features of proprietary rights is not adopted, it is 
conventional to treat at least some combination of these incidents as a necessary consequence of a 
right being proprietary.10
This view that proprietary rights entail a package of incidents encourages us to connect 
issues which may otherwise be regarded as distinct. This then has consequences for our analysis of 
the claimant’s position and the claims available to him. So, if, as commonly assumed, a claimant 
will only be entitled to the specific recovery of misapplied assets only if  he retains a proprietary 
right in them, and, again as commonly assumed, proprietary rights give the claimant priority in the 
event of the defendant’s insolvency, then we can infer from the fact that the claimant is entitled to 
specific recovery that his right is proprietary and hence that his claim would be prioritised were the 
defendant insolvent. By contrast, if we know that the claimant has no such priority in insolvency, it 
must follow that he has no proprietary right and, therefore, that specific recovery is ruled out. 
Similarly, when determining whether the claimant should be entitled to specific recovery, we must,
9 See, e.g., F. Lawson and B. Rudden, The Law o f Property (Clarendon Press, 3rd edn 2002), p. 14; W. 
Swadling, “Property: General Principles”, ch. 4 of P. Birks (ed.), English Private Law: Volume I  (Oxford 
University Press, 2000), pp. 204-206; S. Worthington, Equity (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2006), pp. 51-55.
10 For instance, Virgo {supra, n. 4, pp. 569-577) is of the view that proprietary rights entail and are necessary 
for priority in insolvency, claims against indirect recipients, the recovery of any increase in the asset’s value 
and the possibility of specific recovery. Grantham and Rickett {supra, n. 4, pp. 401-404) treat proprietary 
rights as entailing and necessary for priority in insolvency, claims to any increase in the asset’s value and the 
possibility of specific recovery, though not, it seems, for claims against indirect recipients {ibid., pp. 63-65). 
Burrows (A. Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (Butterworths, 2nd edn 2002), p. 52) takes the view that 
proprietary rights entail and are necessary for the priority of claims in insolvency and, it seems, the possibility 
of specific recovery, and that they enable claims to be brought against indirect recipients, though such claims 
may at least on occasion lie in the absence of such a right {ibid., pp. 31-41). Birks (P. Birks, Unjust 
Enrichment (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2005), pp. 78-98), by contrast, appeared to regard claims against 
indirect recipients and for recovery of an increase in the asset’s value as possible even in the absence of some 
proprietary right, though such a right was necessary for priority in insolvency. He also took the view that 
specific recovery need not be limited to cases where the claimant held a proprietary right {ibid., pp. 169-171).
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on this basis, inquire not only into the reasons for and against allowing the claimant to recover the 
asset itself but also into the reasons for and against prioritising his claim over those of other 
creditors, since the one entails the other. In this way, by employing the notion o f proprietary rights 
in the analysis o f such claims, the answer to one question -  the possibility of specific recovery -  
becomes conditional on or at least connected to the answer we give to another question -  the 
appropriateness o f giving such claims priority.
Such reasoning is unproblematic provided the initial assumption -  that specific recovery 
and priority in insolvency are both necessary and exclusive features o f proprietary rights -  is 
correct.11 But why should we assume this? The language of proprietary rights, at least as 
conventionally used, encourages us to connect various distinct types o f claim, but without offering 
any explanation as to why we should treat such claims as connected. Without an account of why we 
should treat such standard incidents of proprietary rights as necessarily co-incident, employing the 
language o f proprietary rights threatens the development of a principled response to such cases by 
introducing irrelevant considerations.
An example o f this and o f the dangers o f treating the incidents o f proprietary status as an 
indivisible package can be found in the law’s handling of specifically enforceable obligations to 
transfer identified assets. Here, the defendant obligor is routinely regarded as holding the relevant 
assets on constructive trust, pending the actual transfer of title. The foundation of this trust seems 
to be an assumption that, since the court would allow the claimant obligee to recover the asset in 
specie, he must be taken to have a proprietary interest in the asset. This then gives him priority in 
the event of the defendant’s insolvency. However, if we ask why the claimant should be accorded 
such priority, what principle supports this, we are left struggling for answers.12
Moreover, i f  it is correct to view the various incidents o f proprietary rights as coterminous, 
it will be because the same factors are relevant to each; that the reasons for according a claim 
priority are also reasons for allowing specific recovery. And i f  this is true, then we have a good 
reason for employing the terminology of proprietary rights to mark out those cases where all these
11 Of course, this is just an example and I acknowledge that few, if any, judges or commentators who employ 
the personal-proprietary rights terminology would suggest that all the incidents mentioned here are features 
which are both inherent to and exclusive of proprietary rights. Nonetheless, there is a clear tendency to see a 
right’s proprietary status as determinative of a number of separate issues, and the challenge is as to the 
validity of this assumption: see supra, n. 10.
12 See, e.g., W. Swadling, “The Vendor-Purchaser Constructive Trust”, ch. 18 of S. Degeling and J. Edelman, 
Equity in Commercial Law (Law Book Company, 2005). In other contexts, despite occasional lapses, the 
courts and commentators have stressed that the availability of specific relief is not determinative of a right’s 
proprietary nature, and hence its ability to bind third parties: see, e.g., National Provincial Bank Ltd. v. 
Ainsworth [1965] A.C. 1175, at p. 1253,per  Lord Wilberforce; W. Swadling, “The Proprietary Effect of a 
Hire of Goods”, ch. 20 of N. Palmer and E. McKendrick (eds), Interests in Goods (L.L.P., 2nd edn 1998), at 
pp. 504-508; B. McFarlane, “Identifying Property Rights: A Reply to Mr Watt” [2003] Conv. 473, at pp. 474- 
476. Examples of such lapses can be found in Errington v. Errington [1952] 1 K.B. 290, at pp. 298-299, per 
Denning L J. and G. Watt, “The Proprietary Effect of a Chattel Lease” [2003] Conv. 61.
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incidents arise. But this needs first to be demonstrated. The only way to do this is to look at each 
question -  the availability of specific recovery, the issue o f indirect receipt, the impact of a 
defendant’s insolvency -  separately and solely on its own terms, examining the principles relevant 
to each, without assuming any connection between them. Such an examination may then reveal 
such a connection, and, importantly, its basis and scope. But it may be that no such connection is 
revealed. Certainly, before we have a clear and convincing basis for connecting these various 
incidents, relying on such an assumption means that our analysis o f such claims proceeds on the 
basis o f  assertion, hunch and received wisdom rather than the examination and application of 
principle. These dangers are further compounded since, as has been noted,13 opinions differ as to 
which o f these incidents are necessary and which exclusive features of proprietary rights.14 As 
such, we risk not only begging important questions but also talking at cross-purposes.
A useful analogy can be taken from the law of trusts. In the typical or paradigm trust, one 
party, the trustee, with his own, usually legal, title to an asset holds that asset for, and in so doing 
owes fiduciary duties to, another, the beneficiary, who has a separate, equitable title to the asset. 
Thus the typical trust possess two distinctive features or elements, this separation of legal and 
equitable title and the existence of fiduciary duties owed by the trustee to the beneficiary. As has 
been noted already,15 the suggestion has recently been made that trusts should be recognised in 
many cases where assets have been misapplied, such as would allow the claimant, on the back of 
his equitable title, to recover the asset in priority to the claims o f other creditors o f the defendant. A 
number of counter-arguments have been made in response to this proposal, one o f which is that it 
would be unfair to innocent recipients of misapplied assets to impose on them the fiduciary duties 
typically owed by trustees.16 In turn, those proposing the recognition o f trusts in such cases have
13 Supra, n. 10.
14 The uncertainty here extends well beyond the particular problem of misapplied assets. So, in relation to 
enforceability against third parties, while there is unanimity that proprietary rights necessarily bind an open- 
ended class of third parties, it is also accepted that some proprietary rights are enforceable against a wider 
class of third parties than others. Moreover, even where no proprietary right is found, similar, if not identical, 
results can be achieved through the imposition of “new” personal rights against such third parties: see, e.g., S. 
Bright, “The Third Party’s Conscience in Land Law” [2000] Conv. 398; McFarlane, supra, n. 12, pp. 477- 
482. Similarly, it is clear that not all proprietary rights provide the same degree of priority in insolvency 
(some may indeed accord no priority: see Companies Act 1985, s 395(1)), and that some priority, or a ranking 
in insolvency equivalent to according priority, is an attribute of certain personal rights: see, e.g., Insolvency 
Act 1986, ss 40(2) and 175(2)(b); Companies Act 1985, s 196; see too Insolvency Act 1986, s 176A, inserted 
by Enterprise Act 2002, s 252. The disconnection of proprietary rights and the possibility of specific recovery 
has been noted already: see, supra, n. 12. For a general discussion of the difficulty of identifying 
distinguishing features of proprietary rights, see S. Worthington, “The Disappearing Divide between Property 
and Obligation: The Impact of Aligning Legal Analysis and Commercial Expectation”, ch. 5 of S. Degeling 
and J. Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Law Book Company, 2005).
15 Chapter 7, text to n. 10.
16 See, e.g., Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] A.C. 669, at 
p. 690, per Lord Goff, and at pp. 703, 706-707, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; A. Burrows, “Swaps and the 
Friction between Common Law and Equity” [1995] R.L.R. 15, at p. 27.
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countered that they never intended to suggest that innocent recipients would be subjected to such 
obligations.17
There are two possible interpretations of this disagreement, each of which highlights a 
danger posed by the use o f such concepts in legal argument and analysis. The first and more 
straightforward view is simply that the two sides were at cross purposes, and hence the 
disagreement was apparent rather than real. Those arguing for trusts to be recognised in such cases 
understood and intended the word “trust” to signify merely the division o f legal and equitable title. 
Their critics understood the term to refer to the combination o f such duality of title and fiduciary 
duties owed by the trustee to the beneficiary. As such, they misunderstood the substance of the 
argument that its proponents had in mind. Such confusion is solely the product o f employing the 
terminology of trusts. If, instead of using this language, the argument had been expressed in terms 
of priority in insolvency, the possibility of claiming against indirect recipients, the application of the 
bona fide  purchase rule and the like, and so setting out exactly the claims held by and duties owed 
to the parties, any confusion would have been avoided.
A second interpretation of the disagreement is that it concerned whether a separation of 
legal and equitable title was possible without fiduciary duties also arising. On this view, the critics 
did not misunderstand the argument that had been put forward, but instead maintained that the 
intended division of title necessarily entailed or depended upon the recipient owing fiduciary 
obligations to the claimant. In other words, that the division o f legal and equitable title always 
comes, at least in the first instance,18 as a package with fiduciary duties. Then the question becomes 
whether this is indeed true, to which the answer must be that, at the very least, it is hard to see what 
reason there could be for holding that such duality of title cannot arise in the absence of fiduciary 
duties. Indeed, if it were not for the fact that these two elements frequently do coincide, and that we 
are in the habit of grouping them together under the heading “trusts”, it is unlikely that such a 
suggestion would ever have been made. In any case, if it is to be suggested that we cannot have the 
division of legal and equitable title without accompanying fiduciary obligations, this requires more 
support than the bare fact that these usually do come as a package and that we usually do intend this 
package when using the word “trust”.
The upshot of all this is that, on the first view, employing the language of trusts has led to 
unnecessary confusion and, on the second, that it has encouraged some to connect two questions -  
on the one hand, whether the claimant should have the advantage o f priority in insolvency and other 
incidents of equitable title and, on the other, whether the defendant should he subjected to fiduciary 
duties to the claimant -  which have no obvious connection in principle, and without any explanation
17 See, e.g., P. Birks, “Trusts Raised to Reverse Unjust Enrichment: The Westdeutsche Case” [1996] R.L.R. 3, 
at pp. 11-12, 25-26; Chambers, supra, n. 2, pp. 196-203.
18 See Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] A.C. 669, at pp. 
706-707, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
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of the basis of this connection. As before, the suggestion is not that the language of trusts should be 
abandoned. Rather, it is that until our understanding of it becomes settled, it is imperative to say 
exactly what we mean when using it. Without any agreement as to what the term imports, its use 
creates the possibility that the substance of the argument will be lost or misinterpreted. Moreover, 
even if we opt for a conception of trusts which comprises both duality of title and fiduciary 
obligations, it does not follow that these elements cannot exist or arise in isolation. This would 
require a further argument of principle, which must clearly go beyond appeal to linguistic 
convention, as to the basis of any such necessary connection.
These dangers are mirrored in the use of the language o f personal and proprietary rights, for 
here too we have uncertainty as to what consequences follow from a right is described as 
proprietary and a tendency to assume a connection between various, seemingly discrete, incidents 
without any attempt to explain this in terms of principle. To avoid these dangers and to give us the 
best chance o f developing a body of law which is consistent and just, the terminology of proprietary 
and personal rights, and its application in a given case, rather than driving the analysis of such 
claims, must follow from and depend on a prior examination and application of the principles 
relevant to such cases.
8.3 The location of title to misapplied assets
For these reasons the preceding chapters have examined the claims that should follow a 
misapplication of assets without reliance on the language of and distinction between personal and 
proprietary rights. As a consequence, there has been no inquiry into to the location of title to 
misapplied assets.19 Once more, a finding that title resides in a particular party must follow from 
and depend on a prior examination of the principles applicable in such cases and the claims they 
support. Once this is done, to hold that a particular title is held by the claimant may stand as a 
convenient shorthand for the detailed conclusions which follow from the application of these 
principles. Here too, however, such expressions are only useful, and indeed can only be used 
safely, if they do accurately convey the substance o f these conclusions as to the parties’ respective 
claims and liabilities. O f course, such conclusions can be stated, as they have been here, without 
using these expressions. In any case, it is clear that the examination o f principle must come first.
It has been noted already20 that the approach taken here, in a number of respects, mirrors the 
position of those who have argued that, in some cases, recipients of misapplied assets should hold
19 At least, if we use the word “title” to signify a particular type of proprietary right, rather than as a synonym 
for a more generalised interest in an asset such as justifies claims of the kind analysed here. For the 
difference between rights and interests that support them, see infra, text to nn. 65-72.
20 Supra, text to n. 2.
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them on resulting trust for the claimant, such that he can establish equitable title to them. However, 
there are also important differences between the resulting trust argument, as it has been put forward, 
and the line taken here. For instance, the preceding chapters argue for the defence of change of 
position replacing, rather than merely supplementing, the bona fide  purchase rule, and its extension 
to cases of insolvency so as to protect the interests of other creditors.21 As such, there is no exact 
correlation between the approach advanced here and any one o f the various responses presently 
found in English law. Because of this, while it would be possible still to reframe the conclusions of 
the previous chapters in terms of the recipient holding misapplied assets, and their fruits and 
substitutes, on trust for the claimant, thus signifying the possibility o f recovering such assets from 
direct and indirect recipients alike and in priority to the claims of other creditors of the defendant, 
we would also have to gloss this by saying that the claimant’s equitable title, and the claims o f its 
holder, are subject to the change of position defence but are not defeated simply by the assets 
acquisition by a bona fide  purchaser for value without notice.22 The gains of such a reframing are 
doubtful.
Though some may find the absence of references to proprietary rights and the location of 
title jarring, it should be plain that the omission is purely terminological rather than substantive. 
Such notions, as with all conceptual language, are simply a means o f conveying particular ideas. 
Often such concepts provide a useful shorthand, neatly encapsulating an idea or some combination 
of ideas whose expression would otherwise be unwieldy or awkward. But they are useful only in so 
far as we do not lose sight o f the ideas they identify. And even where such concepts are used 
consistently and the ideas they embody are well understood, it will always be possible to express 
those ideas without employing that conceptual language.23
8.4 The viability of distinguishing personal and proprietary rights
The foregoing sections have questioned the utility of reliance on a distinction between 
personal and proprietary rights in the presentation and justification o f legal rules and entitlements. 
As we have seen, one ground for this is the uncertainty that exists as to the incidents of proprietary
21 See chapter 6, text to nn. 31-36 and chapter 7, text to nn. 51-53.
22 This is not the only possibility. An alternative expression of the same substantive position would be to say 
that the claimant retains his title to the misapplied asset, though the defendant, by virtue of his receipt and 
possession of it, obtains a separate (legal) title to it, the claimant’s title and the claims available to him again 
being subject to change of position. Since each denotes the same set of claims and liabilities, which, if either, 
we adopt is a solely a matter of linguistic convenience.
23 Much the same argument is made in C. Rotherham, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: A Misunderstood 
Relationship”, ch. 9 of A. Hudson (ed.), New Perspectives on Property Law, Obligations and Restitution 
(Cavendish Publishing, 2004), at pp. 197-198.
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rights and hence as to the significance of classing a right as proprietary rather than personal. 
However, though accounts differ on the consequences o f such categorisation, there appears little or 
no doubt that personal and proprietary rights can meaningfully be opposed. Nonetheless, the lack 
of certainty as to the consequences which flow from so categorising rights at the very least suggests 
some uncertainty as to the basis o f the distinction.
A useful starting point for an examination of the nature of the personal-proprietary rights 
divide, both because it has many supporters and because it provides a neat illustration o f some of 
the problems of drawing and basing such a distinction, is the account put forward by Birks.
For Birks, the distinction between the two categories o f right rested on their exigibility. 
The classification of a particular right as personal or proprietary turns on the answer to the question 
against whom the right can be demanded or asserted.24 On this basis, personal rights, or, 
synonymously, rights in personam, are straightforwardly defined as those rights exigible only 
against a particular person.25
[A] right in personam is a right against a person in the sense that it is a right that that person make 
some performance. The claimant holds the string and the other end is around the other’s neck ... [T]he right 
is not called “personal” because it belongs to a person but because it is exigible against, and only against, the 
person who must make the performance.26
Given this, we might therefore expect proprietary rights to be defined as those rights whose 
exigibility is not so limited and are instead exigible against a wider and/or open-ended class of 
people, since this is the alternative to the right being exigible only against a given individual. 
However, this is not quite what Birks said. Instead, he defined proprietary rights or, again 
synonymously, rights in rem as follows: “a right in rem is one whose exigibility is defined by 
reference to the existence and location of a thing, the res to which it relates.”27 And again: “[r]ights 
in rem are in principle demandable wherever the res (the thing) is found and hence against anyone 
who has it or is interfering with it.”28
This creates problems. Firstly, this seems to leave over a third possible class of rights, 
namely those which are not exigible only against a given individual, and so cannot be classed as 
personal rights, but whose exigibility is not determined by reference to the location o f a particular 
thing. Indeed, Birks later accepted this possibility, identifying the right to bodily integrity and the
24 See P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law o f Restitution (Clarendon Press, rev. edn 1989), p. 49; Birks, 
supra, n. 10, p. 28.
25 Or someone representing that person: Birks, supra, n. 10, p. 28.
26 Ibid, p. 164.
27 Birks, supra, n. 24, p. 49.
28 Birks, supra, n. 10, p. 28. See too ibid., p. 165: “A right in rem is a proprietary right or simply a property 
right. The string in the claimant’s hand is attached, at the other end, to a res, a thing.”
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right to reputation as instances.29 The would mean that, contrary to the conventional understanding, 
the personal-proprietary categorisation of rights is not exhaustive. Birks, no doubt anxious to avoid 
such a conclusion, was able to assert the exhaustiveness of this classification only by reducing the 
focus o f his inquiry to those legal rights which are “realizable in court”. On this basis, he felt able 
to exclude any rights which would fall into this third class since these were “superstructural” and 
“never directly realized in court”.30 This move is itself problematic given Birks’ position that, even 
where proprietary rights are capable of direct “vindication”, the subsequent recovery of that asset or 
its value is necessarily depends on the existence of a separate personal right to that effect.31 As 
such, if we are to limit our analysis to rights realisable in court, and the reasons for this are nowhere 
to be found, it is unclear to what extent we can accommodate proprietary rights.32
Secondly, and more importantly, if we define proprietary rights as Birks did, the basis of 
the classification of rights as personal or proprietary begins to look uneven. Though defined in both 
cases in terms of exigibility, the two categories can be seen to respond to different questions 
concerning exigibility, rather than embody different answers to the same question. The category of 
personal rights is formed in response to an inquiry into the number or, perhaps, the open-endedness 
of the people the right is exigible against. By contrast, the category o f proprietary rights is 
identified as a response to the question of whom the right is exigible against or how we determine 
the exigibility of the right, the answer being those who have or are interfering with the relevant 
thing.33 On this basis, we are in fact wrong to align personal and proprietary rights since they are 
categories formed in response to different questions. Indeed, applying Birks’ definitions of 
personal and proprietary rights, we end up with just the sort of “bent” classification Birks was, 
rightly, so quick to reject elsewhere.34 It is because of this that the supposed twofold exhaustive 
classification ends up leaving room for a third, residual class. And, though Birks’ definitions do not 
result in overlapping or intersecting categories, their misalignment leaves us with no clear
29 Ibid., p. 30. Earlier, Birks, noting that such rights did not meet his definition of proprietary rights, was 
compelled to insist that such rights were personal, notwithstanding that they could be asserted against an 
indefinite number of people: see P. Birks, “Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13”, ch. 1 of 
P. Birks (ed.), The Classification o f Obligations (Oxford University Press, 1997), at p. 10.
30 Birks, supra, n. 10, p. 30.
31 See P. Birks, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths” [1997] N.Z. Law Review 623, at pp. 
656-658.
32 By contrast, if we hold that proprietary rights are to be treated as realisable in court despite their protection 
being dependent on such subsidiary personal rights, it is difficult to see why we cannot also treat Birks’ 
“superstructural” rights as realisable in court on a similar basis. The relationship between my proprietary 
right and my right that you not interfere with the thing or that you give it up to me seems to be no different 
from the relationship between my right to reputation and my right that you not publish material which is 
defamatory of me, a right capable of protection through the grant of an injunction.
33 This shift in inquiry is also identified, though differently expressed, in W. Swadling, supra, n. 9, p. 222.
34 See, e.g., Birks, supra, n. 29; P. Birks, “Misnomer”, ch. 1 of W. Comish, R. Nolan, J. O’Sullivan and G. 
Virgo (eds.) Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Hart Publishing, 1998), at pp. 4-9. See too W. Swadling, 
“What is the Law of Restitution About? Four Categorical Errors”, ch. 21 of W. Comish, R. Nolan, J. 
O’Sullivan and G. Virgo (eds.) Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Hart Publishing, 1998), at pp. 331-335.
159
understanding o f the basis, and hence the significance and consequences, o f distinguishing personal 
and proprietary rights.
It seems likely that Birks was led into this misalignment by failing to distinguish two 
common, though distinct, conceptions of proprietary rights. The first o f these sees proprietary 
rights as rights “good against the world”, or at least as against an open-ended class of people. The 
second views proprietary rights as rights “in” things. The former leads to a distinction between 
rights that can be asserted only against a particular individual, or perhaps some closed set of 
individuals, and rights that can be asserted against a wider, indeterminate class. It is this 
understanding which informs Birks’ use of exigibility as the basis for the personal-proprietary 
divide and gives him his definition of personal rights. It can also be seen in his reference to 
personal rights being “bipolar”,35 the implication being that proprietary rights, being exigible 
against a wider class, are not. O f course, as we have seen, Birks did not define proprietary rights as 
rights good against a wider or indeterminate class, identifying them instead as rights exigible 
against those holding or interfering with the relevant thing. Here we see the second understanding 
of proprietary rights, as rights to or in things, creeping in. This view is also evident in the metaphor 
Birks employed, whereby right holders were to be understood as holding a string tied to the object 
of that right. With personal rights this string is tied to another individual, the person under the 
correlative duty to render the performance. By contrast, when a right is proprietary the string is 
attached, not to a person or group of people, but to a thing.36 It is this confusion of two separate 
ideas which leads to Birks’ misaligned and confused division between personal and proprietary 
rights. If we are to use this distinction in legal analysis it must have a single, clear basis. To this 
end, we shall examine each o f these two conceptions o f proprietary rights to see if they lead to a 
useful and workable distinction.
8.5 Proprietary rights as rights against people generally
Personal rights are usually understood to take the form of what are often called Hohfeldian 
claim-rights,37 that is, an entitlement that a specified individual render a particular performance. 
Such rights can be asserted only against that individual obligated to render that performance. 
However, we are also used to referring to rights which do not appear to be so limited. Because of 
this, it appears that we may be able to draw a distinction between those rights which can be asserted 
against only a specified individual and those rights which are assertable against a broader and/or
35 P. Birks, English Private Law: Volume I  (P. Birks (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2000), p. xxxix.
36 Birks, supra, n. 10, p. 165.
37 Following W. N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (W. W. Cook (ed.), Yale University Press, 
1923), pp. 36-38.
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indeterminate and/or open-ended class of people.38 Some have argued that it is this distinction 
which the language of personal and proprietary rights identifies.
One immediate consequence of this is that, though it gives us a definition o f personal with 
which we are familiar, it brings within the category of proprietary rights an array o f rights which 
have little or nothing to do with “property”, at least as conventionally understood.39 This, o f course, 
is not a reason for doubting the distinction. At most it means that the proprietary label may not be 
the most appropriate for what is being described, and, given the inconsistency there has been in the 
application of these terms, even this objection is rather minor. However, before we approach the 
question whether this terminology is appropriate, we must ask whether the purported distinction 
holds good and whether it provides useful insights in the analysis and presentation o f the law. If the 
distinction turns out to be either false or unrevealing, then we have reason to disregard it, whatever 
the terms in which it is expressed.
To answer the question whether a given right is assertable against one person or against a 
wider class of people, we must first offer a description o f the right. Only then will we know if the 
right which can be asserted against a particular defendant is the same right which is capable of 
being asserted against other people. If, for instance, I am standing in front of you, I will have a 
right that you not punch me. I also have a right that you not poke me in the eye or stamp on my 
feet. Are these separate rights or all instances of the same right? Moreover, is my right that you not 
punch me when I am standing in front of you the same right as I have against others when driving 
that they do not crash their cars into me?
I would imagine that most people would say that we can view all these as instances of the 
same general right, the right that you not cause me physical injury. This is in essence just another
38 As Honore has noted, these various formulations differ and so lead to differently located distinctions: see A. 
Honore, “ Rights of Exclusion and Immunities against Divestment” (1960) 34 Tulane L.R  453, at pp. 453- 
456. However, for present purposes, given the argument which follows, it is unnecessary to distinguish 
between them.
39 This is evident is the analyses of those who define proprietary rights or rights in rem in these terms: see, 
e.g., J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy o f Positive Law (John Murray, 4th edn 1873), 
Lecture XIV, at pp. 381-382; H. Stone, “The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust” (1917) 17 
Columbia L.R. 467; L. Smith, “Transfers”, ch. 5 of P. Birks and A. Pretto (eds), Breach o f Trust (Hart 
Publishing, 2002); cf. L. Smith, The Law o f Tracing (Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 48-57; P. Jaffey, The 
Nature and Scope o f Restitution (Hart Publishing, 2000), pp. 279-280. Others, while distinguishing rights in 
rem and rights in personam on this basis have rejected the equation of proprietary rights and rights in rem, 
thus avoiding the counter-intuitive conclusion that proprietary rights may have no connection to property as 
conventionally understood: see, e.g., Penner (J. Penner, The Idea o f  Property in Law (Oxford University 
Press, 1997), pp. 23-31) who treats proprietary rights, along with, for instance, the right to bodily security and 
the right not to be killed as examples or sub-classes of rights in rem. See too Honore, supra, n. 38; Swadling, 
supra, n. 9, p. 222. In response to such approaches, Pretto-Sakmann (A. Pretto-Sakmann, The Boundaries o f 
Personal Property: Shares and Sub-shares (Hart Publishing, 2005), p. 91) confidently states, “..property 
rights and rights in rem can never stand in a relationship of approximation or exemplification. They can only 
stand in a relationship of identity.” Quite why we should consider it impossible to decouple such terms, given 
that the question is simply one of linguistic convenience, and especially in light of the way these terms have 
been used historically, is left unexplained.
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application of the principle that like cases should be treated alike. Despite the factual differences 
between these cases, between the specific act situations to which each right pertains, we can see that 
they are +all applications of the same principle, in this case that o f protecting my interest in my 
bodily integrity. The grouping together of specific rights so as to form one general right is then 
possible wherever the specific rights share a common basis in principle. The more broadly we 
describe these principles, the more specific rights we can bring together as examples of a single 
general right.40
However, though we can on this basis speak of a single general right that others not cause 
me physical injury, covering all these situations, we are not thereby precluded from also saying that 
I have a right that you do not punch me, that you do not poke me in the eye, and so on. There is 
nothing in the language of rights and duties which commits us to using them always at the same 
level o f abstraction. Indeed, such uses of the term “right” are perfectly compatible. The specific 
right is simply an example or an application of the general right. The right that you not cause me 
physical injury means that I have, at this moment in time, a right that you not punch me. I have a 
right that you not punch me because I have a right that you not cause me physical injury.
The fact that rights and duties can be stated at different levels of abstraction creates 
problems, however, for a classification of rights by reference to the number or open-endedness of 
those they can be asserted against. This is because the same right is capable of expression in 
alternatives forms, depending on the level of abstraction at which we describe it. At higher levels 
of abstraction, the right we describe will take a general form, which is likely to be capable of 
assertion against people generally; at the lower end the right will pertain to specific act situations 
and requirements directed at and, at least at a given point in time, comprehensible to only one 
person or a limited class of people. So, for instance, the right that you not cause me physical injury 
is a right that I will also have against people generally. However, what particular conduct this 
requires of you, and indeed of others, will depend on the circumstances in which we find ourselves. 
If I am standing in front of you, I shall have a right, inter alia, that you not punch me; if  I am 
crossing the road you are driving along, I have a right that you slow down and let me pass; if you a 
carrying me on your shoulders, I have a right that you not drop me. These specific rights and the 
directions they give to the duty holder only make sense in particular circumstances, to particular 
individuals at particular points in time. Accordingly, the more we focus on specific rights and 
specific act-situations, the more rights fall into the category o f personal rights. The more we frame 
rights in general terms, the greater, on this version of the distinction, the category of proprietary
40 For instance, we might view my interests in bodily integrity, in mental wellbeing, and in my reputation as 
separate, such that we can treat my right that you not physically injure me, my right that you don’t cause me 
psychological harm, and my right that you do not defame me as separate rights. Alternatively, we might view 
the first two, or all three, as examples of a more general interest in my being free from harm or in autonomy 
etc., in which case these rights could be viewed as instances of a more general right.
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rights becomes. And yet these are simply alternative expressions o f the same rights. We must 
question what is gained by a classificatory system which allows the same material to be categorised 
differently simply as a result of resorting to different modes o f expression.
To avoid this conclusion, and to enable personal and proprietary rights to be meaningfully 
opposed on this basis, we would have to show either that, contrary to the assumption made thus far, 
there is in fact only one true form or correct expression of a particular right or, alternatively, that, 
though this process of abstraction is possible and legitimate, it is nonetheless true that all rights, 
regardless of the level o f abstraction at which they are expressed, remain either, in all forms, 
assertable against people generally or, in all forms, assertable against a fixed person or limited class 
of people.
The first approach is implausible. It is plain that we do habitually refer to rights at varying 
levels o f abstraction and that such references are intelligible. The most that one could argue is that, 
in relation to any given right and its correlative duty, there is a form of expression which best 
expresses its content, which contains the optimal combination o f general and specific information. 
Applying the notion of “basic-level concepts”, Penner has argued that we can identify a set of 
“basic obligations”, which formulate the duties we owe, and, presumably, the rights we hold, at a 
level of abstraction which most closely reflects the terms in which we perceive the interests the law 
seeks to protect and the events in the world to which such rights and duties pertain.41 However, 
even if this is true, it does not follow, and Penner does not suggest, that we refrain from speaking of 
rights and duties at anything other than this basic level. The most that we can say is that describing 
rights at a basic level is likely to provide a useful balance between providing specific information as 
to the act-situations to which it relates and general information about the basis of the right and its 
relationship to other rights. O f course, whether such a balance o f the general and specific is the best 
way to describe the right will depend on the purpose o f our inquiry. If we focus simply on the role 
of the law in guiding conduct, what type of description is most informative will depend on the sort 
of decision one is making. When we are making long-term or general plans, generalised rights and 
duties descriptions will be useful; when deciding between a variety of immediate actions, we are 
likely to benefit more from descriptions of rights and duties which are more specific.
Accordingly, classification of rights by reference to the number or open-endedness of those 
against whom the right can be asserted will only be viable if, despite the possibility of describing 
rights as different levels o f abstraction, it remains true that, for any given right, however framed, it 
is assertable either against a fixed person or class or, alternatively, against a wider, open-ended 
class. However, this attempt must also fail. It may be that there are some rights which, however 
expressed, can only be asserted against a given individual or a fixed class. An example may be
41 J. Penner, “Basic Obligations”, ch. 5 of P. Birks (ed.), The Classification o f Obligations (Oxford University 
Press, 1997).
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certain rights one holds against one’s parents by virtue o f the parent-child relationship, since 
necessarily the number o f people who fall within the class o f parents is fixed. Even here, though, 
the question remains whether we can view such rights and duties as simply particular instances of 
more general rights that can also be asserted against others, for instance that they, in certain 
circumstances, provide for our welfare. Other rights which may be considered paradigm examples 
of personal rights can more straightforwardly be reframed in such terms that they can be asserted 
against people generally. Rights to contractual performance provide a useful example.
If I enter into a contract with you under which you undertake to pay me £100, my right that 
you pay me this sum is a right which can be asserted against you and nobody else. My right is that 
you give effect to your undertaking, and the undertaking was yours and yours alone. But this is just 
one instance of my right that others perform the contractual undertakings they make to me. In other 
words, I have a right to the performance of any contracts that I have entered or may enter into. This 
right avails against an open-ended class of people, since, though the number o f people I presently 
have a contract with will be determinable, there is no limit to the number I may contract with. 
Accordingly, we can alternatively say that I have a specific right that you pay me £100 or that this is 
just one instance of a general right that others perform the contracts they make with me.
Some might object to framing a general right in these terms. When so described, the right 
and its correlative duty are, in a sense, contingent; before it imposes any direction or limitation on 
others’ conduct, something else needs to happen, a contract needs to be in place. Until that time, 
there is nothing I can require of you. And then, once there is such a contract, the content of the duty 
and its correlative right is specific to the parties to it. If we compare this with the right that others 
not cause me physical injury, there appears to be an important difference, since, in this case, the 
duty on others has immediate practical application. No other element needs to be in place for me 
before I can require you to act or refrain from acting in a particular way. So, while my personal 
right to your contractual performance may be capable o f being abstracted to a right which avails 
against people generally, this appears only to be possible by framing it in such terms as deprive it 
of present practical relevance to all but a determinable set of those to whom the norm is addressed. 
Indeed, it may be argued that it strips the notion of rights and duties o f their import if they are 
expressed in a form which necessarily has no bearing on and offers no guidance in relation to the 
parties’ present conduct.
The view one takes of how and when the language of rights and duties may legitimately be 
used of course turns on what one means by such terms, and it is quite clear that there are variances 
in how they are used. Sometimes, saying that a right is held and a duty owed is simply a way of 
expressing how legal rules apply to a particular fact situation. If we have a rule that contracts entail 
rights to performance and duties to perform, and that these follow as a matter of course from 
contract formation, then we can say that, prior to entry into a contract, there is a legal rule that entry
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into such a contract will lead to the parties being required to perform and to their being able to 
require the other’s performance. On this basis, it is simply a restatement of this legal reality to say 
that each party has a right that the other perform, should such a contract be entered into, and, more 
generally, that we have a general right to the performance of whatever contractual undertakings 
may be made to us. At other times, the language of rights and duties is used in a slightly different 
manner, stressing the normative role of law. This sees rights and duties as guides to conduct, as 
providing reasons for action. On this approach, the language o f rights and duties should be used 
only where the purported right and duty do indeed have something to say to the parties about their 
present conduct, offering them an immediate, non-contingent reason for action.42 It is on this basis 
that one might argue that, though it is true that, wherever I enter into a contract, I acquire a right to 
its performance, it is wrong to say that I have a present right against people generally that they 
perform whatever contracts they may enter into with me.
Neither approach is misplaced. Each reflects an important function o f law. The law 
provides responses to real world events and problems, stating what consequences follow from 
particular fact combinations in order to advance a variety o f moral, social and economic ends. It 
also seeks to give directions and to offer guidance and assistance to people in their deliberations as 
to how to act. What I think we can say is that even if we wish to stress the normative understanding 
of rights, it does not follow that contingent rights, such as the right that others should perform the 
contractual undertakings they make to us, are not true rights. For a start, that the right and duty are 
contingent in the manner described above, does not mean that they have no impact on our conduct 
until that contingency arises. The fact that the making of a contractual undertaking generates a duty 
to perform is clearly important information for all those considering making such undertakings. 
More fundamentally, my right that you pay me £100 in performance of a particular contract exists 
because of a principle o f general application that contracts should be performed.43 The principle 
has an existence beyond its various, specific applications to individual contracts. Accordingly, the 
general statement of the right is in keeping, with, and indeed may be said to follow from, the
42 An example of this difference in the way the language of rights and duties is used can be seen in the 
challenge Smith makes to the orthodox view that recipients of mistaken payments come under an immediate 
duty to give up an equivalent sum, even where they are not to blame for and do not even know of the mistake: 
see S. Smith, “Justifying the Law of Unjust Enrichment” (2001) 79 Texas L.R. 2177. Smith argues that it 
cannot be right to expect a defendant unaware of the payment or of the mistake which motivated it to make 
restitution. This must be true, but it is likely that, when the orthodox accounts speak of such a defendant 
owing a duty to make restitution, they mean only that the law entitles the claimant to recovery of such a sum 
from the defendant, and so makes the defendant liable to make such a payment, upon receipt and without 
more. This leaves over, however, the question why the claimant should have such a claim, which is Smith’s 
principal focus.
43 Or more precisely, because there is a principle which justifies a requirement that contracts be performed. 
As we have seen already (chapter 6, n. 54), the precise identity of this principle, that is the reason why we say 
that contracts give a right to performance, is a matter of widespread disagreement.
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generality of the principle that supports it.44 As such, there is nothing inherent in our understanding 
of rights and duties which requires that they are not so contingent. Therefore, rights to contractual 
performance, despite conventionally being viewed as paradigm personal rights, can alternatively be 
described in a form which identifies a right which avails against people generally.45
All of this reflects a basic truth about the way the law works and is structured. As we saw 
earlier,46 the law is shaped by a body of principles reflecting the goals we wish to pursue through 
law. It is these principles which determine the content of the legal rights we hold and the duties we 
owe. Unless we believe that the law exists to further the interests of only some sub-section of 
society, these principles will not identify any particular individuals as deserving of special 
treatment. Instead they will be of general application. What the application of these principles 
entails for each o f us will, of course, then depend on the circumstances in which we find ourselves, 
and, given that our circumstances differ from one person to another and change over time, what 
particular claims these principles justify and what particular limits they impose on our conduct will 
vary from day to day and from person to person. It is for this reason that the rights we have can be 
framed both in general terms, such that they are common to all of us, and in specific terms, which 
may be unique to a given individual at a given point in time.
Because o f this, it becomes impossible to draw any meaningful opposition between rights 
which can be asserted against people generally and those that can be asserted only against a given 
individual or limited class of individuals. Personal and proprietary rights are usually viewed as 
being different and mutually exclusive types of right. However, dividing them on the basis of the 
number, determinacy or open-endedness of those against whom they can be asserted leaves us with 
a distinction reflecting not a difference in kind but rather the difference, and the relationship, 
between the general and the specific. Moreover, given that the same material can be located on 
either side of the divide simply by formulating it in broader or narrower terms, it is far from clear 
what advantages categorisation along such lines brings to legal analysis and presentation. That the 
law applies generally is clear. So too that what it requires o f us depends on our personal 
circumstances. None of this offers any insight into, or assists us in the task of determining, the
44 See too chapter 3, text to n. 3. Penner, supra, n. 39, pp. 20-22, also concludes, and for similar reasons, that 
contingent norms, rights and duties should be understood as applications of general norms, rights and duties. 
Further support for this view comes from drawing an analogy with the moral duty to keep one’s promises, 
which mirrors the legal duty correlating to the general right described in the text, namely to perform whatever 
contracts one enters into. It is quite clear that references to the moral duty are intelligible and useful, despite 
the contingent nature of that duty. Accordingly, we have no reason for thinking that a parallel contingency is 
incompatible with a legal right. C.f P. Eleftheriadis, “The Analysis of Property Rights” (1996) 16 O.J.L.S. 
31, at pp. 51-53.
45 Though see J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 117-124 for a more 
hesitant approach to the possibility of such contingent rights.
46 Chapter 3, text to nn. 1-4.
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content of the general rights and duties found in the law nor the specific rights and duties which 
manifest them.
8.6 Proprietary rights as rights in things
The rights we have examined thus far, even those which can be asserted against people 
generally, have been rights against people, rights that another or others conduct themselves in a 
particular manner. However, it is clear that our expressions of rights frequently take a different 
form. Most statements o f human rights, for instance, are not framed as rights that others not 
interfere with our expressing our opinions or that others not kill us, but rather as rights to freedom 
of expression and to life. Moreover, it is often assumed that these rights are more than a 
combination of rights that others so conduct themselves.47 A second common understanding o f the 
distinction between personal and proprietary rights proceeds on such a basis: while personal rights 
are rights against people, proprietary rights are to be understood as rights to or in things.
This conception of the personal-proprietary distinction fits a lot more closely with the 
notion of property as conventionally applied by lawyers and laymen alike. However, the validity of 
this distinction depends upon the validity of its premiss, that what we refer to as rights to or in 
things are indeed a genuine and distinct kind o f right. This was famously doubted by Hohfeld. 
Hohfeld observed that lawyers’ use of the term “right” in fact embraced a variety o f distinct ideas 
and it was his contention that the failure to differentiate these senses of “right”” had skewed legal 
analysis by encouraging the drawing of false equations and inferences. Hohfeld’S thesis was that 
the various uses of “right” were all reducible to one, or a combination of, four discrete conceptions - 
claim-rights, liberties, powers and immunities -  and that these, when combined with their jural 
opposites, exhaust the variety of legal relations.
Clearly this analysis could not accommodate the notion of a right to a thing, and 
accordingly Hohfeld argued that all references to proprietary rights or rights to things were 
reducible to combinations of distinct claim-rights, liberties, powers and immunities, and hence to a 
series of relationships with people,48 Unsurprisingly, those who support the view that rights to 
things are distinct from rights against people have been at pains to find fault with Hohfeld’s
47 See, e.g., article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights which states: “1. Everyone has a right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by 
a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedom of others.” The statement that exercise of the right is not to be interfered with clearly 
presumes that the right is not simply a right that others not interfere with our (ability to lead a) private life.
48 Hohfeld, supra, n. 37, pp. 28-31, 74-91.
167
analysis. One common objection is that Hohfeld’s analysis is unable to account for or to 
accommodate many of the ways we typically employ the language of rights. For instance, Raz 
writes, “Hohfeld’s insistence that every right is a relation between no more than two persons is 
completely unfounded and makes the explanation of rights in rem impossible, as has often been 
noted.”49 One immediate response is that Hohfeld did indeed offer an account o f right in rem which 
fitted into his scheme, albeit one which differed from others’ understanding of the term.50 But, even 
if  Hohfeld had concluded that the notion of a right in rem could not be accommodated within the 
analysis he had set down, what would this show? That Hohfeld’s approach entails a rejection of 
some conventional uses of “rights” is plain. However, as we have seen, Hohfeld’s principal 
objective in proposing his analysis of rights was to remedy the threat posed to sound legal analysis 
by the indiscriminate use of the language of “rights” to describe distinct notions. As Hohfeld 
wrote:51
Anyone who has seriously observed and reflected on the interrelation of ideas and language must 
realize how words tend to react upon ideas and to hinder or control them. More specifically, it is 
overwhelmingly clear that the danger of confusion is especially great when the same term or phrase is 
constantly used to express two or more distinct ideas.
It is hardly surprising then that Hohfeld’s preferred approach involved both the adoption of 
less familiar terminology and the division of concepts previously understood to be indivisible. 
Accordingly, objecting that his analysis is inconsistent with standard uses of the term “right” or 
involves a more complex understanding of legal relations falls a long way short o f identifying a 
flaw in his argument. Without more, such criticisms at most amount to appeals to linguistic 
convention and simplicity. However, when, as here, they are opposed to clarity and precision of 
thought and analysis, it is clear that such considerations carry little weight.
If Hohfeld’s analysis is to be rejected it can only be on the basis that it fails accurately to 
describe the nature of legal relations and entitlements or that, though it does not misdescribe these 
concepts, they are nonetheless better understood and expressed in other terms. Some challenges 
have sought to demonstrate that Hohfeld’s scheme of jural opposites and correlatives is false; for 
instance, that it is inaccurate to view rights and duties as necessarily correlative. However, such
49 J. Raz, The Concept o f a Legal System (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn, 1980), p. 180. See too Honore, supra, n. 
38, p. 456: “What Hohfeld does not notice or does not mind is that these axioms render impossible many of 
the uses of ‘a right’ to which lawyers and laymen are accustomed.” Such an observation displays a 
remarkable unwillingness to engage with, even to acknowledge, Hohfeld’s arguments.
50 It is often said that Hohfeld viewed rights in rem as combinations of claims, liberties, powers and 
immunities. In fact, Hohfeld conceived of a right in rem, or multital right, as one such claim, liberty, power 
or immunity which exists alongside a variety of other claims, liberties, powers and immunities against other 
individuals of similar content; see, ibid., pp. 12-1 A.
51 Hohfeld, supra, n. 37, pp. 69-70.
168
accounts commonly depend on a departure from Hohfeld’s own use o f such terms.52 As such, they 
succeed only in showing that the word “right” can be used in different ways, and that, when used in 
some alternative sense, it does not carry the meaning or share the same relationship of entailment as 
Hohfeld describes. This clearly gets us nowhere.
A better focussed challenge to Hohfeld is comes from Penner. He offers the following 
criticism:53
If Hohfeld’s description of rights in rem is correct, then whenever Blackacre is transferred from one 
person to another, everyone else in the world exchanges one duty for another. Since rights correlate with 
duties, when A sells Blackacre to B, all persons who previously had a duty to A now have a duty to B, since B 
now has the bundle of Blackacre rights. The alternative, and I think better, view is that no one’s but A’s and 
B’s rights and duties have changed. Every one else maintains exactly the same duty, which is not to interfere 
with the use and control of Blackacre. It matters not the least to C, one of the multitude, who owns Blackacre. 
It matters not one whit to the content of his duty in respect of Blackacre that B now owns it instead of A. The 
duty not to interfere with the property of others is not owner-specific. We do not need to identify the owner 
in order to understand the content of the duty.
O f course, Penner is right that for most people most of the time it is irrelevant who owns a 
particular asset, and that they remain under a duty not to interfere with it irrespective of the identity 
of the present owner. Moreover, he is right to say that this duty is, at least for most purposes, fully 
intelligible without reference to the owner’s identity. However, it is also surely true to say that this 
duty that each of us owes not to interfere with a given asset is owed to someone, and that that 
someone is the owner of the asset at the present time. Furthermore, it surely cannot be in doubt that 
this duty that each of us owes correlates to a right held by the present owner that others refrain from 
such interference. Accordingly, where ownership of an asset in transferred, though we may say that 
there is a persistent duty we all owe not to interfere with that asset, it must be true that no duty is 
now owed to A, the previous owner, and instead a duty is owed to the new owner, B. Equally, 
though A, prior to the transfer, has a right that others not interfere with the asset, it seems clear that, 
following the transfer, he loses that right and it, or such a right, is held instead by B. So, it is surely 
undeniable that the parties to the right-duty relationship have changed. At no point does Penner 
provide any basis for doubting the correctness, rather than the suitability or convenience, of this 
understanding of the legal effect of transferring assets. To argue this, he would have had to show 
that it is inaccurate to day that, prior to the transfer, C owed a duty to A not to interfere with the
52 For a fuller account of such arguments, and a defence of Hohfeld, see M. Kramer, “Rights Without 
Trimmings” in M. Kramer, N. Simmonds and H. Steiner, A Debate Over Rights (Oxford University Press, 
1998), pp. 22-49.
53 Penner, supra, n. 39, p. 23.
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asset, and that, after its transfer, C owed such a duty to B. Unsurprisingly Penner makes no such 
attempt. At most, his argument suggests that Hohfeld’s is an unnecessarily complicated or long- 
winded way of explaining the legal consequences of such a transfer, and that we can and should 
formulate the position in simpler but no less intelligible terms.
This simply takes us back to a point we examined earlier.54 We can express rights and 
duties in different ways without changing their content. Which particular form of expression we 
use will depend on our purposes. Penner is no doubt right that for most purposes it is enough to 
express the duty we are under not to interfere with others’ assets without reference to the identity of 
that owner. But that does not mean that an expression of the duty which does so identify the owner 
is incorrect or does not identify a genuine duty. So while Penner’s argument shows that we can 
often understand and convey the legal rights and duties that exist in relation to assets in non- 
Hohfeldian terms, it fails to show that Hohfeld’s analysis is defective and, in particular, it gives us 
no basis for rejecting the notion that rights in or to things are reducible to combinations of rights 
against people.55
Other critics have sought to expose limitations of Hohfeld’s analysis. Harris, for instance, 
argues that, though the law at any given time may be capable of reformulation in Hohfeldian terms, 
Hohfeld’s approach fails to offer any assistance in determining the content of the law where it is 
unsettled or to accommodate any understanding of the law as a dynamic practice, whereby legal 
rights and relations change over time.56 Moreover, it is in resolving such questions, Harris 
maintains, that some notion of ownership or property as a right to or relation with a thing is 
indispensable. Similarly, it has been pointed out that Hohfeld’s analysis of rights in rem cannot 
account for why such rights come in bundles, and what the nature o f the connection between them 
is.57 If rights in rem are understood as rights to or in things we have no such difficulties.
In response to such criticisms we must note that Hohfeld’s analysis does not, and does not 
seek to, help us determine what legal entitlements we have, save for the entailments expressed 
through the relationships of correlativity and opposition found in his scheme. So, if we know that A 
has a right that B do X, it means that B has a duty to A to do X and that B has no liberty in relation 
to A not to do X. Beyond this, Hohfeld was concerned only to correct common misunderstandings 
as to the meaning and necessary consequences o f A having “a right”. Now, one may say that we 
need a theory of rights which says something about what rights we have or at least how we are to
54 See supra, text to n. 40
55 As such Penner’s argument ultimately reduces to a more sophisticated version of the objection that 
Hohfeld’s analysis involves embracing certain unfamiliar applications, and rejecting certain familiar 
applications, of the term “right”. A more explicit rejection of Hohfeld on such grounds is found in J. Penner, 
“Hohfeldian Use-Rights in Property”, ch. 13 of J. Harris (ed.), Property Problems: From Genes to Pension 
Funds (Kluwer Law International, 1997), at pp. 168-174.
56 J. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 120-125.
57 See, e.g., J. Penner, “The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property” (1996) U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 711, at p. 727.
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determine what rights we have. But this would be a different sort o f theory to the one Hohfeld put 
forward, and, crucially, there is no incompatibility, and so no reason to choose, between an inquiry 
into what rights we have and an inquiry into what a right is. Indeed, it is hard to see how we can 
begin to answer the former question without having first addressed the latter.58 Accordingly, we 
should not reject Hohfeld’s conclusions on the nature o f rights simply because he did not go on to 
provide a theory o f what rights we have.
When we turn to the question of the content of the rights we have, this is determined by a 
set o f principles reflecting the interests we want the law to protect and the causes we want the law 
to advance. It is through an understanding of these principles, rather than a clearer formulation of 
the basic nature o f a right, that we are able to resolve uncertainties in the law, to see the connections 
that may exist between the various rights we and others hold, and to conceive of law as something 
more than a snapshot of the rights and relations which obtain at a given point in time. It is here that 
conceptions of ownership and property have a role to play, in identifying the sort of interest in the 
disposition o f assets recognised and protected by law. To this extent I agree with Harris and 
Penner. What I doubt is whether these terms, and references to rights to or in things, are anything 
more than expressions of what rights (and liberties, powers and immunities) we have or may have 
against others in relation to particular things.
Though critics of Hohfeld’s approach are quick to pour scorn on the idea that there can only 
be legal relations between people,59 what exactly a legal relation between a person and thing is 
remains obscure. Moreover, the claim that there can be rights to things that do not reduce to, and so 
are not simply shorthand for, combinations of rights against people begins to look decidedly weaker 
when it is then admitted that there would be no room or no need for any notion of rights to things 
where all assets are held by the same person60 or where there is no potential for competing claims to 
the use of assets.61 This looks very much like an admission that property is not about the rights to 
and relationships with things but rather about the rights we have as against one another concerning 
access to things. If our focus really was on relations between people and things, separate from the 
rights people have against each other, then why should their existence be dependent on the positions 
and claims o f others?
Similarly, the idea of proprietary rights as rights to things tends to fade away when critics 
of Hohfeld come to address the boundary of personal and proprietary rights. Since, on this view,
58 See too N. Simmonds, “Rights at the Cutting Edge” in M. Kramer, N. Simmonds and H. Steiner, A Debate 
over Rights (Oxford University Press, 1998), at pp. 162-165.
59 See, e.g., Honore, supra, n. 38, p. 463; aptly answered by Eleftheriadis, supra, n. 44, pp. 37-39. The idea 
that legal relations can exist between people and things is also rejected in J. Finnis, “Natural Law: The 
Classical Tradition”, ch. 1 of J. Coleman and S. Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook o f Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy o f Law (Oxford University Press, 2002), at p. 51.
60 See Penner, supra, n. 39, p. 27.
61 See Harris, supra, n. 56, pp. 23-24.
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proprietary rights are not to be understood as distinct from and hence not reducible to the personal 
rights which may arise to protect or given effect to them, we would expect the classification of a 
right as proprietary to turn not on the class of people against whom the right can be asserted but 
rather on its content and the extent to which it pertains or gives access to a thing. Yet this is not 
what we find. Harris, for instance, offers the following account o f “non-ownership proprietary 
interests”:62
If a particular category of contract or grant conferring some specific use-privilege over the thing, or 
some determinate monetary claim out of the wealth-potential of its exploitation, is protected by trespassory 
rules, not merely against the contractor or grantor, but against the world in general including succeeding 
owners, the contract or grant creates a non-ownership proprietary interest.
So, when it comes to identifying a right as personal or proprietary, the notion o f proprietary 
rights as rights to things drops out of sight, to be replaced by the alternative notion o f proprietary 
rights as rights which can be asserted against people generally. In other words, we know that a right 
can be regarded as to or in a thing only once we know or decide that it can be asserted against 
people generally. Far from being incidental to or consequential upon the right’s proprietary status, 
the existence and scope of the claims that may be brought to protect or vindicate the “right” become 
the defining feature.
Perhaps the reason for this retreat is that a commitment to the idea of proprietary rights as 
rights to things would lead us to locate the divide between personal and proprietary rights in some 
unfamiliar places. Consider licenses over land. Licenses may confer liberties to use the land, far 
more extensive than the liberties held by the holder of an easement, let alone a party entitled to the 
benefit of a restrictive covenant who has only a claim-right that the servient owner not use the land 
in a particular way. It is well established that while easements and restrictive covenants are capable 
of binding purchasers of the relevant land, licenses are not. Yet, if this is to be decisive of the status 
of such rights as personal or proprietary, the notion of rights to things collapses into one of rights 
(relating to a thing) which can be asserted against people generally. If we were serious about the 
idea of rights to things, we would conceive of and so define proprietary rights in a similar manner to 
Gray, who argues that there can be degrees of property, reflecting the extent to which the right- 
bearer has access to and control over the asset and its use.63 And, o f course, if we do follow this 
path we have no good reason for denying that at least some licenses are proprietary rights, albeit
62 See Harris, ibid., pp. 55-56.
63 See K. Gray, “Property in Thin Air” [1991] C.L.J. 252, at pp. 295-296. See too K. Gray and S. F. Gray, 
Elements o f Land Law (Oxford University Press, 4th edn 2005), pp. 105-106: “ ...there can be gradations of 
property in a resource, and these gradations may vary over time. The quantum of property which a specified 
individual may claim in any piece of land is capable of calibration -  along some sort of sliding scale -  
between a maximum value and a minimum value.”
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ones which happen to be particularly fragile.64 The suggestion is not that we cannot or should not 
consider the extent to which rights are thing centred, but rather to question the commitment o f those 
who argue that there are rights to things which are not simply reducible to combinations of rights 
against others. For, if  the accounts of those who take such a view can be seen ultimately to define 
proprietary rights by reference to the people against whom such rights can be asserted, we may 
reasonably doubt whether it is possible meaningfully to oppose rights to things and rights against 
people.
For these reasons I remain doubtful of the possibility o f conceiving of a class o f rights to 
things which cannot alternatively be framed as combinations o f claim-rights, liberties, powers and 
immunities which avail against other people. However, it is unnecessary to pursue this argument 
further for, even if we were to accept that there is a valid notion of rights to things which does not 
reduce to combination of rights against people, we would nonetheless have good reason to reject a 
classification which opposes rights to things and rights against people.
8.7 The meanings of “rights”
“Personal rights” and “proprietary rights” are intended to identify subsets of the set “legal 
rights”. In other words, if  we start off with the full array of legal rights before us, we will be able to 
allocate some to the category of personal rights and other to the category of proprietary rights.65 
The possibility of such categorisation depends on our identifying what it is that we are seeking to 
categorise, what constitutes the class “legal rights”. This, o f course, requires some inquiry into the 
rights recognised by a given legal system. More fundamentally, however, and before we can begin 
any inquiry into what legal rights exist, we need to know what “legal rights” means. This involves 
not only distinguishing legal rights from other kinds of rights, but also that we identify what we 
mean by the word “right”. The need for a clear answer to this last question is particularly important 
seeing that the language of rights has been and, notwithstanding Hohfeld’s efforts, is still used at 
different times to mean different things. If our categories o f personal and proprietary rights are to 
align we need to ensure that each identifies a class of rights, with “rights” bearing the same meaning 
in each case. Unless our classification employs and adheres to single sense o f “rights”, our 
categories will not identify different varieties of a common set of “rights” but will instead identify 
different concepts, or sub-classes of different concepts, which happen to share the common
64 Moreover, if we did take this approach to the identification of proprietary rights, unless we were content to 
detach a right’s proprietary status from the question of its assertability against third parties, we would have 
reason then to reconsider whether licenses should be so fragile.
65 For present purposes we do not need to consider whether the categories of personal and proprietary rights 
exhaust the set of legal rights.
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language of “rights”.66 It would be equivalent to adopting a categorisation of games which gave 
counted among its categories “the Olympic games” and “ball games”. A classification of rights 
which includes categories o f “rights against people” and “rights to/in things” is skewed in just this 
way.
Despite occasional suggestions that rights against people and rights to things differ only in 
their “polarisation”, the right in the former case being attached to another person and in the latter 
case to a thing,67 it is clear that the relationship with another individual entailed by a personal right 
is different in kind, and not just in focus, to any relationship that can exist between person and 
thing. This can be seen from the fact that a personal right against another necessarily correlates to a 
duty owed by that other. The right and duty identify the same relationship from different ends. No 
such dual aspect or perspective exists in relation to rights to things. Those who correlate rights in 
rem with duties in rem can only do so by reducing such rights to rights against people or by misuse 
of the language o f correlation, such that rights to things do not equate to the duties of non­
interference owed by others but rather generate and, perhaps, necessitate such duties for their 
protection.68 That we are here employing different senses of “right” is also suggested by the form 
in which the two types of right are expressed. For instance, we are compelled to apply different 
prepositions, such that rights are to or in things but against people. Moreover, while rights to things 
identify a “two-term” relationship between person and thing, which without more informs us, albeit 
incompletely, as to the right’s content, rights against people require a “three-term” expression, 
identifying not just the two parties but also the conduct o f the duty bearer to which the right relates, 
to be intelligible.69
When we talk o f rights to things, we use the word “right” to identify some interest or 
domain of the right holder, some aspect of himself and/or his interactions with the world, which 
merits protection. This domain or interest marks out an area in which the right holder’s autonomy 
is to be respected and others must not intrude or interfere. So, when we say the claimant has a right 
to a particular thing, we mean that he is exclusively entitled, at least in relation to certain
66 This is not to suggest that the use of a common term is likely to be purely co-incidental. Often, as with the 
language of “rights”, there will be connections of content or context which explain why we use the same term 
in each case: see H. Hart, The Concept o f Law (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 1994), pp. 15-16. The key point is to 
appreciate that the same term may identify essentially different concepts, rather than simply examples or 
varieties of a common concept.
67 See, e.g., F. Lawson, Many Laws: Selected Essays, Volume 1 (North-Holland Publishing Company, 1977), 
at p. 12; Birks, supra, n. 10, pp. 164-165; Pretto-Sakmann, supra, n. 39, p. 92.
68 See, e.g., Penner, supra, n. 39, pp. 23-31, whose understanding of rights and duties in rem seems to reduce 
to combinations of right-duty relations between people, albeit that the identity of the other party to the 
relationship is, for the most part at least, unnecessary for an understanding of the content of the right and duty, 
and hence such rights and duties are capable of expression without reference to the other party.
69 The language of “two-term” and “three-term” relations is taken from J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 201-202, 218-219. Of course, these differences in expression only reflect 
and do not explain, let alone ground, the difference between these two concepts of “rights”.
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dispositions of or advantages derived from the thing, to decide how that thing is to be used, and that 
he will be protected in the exercise of these freedoms and his choices respected. The “right” as 
domain or interest, though protected by and given effect through the imposition o f rights against 
people is not reducible to a combination of such claims. Rather, it is to be understood as the basis 
of them. On this account, it is because the claimant has a right to the thing that he can, for instance, 
require that others not interfere with it without his consent or must return it if  it comes into their 
possession, again in the absence of the claimant’s consent.
The difference between the two senses of “right” then becomes plain. We can and do use 
the word “right”, on the one hand, to describe the concrete claims that we can make o f others in 
their dealings with us and, on the other, to identify the interests, objectives or freedoms which 
underlie and justify these concrete claims.70 When we talk of “rights against people” we use 
“rights” in the first sense; when we talk of “rights to things”, at least in so far as we intend these to 
be more than aggregates o f rights (and liberties, powers and immunities) against people, it is the 
second sense o f “right” we use. Because of this, if we define personal rights as rights against 
people and proprietary rights as rights to or in things, distinct from and not reducible to 
combinations o f rights against people, our resulting classes cannot be understood as subsets o f a 
single notion o f “rights”. Rather each identifies a discrete concept, or a subset o f a discrete concept, 
to which the terminology of rights can be applied. Accordingly, so understood, the categories of 
personal and proprietary rights do not align and no meaningful opposition exists between them. 
Instead, proprietary rights, since they identify a subset of “interest” or “domain” rights, align with 
other instances o f such rights, such as the right to bodily integrity, to reputation or to privacy.71 
Personal rights identify a discrete notion of “rights” and they can be aligned only with liberties, 
powers and immunities, as subsets (when combined with their correlatives) o f the set “legal 
relations between individuals”.72
70 The “domain” and “claim” senses of “rights” are identified and contrasted in J. Harris, “Property -  Rights 
in Rem or Wealth”, ch. 4 of P. Birks and A. Pretto, Themes in Comparative Law: In Honour o f Bernard 
Rudden (Oxford University Press, 2002), at p. 52.
71 Proprietary rights as rights to things can then be sub-categorised on the basis of, inter alia, the type of thing 
one may have rights in or kind of rights or interest one may have in a thing (e.g., the right to use, to sell, to 
income).
72 The category of personal rights can then be subdivided, most informatively on the basis of the principles or 
interests which justify such claims. One resulting sub-class would be claims which exist to protect or give 
effect to the claimant’s interest in exclusively determining the disposition of his assets.
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8.8 Proprietary interests
If we return to the understanding of the law’s shape and structure which have guided the 
preceding chapters, we can, I think, identify a useful role for “property”, one which is consistent 
with familiar applications of the language of “property” and retains much of their significance.
The law is not an arbitrary set of rules and stipulations. Law has a purpose or collection of 
purposes, and the body of the law is shaped by those purposes, by the goals that law exists to 
pursue. The protection and effectuation of certain interests o f individuals is, alternatively, one such 
purpose or necessary for the law to achieve its purposes, and much, at least, o f the law is explicable 
and justifiable on the basis that it protects or effectuates such interests. These interests can be 
reformulated in dynamic terms as principles. To recognise some aspect o f an individual or his 
engagement with the world as an interest which merits legal recognition is to say that it should be 
recognised and protected. So, our interest in our bodily integrity becomes a principle that we 
should not cause others, and that others should not cause us, bodily harm. These principles, when 
applied to concrete fact situations, justify specific determinations as to the permissibility and legal 
consequences o f certain conduct; determinations which, I suspect, can be expressed without 
remainder through the language of Hohfeldian claim-rights, liberties, powers and immunities.
One such interest is an interest in exclusively determining the disposition o f certain things. 
This interest can be expressed at different levels of generality. At its broadest, it is an interest in the 
institution and maintenance of a regime whereby individuals can become entitled exclusively to 
determine the disposition of certain items o f wealth. More narrowly, it is an interest in exclusively 
determining the disposition of those items to which one has acquired such an entitlement. At this 
level, we can say that a claimant has an interest in relation to, or simply in, an asset where he is, at 
least in some form and to some extent,73 exclusively entitled to determine its disposition. It is in 
describing these interests that we can usefully turn to the language o f property. Hence, the regime 
through which individuals are accorded exclusive entitlements to certain assets is one of private 
property. The interests in assets which entitle their holder exclusively to determine their disposition 
can be usefully labelled proprietary interests.
This also allows us to account for the standard incidents o f proprietary interests.74 To say 
that one has an interest in exclusively determining an asset’s disposition means, at least 
presumptively, that, so far as the interest extends, it is for the claimant, and nobody else, to choose
73 This provides for the possibility that the property regime of a given legal system accommodates, as English 
law does, distinct types of interests in things. So, for instance we can distinguish interests which give open- 
ended use privileges (which we have termed “ownership interests”) from those which are more limited, 
entitling the claimant, for instance, to use the asset only in some limited way or merely to determine whether 
others may use it in a particular way.
74 See supra, text to nn. 9-10. Of course, it does not follow that all interests in assets should share the same 
incidents or that the claims of parties with no such interest should not carry at least some of these incidents.
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how that asset is to be used, that it is his choices, and not those o f others, which are to be respected, 
and that, in exercising his capacity for making such choices, he is to be protected from others’ 
interference. This then tells us how we can link property with transmissibility, enforceability 
against third parties and priority in insolvency. It also allows us to distinguish, on the one hand, the 
entitlements of claimants with use-privileges to assets which derive from such an interest in the 
asset, and so which can be asserted against people generally, and, on the other, those o f claimants 
whose use-privileges are based on other principles, such as the principle that contractual 
undertakings be performed, and so which impose duties only on a particular individual or group.75 
We can also see now why there is no illogic or inconsistency in references to proprietary interests in 
personal rights or claims, or combinations o f such claims. As we saw earlier,76 the concrete 
determinations as to the rights, duties, liberties etc which we bear are distinguishable from the 
interests and principles which support them. Thus, proprietary interests justify and are, I would 
suggest always, protected and effectuated through (personal) rights, liberties, powers and 
immunities. Moreover, since our personal rights are “ours”, in that it is for each of us, as holder of 
a given right, to determine how the right is to be exercised, whether it is to be enforced or waived, 
whether, where possible, it is to be transferred and on what terms, and how its fruits are to be 
applied, there is obvious sense and in and meaning to the statement that we have a proprietary 
interest, indeed an ownership interest, in our personal rights.77 So understood, we are not forced 
into the awkward positions taken by those who, wrongly, treat proprietary interests and personal 
rights or, more simply, property and obligation as mutually exclusive.78
It is on this understanding of “property” and “proprietary interests” that we can say that the 
collection of claims commonly grouped under the heading “unjust enrichment”, as well as 
fragments of the law of torts and trusts, have as their basis the claimant’s proprietary interest, even
75 Of course, this tells us only why not all claimants with some entitlement to the use of assets can bring 
claims against third parties who receive the asset or interfere with the claimant’s use of it. The important 
question is when the claimant has an interest in (exclusively determining the disposition) the asset and when 
his claim rests on some other interest or principle. Here I think an important distinction is to be drawn 
between grants and promises. If we start with an asset in which A has an ownership interest, he, very 
generally, and subject to competing principles, is free (a) to transfer his interest or grant some lesser interest 
to B or, alternatively, (b) to promise B that he may use that asset in a given way (or that A will not use his 
asset in a given way). In the former case, B, so far as his interest extends, will carry rights against third 
parties, whereas, in the latter, his claim will be against A alone. The circumstances in which proprietary 
interests may be acquired in the absence of a grant (first acquisition, long use etc) involve different 
considerations. This in turn reflects the fact that the exact form of our private property regime and our 
interests under such a scheme, are dependant on our reasons for, that is, the principles and interests which 
support, the institution of such a regime.
76 Supra, text to nn. 70-72.
77 Or, in other words, “an obligation is as truly the subject-matter of property as any physical res”: J. Ames, 
“Purchase for Value without Notice” (1887) 1 HarvardL.R. 1, at p. 9.
78 Notable examples include Pretto-Sakmann, supra, n. 39, who forces upon herself the conclusion that shares 
cannot be the subject of proprietary interests, and those who insist that “charge backs”, though clearly 
commercially effective, are nonetheless “conceptually” impossible: see, e.g., R. Goode, Commercial Law in 
the Next Millennium (Sweet and Maxwell, 1998), pp. 69-71.
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where the law, as part o f its response, holds title to the relevant asset to have passed. Where the 
claimant has a proprietary interest, that is, an interest in exclusively determining the disposition of a 
particular asset, then, to the extent o f that interest, it is for him and him alone to determine who may 
receive and use that asset. It is only by reference to this interest that we can explain why the 
claimant’s lack of consent to the defendant’s receipt and use of the asset justifies the latter’s 
liability. Liability is justified precisely because it was and is the claimant, by virtue of his interest 
in the asset, to decide whether the defendant may make such use o f it and he did not so choose. 
Without such an interest, even where the defendant’s receipt comes, in some factual sense, “at the 
claimant’s expense”, we simply have no reason for supporting his preference that the defendant not 
be entitled to retain the asset or the benefits it brings. Similarly, where, prior to its transfer, the 
claimant did have such an interest but, notwithstanding some flaw in his consent, he is regarded as 
having effectively exercised his power to dispose of that interest in the defendant’s favour, what 




Implications and Concluding Remarks
The preceding chapters have mapped out a new approach to cases involving a defective 
transfer or misapplication of assets, shaped by the interests and principles which support and qualify 
such claims. Though these principles are all to be found in the law as it stands, their recognition 
and application is inconsistent and sporadic. The development o f a response consistent with 
principle and which treats like alike therefore entails a number of important changes to the legal 
rules we presently apply. So, specific recovery o f misapplied assets would, subject to defences, be 
available as of right. There would be no difference in the treatment o f direct and indirect recipients. 
All such claims would, again subject to defences, be accorded priority in the event of the 
defendant’s insolvency. Change of position would be extended to all such claims. The arguments 
in support of each o f these changes have been made already and will not be repeated here. One 
comment is, however, worth making, particularly since many will consider these proposed changes 
radical and far-reaching.
It is surely uncontroversial to say that the law here is far from a model of clarity or 
consistency.1 Moreover, though theories abound which, if adopted, would go some way to 
remedying much of this uncertainty, we are some distance from anything approaching a consensus 
as to which o f these should be adopted. This is worth stressing, for there is a tendency to dismiss 
some reconceptions o f the law purely on the basis that they involve, or are perceived as involving, 
too great a departure from the law as traditionally framed and understood. Now, as we have seen,2 
when dealing with the question of what the law should be, it is beside the point simply to argue that 
a given approach differs, even differs greatly, from what the law is. The most that can be said is 
that we should be wary of upsetting settled law, and thereby, at least in the short term, creating 
uncertainty and defeating the expectations of those who have planned their affairs on the basis of 
the law as it stands.
But, while I do not seek to challenge the relevance or value of such considerations, they 
carry much less weight where, as here, the law is far from settled. Moreover, it is questionable how 
much impact such considerations should have where they conflict with the requirement that like 
case be treated alike, and so with the pursuit of justice. In any case, seeing as there are few, if  any, 
commentators in this area who do not argue or have not previously argued for changes in the law of
1 For a summary of the law, see chapter 4, text to nn. 11-19.
2 See chapter 3, text to n. 4.
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comparable significance,3 those inclined to reject the approach proposed here simply on the basis of 
its novelty may be thought to display a somewhat fleeting and selective commitment to the value of 
leaving settled law undisturbed.
Aside from these substantive changes, the analysis presented here also differs markedly 
from standard accounts of the law in the manner o f its expression, in the conceptual apparatus used 
to present and to justify the law’s response. Claims following defective transfers and 
misapplications o f assets have been approached through a variety of conceptual and doctrinal 
devices. Some such claims fall within the law of torts, others within the law of trusts, and a large 
group was traditionally collected under the heading quasi-contract. In recent years, many, though 
not all, of these have been reconceptualised as examples of unjust enrichment and/or restitutionary 
liability, though with well known differences of opinion as to the reach of and relationship between 
these terms.
Much good has been done by unjust enrichment theorists in locating unities obscured by 
some of the traditional terminology. But it is also clear that, at times, they too have been guilty of 
an uncritical adherence to the formal divisions found in the law. So, while they have been prepared 
to look behind the language of money hand and received, quantum valebat, quasi-contract, and 
resulting trusts to ask whether these terminological and presentational differences reflect material 
differences in the cases they covered, they notably failed to do the same elsewhere. The distinction 
between those cases where title to the misapplied asset remained in the claimant and those where 
title passed went largely unquestioned. So too did the allocation o f some o f these case to the law of 
torts. As Jaffey has astutely noted,4 while the unjust enrichment school has been zealous in its 
rejection of the fiction o f implied contract, it has been strangely tolerant of what we may call the 
fiction of implied tort.5
3 In particular, and despite the conservative terms in which it was often framed, the development of a law of 
restitution for unjust enrichment as put forward by Birks, not to mention the (re)classification of private law 
of which it is part, involved and involves far-reaching changes both to the substance of the law and the terms 
in which it is to be understood. See P. Matthews, “The Legal and Moral Limits of Common Law Tracing”, 
ch. 2 of P. Birks (ed.), Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 36-37.
4 P. Jaffey, The Nature and Scope o f Restitution (Hart Publishing, 2000), p. 327. See too A. Tettenbom 
“Conversion, Tort and Restitution”, ch. 32 of N. Palmer and E. McKendrick (eds), Interests in Goods (L.L.P., 
2nd edn 1998), at p. 825: “[N]o-one has ever sat down seriously to consider what conversion is for. True, it is 
classified as a tort: but that is only for historical reasons and for lack of anywhere else to file it.”
5 Of course, in each case, whether there is truly a fiction involved depends on how one understands the terms 
“contract” and “tort”. Implied contracts are only a fiction if contracts are treated as necessarily dependant on 
consent; implied tort a fiction only if torts are treated as dependant on genuine culpability or moral 
wrongdoing. How these terms are used is largely a matter of convention, and no particular objection can be 
made to those who employ these terms to mean different things. The key point is just as the principles 
underlying implied contracts are different from those underlying “genuine” contracts, so too the principles 
underlying the “implied” tort of innocent conversion differ from those underlying other tort claims.
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9.1 Classification and the law
In rejecting both the traditional categorisation o f such claims and the reclassification 
introduced by unjust enrichment theorists, it should not, I hope, be thought that the approach taken 
here is motivated by scepticism as to the importance of classification in analysing and explaining 
the law. I agree with those who have stressed the potential o f classification to aid analysis and 
affect the outcome of cases.6 The divisions and associations we draw in the law matter since they 
both reflect and shape our understanding of the nature, basis and incidence of legal rights and 
claims. Classification requires us to think about the validity o f the divisions and associations found 
in the law and ensures that we remain focussed on the need to treat like cases alike. The 
contribution unjust enrichments lawyers have made in promoting the cause o f good classification is 
to be applauded. Where I differ from such accounts is simply, but fundamentally, on the question 
o f how and where we draw such divisions, on what it is that makes cases materially alike and 
unalike. The answer we give to the classificatory question is vital for, just as good classification 
assists in our understanding o f the law and our ability to develop a body o f law which is principled 
and just, defective classificatory schemes create obstacles to such goals. At the very least they fail 
adequately to explain why we draw the distinctions we draw; at worst, they encourage and entrench 
distinctions which are unprincipled and unjust.
It is a major failing o f the approach of many unjust enrichment theorists to classificatory 
questions that they have consistently downplayed or disregarded the prescriptive aspects of the 
classifications they propose.7 The tendency has been to present them as (uniquely) latent in the case 
law, such that no justification is needed, and hence none offered, beyond an account of how the 
cases can be seen to fit into the proposed scheme. Aside from the inadequacy of such accounts to 
tell us why we should maintain such an approach to classification, it also opens up its advocates to 
accusations o f inconsistency and hypocrisy, since the case law plainly reveals no such uniform 
classificatory scheme. Instead, the fit with the cases is achieved only by marginalising, distorting or 
dismissing as wrongly decided those decisions which do not square with the approach o f the writer. 
We are told that we should support the theory because it fits the cases, but we should support the 
cases only where and to the extent that (and, we must therefore presume, only because) they fit the 
theory. The cases are relied on where they fit the theory and dismissed where they do not.8 The 
circularity and deficiency of this position are plain.
6 See, e.g., L. Smith, “Unjust Enrichment, Property, and the Structure of Trusts” (2000) 116 L.Q.R. 412, at p. 
422.
7 See, e.g., P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law o f Restitution (Clarendon Press, rev. edn 1989, p. 27; P. 
Birks, “Equity in the Modem Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy” (1996) 26 Western Australia L.R. 1, at p. 3.
8 See S. Waddams, Dimensions o f Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal 
Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 21-22, 222-225.
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As we have seen, the likeness of cases cannot be determined by examination of our 
treatment of such cases. The failing of the accounts offered by the unjust enrichment school is not 
that they seek to change our understanding of the law and to marginalise or treat as incorrect some 
of the cases. Rather it is to think that such conclusions can be justified simply by reference to the 
law as it stands. Classification cannot be value neutral. Any classificatory scheme must address the 
question of what differences and similarities matter, what makes cases alike or unalike. This is true 
even where our purpose in proposing a classificatory scheme is simply to present the current state of 
the law in an accessible and coherent manner, since we need some criteria to determine how the 
material may best be ordered, an inquiry which necessarily takes us beyond what the law is and 
what the cases say.9 Where our concern is to offer some framework against which the law can be 
judged and which offers guidance in the future development of the law, this becomes even more 
apparent. To answer these questions requires the application of standards which are in a sense 
external to or independent of the law, in that they are sourced not in the legal rules we may 
currently have but in some theory of what law exists to do, what its goals and functions are, and, 
just as importantly, how best to achieve them. This, of course, means that the positions we take on 
these issues have no means of authoritative resolution, and for that reason will always be 
contestable. But the fact that the premises on which classificatory schemes are founded will 
necessarily be open to challenge, and that such challenges can only be addressed (and even then 
with no guarantee o f resolution) through moral, political or economic argument, must not lead us to 
conclude that such questions are unanswerable or, worse, that it is not the place of lawyers to 
speculate on them.
9.2 Unanswered questions
The foregoing chapters have covered much ground. The specific focus has been the law’s 
response to the misapplication of assets. However, examination of the failings of orthodox analyses 
of the law in this area and the development of an alternative, principled approach, has also led us to 
address certain broader themes and controversies. These have included the role of classification in 
law and the basis upon which we can usefully categorise claims, the place of concepts in legal 
reasoning, the nature of legal “rights” and the soundness o f dividing personal rights from 
proprietary. Many questions, however, remain outstanding.
The position advanced here is that claims should lie in respect o f misapplied assets where 
and to the extent that the claimant has an interest in exclusively determining their disposition.
9 See too Waddams, ibid., p. 222.
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However, no justification has been offered of private property, and hence of the law’s recognition 
of such interests. Similarly, little has been said as to the limits o f such interests. As can be seen 
from cases such as Victoria Park Racing,10 the exclusivity of proprietary interests will usually not 
be absolute, and the availability of claims against those who have received, used or benefited from 
use of one’s asset will turn on whether such uses of or benefits derived from an asset are among 
those exclusively reserved for the claimant. The answers to these questions, however, fall beyond 
the scope of this thesis and must be sought elsewhere.
I have also offered no account of the historical development of the law in this area and 
hence any explanation as to the why we may have ended up with the current divergence of response 
to a single issue. I am well aware that some have decried those who criticise the law without 
examination o f what led the courts to adopt such rules in the first place.11 I disagree. While history 
may tell us why these rules were developed, and so may give an insight into what the courts 
considered the principles underlying them to be, the key question is to ask whether the law is 
justifiable, and that involves asking what principles, here and now, apply to such cases and whether 
they can be squared with the rules we have in place. History is no substitute for substantive moral, 
political, economic argument.
Accordingly, I shall say nothing on the question of why the law has ended up with such a 
varied and haphazard set of rules in this area, save to note briefly one possible and interesting 
answer which is hinted at in a recent essay by Lionel Smith.12 Smith observes that “unjust 
enrichment” appears to serve a “corrective role”, putting right failings o f or filling in gaps left by 
other areas of the law.13 On this approach, many of the claims commonly grouped together under 
the heading “unjust enrichment” are corrective of and provide a gloss on the rules on property 
transfers, notable the rules on the passing of title.14 So, we may view the rules on the location of 
title to misapplied assets, including the bona fide purchase rule and the various exceptions to nemo 
dat, as providing a basic regime aimed at protecting and ordering the interests of owners whose 
assets have been misapplied and those who have subsequently received such assets. These rules 
have then been supplemented, and (some of) their imperfections ironed out, by the introduction of
10 Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Company Ltd. v. Taylor (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479; examined in 
chapter 3, text to nn. 33-38.
11 See, e.g., W. Gummow, “Conclusion” in S. Degeling and J. Edelman, Equity in Commercial Law (Law 
Book Company, 2005), at p. 515. My only point of agreement with Gummow is in his criticism of those too 
readily move from a conclusion that the law should be X to statements that the law is X. It should be plain 
that I have not argued that my analysis of the claims following a misapplication of assets set down in chapters 
5 to 7 is an account of what the law is.
12 L. Smith, “Property, Subsidiarity and Unjust Enrichment”, ch. 21 of D. Johnston and R. Zimmermann 
(eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
13 Ibid., pp. 610-622.
14 Smith goes further and sees unjust enrichment as also serving a corrective function in relation to contract 
and wrongs. This may be true of other aspects of unjust enrichment as conventionally understood, but not, I 
think, of the claims we have been examining here.
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personal claims to recover the asset’s value, the creation of new equitable titles, and the defence of 
change of position.
The analogy Smith draws is with the way equity was developed to correct the common law 
where the latter was considered to be defective. And just as the dualism between common law and 
equity meant that, though many of the inadequacies o f the common law were remedied, 
inconsistencies sometimes remained,15 so this view may allow us both to say (contrary to most 
unjust enrichment lawyers) that, whether or not title is held to pass, the law is concerned with the 
same basic problem, and, at the same time, to explain why the law has ended up with a variety of 
diverse and seemingly mutually incompatible responses to this problem.
As a final remark, the position taken here on the classification o f private law and on how 
the material likeness or dissimilarity of cases if  to be determined has significance beyond the 
analysis of claims following defective transfers. I believe the rejection of Birks’ event-based 
taxonomy and its replacement by a inquiry into the principles underlying claims would aid us 
greatly in our understanding o f the law and our resolution of a number of well-known problem 
areas.16 These are, however, questions for another time.
15 See generally S. Worthington, Equity (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 2006).
16 Examples would include the proper measure of damages, and more generally the forms of response, where 
there has been a breach of contract; the focus of awards in estoppel claims; the basis and incidence of 
negligence claims for pure economic loss; the interaction of and relationship between law and equity.
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